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ABSTRACT 
The recent U.S. subprime mortgage crisis rapidly spread throughout the 
world and put the global financial system under extraordinary pressure. The main 
implication of the recent crisis is that complex banking regulations failed to 
adequately identify and limit riskiness of banking systems at both domestic and 
international levels. In spite of a large empirical literature on the causes and remedies 
of the recent crisis, there remains substantial uncertainty on (i) how risk measuring 
models performed during crisis, (ii) how systematic factors such as house prices 
affected the financial system, and (iii) how effectively government policy responses 
resolved the financial crisis. This thesis seeks to narrow this gap in the literature by 
offering three empirical essays.  
The first essay investigates the performance of alternative parametric VaR 
models in forecasting riskiness of international equity portfolios. Notably, alternative 
univariate VaR models are compared to multivariate conditional volatility models 
with special focus given to conditional correlation models. Conditional correlation 
models include the constant conditional correlation (CCC), dynamic conditional 
correlation (DCC), and asymmetric DCC (ADCC) models. Various criteria are then 
applied for backtesting VaR models and to evaluate their one-day-ahead forecasting 
ability in a wide range of countries and during different global financial conditions. 
It is found that most VaR models have satisfactory performance with small number 
of violations during pre-crisis period. However, the number of violations, mean 
deviation of violations, and maximum deviation of violations dramatically increase 
during crisis period. Furthermore, portfolio models incur lower number of violations 
compared to univariate models while DCC and ADCC models perform better than 
CCC models during crisis period. From risk management perspective, most single 
index models fail to pass Basel criteria for internal VaR models during crisis period, 
whereas empirical evidence on the choice between CCC, DCC, and ADCC models is 
mixed. 
The recent crisis also raised serious concerns about factors that can 
systematically destabilise the whole banking system. In particular, the collapse of 
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house prices in the United States triggered the recent subprime mortgage crisis, 
which was associated with a sharp increase in the number of nonperforming loans 
and bank failures. This in turn demonstrates the key role that house prices play in 
systematically undermining the whole banking system.  
The second essay investigates the determinants of nonperforming loans 
(NPL) with a special focus on house price fluctuations as a key systematic factor. 
Using a panel of U.S. banking institutions from 1999 to 2012, the analysis is carried 
out across different loan categories, different types of banks, and different bank size. 
It is found that house price fluctuations have a significant impact on the evolution of 
nonperforming loans, while the magnitude of their impact varies across loan 
categories, institution types, and between large and small banks. Also, the impact of 
house price fluctuations on nonperforming loans is more pronounced during crisis 
period. 
The last essay of this thesis investigates the effectiveness of the U.S. 
government strategy to combat the crisis. As a comprehensive response to the recent 
financial crisis, the US government created the Troubled Asset Relief Program 
(TARP). The Capital Purchase Program (CPP) was launched as an initial program 
under the TARP. The CPP was designed to purchase preferred stocks or equity 
warrants from viable financial institutions. Using a large panel of the U.S. 
commercial banks over the period 2007Q1 to 2012Q4, survival analysis is used to 
investigate the impact of TARP funds on the likelihood of survival in the recipient 
banks. It is found that larger recipient banks are more likely to avoid regulatory 
closure, while receiving capital assistance does not effectively help banks to avoid 
technical failure. This implies that governmental capital assistance serves larger 
banks much better than their smaller counterparts. In addition, TARP recipients are 
more likely to be acquired, regardless of their size and financial health. In summary, 
the empirical findings reveal that capital infusions do not enhance the survival 
likelihood of the recipient banking institutions.  
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1. CHAPTER ONE 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 Banking crises, as a distinct subset of financial crises, are often associated with 
bank runs, banking panics, and systemic banking crises. Many countries around the 
world have experienced various episodes of banking crises throughout the history. In 
particular, the last two decades of the 20
th
 century witnessed an unprecedented increase 
in the number of systemic banking crises including the U.S. savings and loan crisis of 
the 1980s, the Asian currency and banking crisis of 1997, and a number of crises in the 
Nordic countries in the early 1990s.
1
 A systemic banking crisis features with a sharp 
increase in the number of defaults and bank failures, which in turn can generate a large 
disruption of the economic activities and lead an economy into deep recession. One 
particularity of the systemic banking crises is that they often begin with an initial failure 
which triggers further failures in a banking system through externalities and spillover 
effects. In addition, due to globalisation of financial markets, some systemic banking 
crises have quickly spread to other countries through contagion (see Mendoza and 
Quadrini, 2010; Kaminsky and Reinhart, 2000; Calvo and Mendoza, 2000).  
In response to these distressing events, researchers and financial regulators paid 
increasing attention to understand the causes of systemic banking crises and provide 
better supervisory practices in order to enhance banking stability. Accordingly, banking 
stability literature expanded in two broad directions. One line of research focused on 
factors that undermine stability of individual banks. In particular, various frameworks 
were proposed to assess the stability and predict bank failures by accounting for both 
systematic and idiosyncratic factors (see, e.g., Wheelock and Wilson, 2000; Tam and 
Kiang, 1992; DeYoung, 2003, among others). Another line of banking stability 
literature focused on measuring the state of the economy to design an early warning 
                                                 
1 For an overview of major systemic banking crises in the past, see Caprio and Klingebiel (2003), Laeven 
and Valencia (2008), and Reinhart and Rogoff (2009). 
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system to predict systemic banking crisis and provide better macro-prudential 
regulations (see, e.g., Demirgüc-Kunt and Detragiache, 2005; Kaminsky and Reinhart, 
1999; Davis and Karim, 2008, among others).  
Parallel to the banking stability literature, banking regulations evolved 
enormously to avoid likewise crises. Indeed, the regulatory framework within each 
banking sector gradually developed as a set of accumulated responses to a long history 
of distressing events, including crises and scandals in that sector. However, in line with 
globalisation of financial markets, many large banks gradually spread their activities to 
other countries around the world. This in turn prompted calls for international 
coordination of banking regulations to ensure the safety and stability of international 
banks which pose significant risks to other banking sectors (Kapstein, 1989). 
Eventually, the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS) established the most 
comprehensive international regulatory framework by announcing the Basel Capital 
Accord, known as Basel I Accord in 1988.  
In general, the main function behind most depository institutions is to accept 
deposits from individuals and efficiently allocate the deposited money to prosperous 
and high-yielding investment projects. In this context, banks often direct depositors’ 
savings to two broad types of investment: (i) making loan and benefit from interest rate 
spread and (ii) trading activities. Accordingly, depository institutions are exposed to two 
primary sources of financial risks, namely credit risk and market risk. The BCBS (1988) 
set minimum capital requirement as a central tool to address credit risk as the main risk 
faced by banking institutions. In 1996, the BCBS amended the original capital accord of 
1988 and introduced a parallel capital requirement framework to calculate market risk, 
thereby taking both major banking risks into account (see BCBS, 1996a).  
Despite all these advances in the literature and banking regulations, in late 
2000s, the U.S. economy witnessed a severe banking crisis which is considered as the 
worst banking crises since the Great Depression of the 1930s. The recent crisis, also 
known as the global financial crisis, originated with the U.S. subprime mortgage crisis, 
which rapidly spread throughout the world and put the global financial system under 
extraordinary pressure (Longstaff, 2010; Eichengreen et al., 2012; Bekaert et al., 2011). 
One implication of the recent crisis is that all these complex banking regulations failed 
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to adequately identify and limit riskiness of the banking systems at both the domestic 
and international levels.  
The global financial crisis triggered a spike of banking and corporate failures, 
large declines in asset prices, and adverse movements of key economic indicators in 
many countries around the world. These distressing episodes have provided renewed 
impetus for understanding the key drivers of the recent banking crisis in order to 
determine how banking stability can be achieved. It is, therefore, not surprising that a 
tremendous number of studies have focused on reinvestigating the regulatory and risk 
management practices over the last few years (see, e.g., Dell'Ariccia et al., 2012; 
Brunnermeier, 2009; Ivashina and Scharfstein, 2010, among others). It is argued that 
although market innovations played a key role in the run-up to the subprime crisis, the 
drivers of this crisis, in many respects, were similar to those of previous banking crises, 
(see Reinhart and Rogoff, 2008). In particular, just like many previous banking crises, 
the recent crisis was associated with a boom-bust cycle in asset prices (Borio and Lowe, 
2002; Hartmann et al., 2004), procyclical lending behaviour and credit rating in the 
banking system (Borio et al., 2001; Amato and Furfine, 2004; Alp, 2013), and excessive 
risk taking incentives by bank managers (Demirgüc-Kunt and Detragiache, 1998; 
Acharya and Naqvi, 2012).  
Furthermore, following the global financial crisis, many governments around the 
world established a broad range of immediate policy actions to combat crisis and restore 
economic growth. Specifically, in a quick response, the Federal Reserve lowered the 
federal funds target in the United States to resolve the financial crisis (see Afonso et al., 
2011; Cecchetti, 2009). Over the course of time, however, the financial turbulence 
intensified while the room for monetary policy tools was limited. Therefore, the U.S. 
government went beyond monetary policy measures and enacted large fiscal stimulus 
packages to support aggregate demand and restore confidence (see Freedman et al., 
2010; Cwik and Wieland, 2011; Spilimbergo, 2009).  
In addition, the U.S. government deployed a number of alternative policy 
measures against liquidity crisis in financial institutions and financial markets. The 
Federal Reserve, on one hand, implemented a broad range of programs to support the 
liquidity of credit markets. One set of these tools was designed to lend short-term 
4 
 
liquidity to financial institutions, which was associated with the traditional role of the 
Federal Reserve as the lender of last resort (see Wu, 2011; Fleming et al., 2010).
2
 A 
second set of these tools involved providing liquidity directly to key non-bank credit 
markets which play critical roles in liquidity provision in the United States (see 
Duygan-Bump et al., 2013; Covitz et al., 2013; Campbell et al., 2011).
3
 Finally, the 
third set of tools was designed to purchase longer-term securities to support stability and 
functioning of the U.S. credit markets.  
Parallel to the Federal Reserve, the Department of the Treasury was authorised 
to establish the Troubled Asset Relief Program, known as TARP, to either purchase or 
insure up to $700 billion of troubled mortgage-related assets of financial institutions in 
order to clean up their balance sheets, enhance market liquidity and stabilise housing 
and financial markets. As an initial program under TARP, the Treasury launched Capital 
Purchase Program (CPP) was designed to purchase up to $250 billion of preferred 
stocks and equity warrants from viable banking institutions. TARP is considered as the 
largest ever government intervention in the banking sector. Although TARP may appear 
as successful plan, the effectiveness of TARP and CPP has been challenged by a number 
of studies. In particular, selection bias in choosing qualifying institutions, lack of 
efficient monitoring and supervision on reinvestment strategy of recipient institutions, 
and increased riskiness of supported banks have been suggested as the main drawbacks 
of TARP and CPP (see, e.g., Veronesi and Zingales, 2010; Duchin and Sosyura, 2012; 
Farruggio et al., 2013, among others). 
 Looking beyond the immediate challenges, the recent financial crisis has 
underlined the essential need for reinvestigations and reforms in at least three areas. 
These include the adequacy and reliability of current risk measurement approaches; the 
assessment of the key drivers of systemic risk in the financial industry; and designing 
                                                 
2
 This set of programs includes Term Auction Facility (TAF), Term Securities Lending Facility (TSLF), 
Primary Dealer Credit Facility (PDCF) as well as the traditional discount window.  
3
This set of tools includes Commercial Paper Funding Facility (CPFF), Asset-Backed Commercial Paper 
Money Market Mutual Fund Liquidity Facility (AMLF), Term Asset-Backed Securities Loan Facility 
(TALF), and Money Market Investor Funding Facility (MMIFF).   
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better instruments of intervention for governments to restore stability during periods of 
financial crises.  
This thesis follows this line of research and includes three empirical chapters. 
Specifically, the first essay investigates the performance of alternative parametric Value 
at Risk (VaR) models in forecasting VaR thresholds of international equity portfolios 
based on two approaches: the univariate approach and multivariate approach. The 
second essay focuses on the role of house price fluctuations as a key macroeconomic 
driver of systemic risk in the banking sector. Notably, the impact of house price 
fluctuations on the evolution of nonperforming loans in banking institutions is 
investigated by using dynamic panel models. Finally, survival analysis is employed in 
the third essay to examine the effectiveness of capital infusion programs as reliable 
instruments to restore banking stability during periods of financial crisis. Below an 
outline of the thesis is given. 
Chapter 2 examines the performance of alternative parametric models in 
forecasting one-day-ahead VaR thresholds of international equity portfolios during pre-
crisis and crisis period. Over the last two decades, many large banking institutions have 
become substantially involved in market-based activities (Laeven et al. , 2014). Due to 
deregulations, technological advances, and globalisations of financial markets, many 
large banks have expanded their portfolios across the world to benefit from portfolio 
diversifications and potentially higher rates of return. Such banks have received 
substantial attention from international regulatory bodies including the BCBS because 
of posing significant systemic risk to financial sectors of countries they operate in.  
One of the main risks addressed by the BCBS is market risk, which is the risk of 
adverse movements in the value of a market portfolio. In 1996, the BCBS proposed 
adoption of VaR as a measure of the market risk of a portfolio (see BCBS, 1996a). VaR 
is defined as a maximum expected loss for a portfolio over a given time horizon and at a 
certain confidence level.
4
 To measure daily VaR of market portfolios, banks can either 
use the standardized approach proposed by the BCBS (1996a) or develop their internal 
VaR models. Since required capital of the standardized model is relatively high, banks 
often prefer to use their internal VaR models. In this case, the amount of capital 
                                                 
4
 For a detailed discussion of VaR models, see Jorion (2007), Alexander (2009), and Dowd (2005). 
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requirement for market risk depends upon the backtesting results of internal models in 
forecasting VaR thresholds. If an internal model performs poorly, it either imposes high 
capital charges or fails the backtesting test, which questions reliability of risk modelling 
in a bank. Therefore, developing a well-performing VaR model is an essential need for 
banks. 
Following the increasing demand for a superior VaR framework, many VaR 
models have been proposed.
5
 Alternative VaR models widely vary in terms of 
parsimony, accuracy, and their imposing regulatory capital charges. The most popular 
category of VaR models include parametric models that have been substantially 
extended after the introduction of autoregressive conditional heteroskedasticity (ARCH) 
model by Engle (1982) and the generalized ARCH (GARCH) model by Bollerslev 
(1986). Specifically, parametric models have been developed in both univariate and 
multivariate directions. The GJR-GARCH model of Glosten et al. (1993), EGARCH 
model of Nelson (1991), and APARCH model of Ding et al. (1993) in the univariate 
framework and Constant Conditional Correlation (CCC) model of Bollerslev (1990), 
Dynamic Conditional Correlation (DCC) model of Engle (2002), and asymmetric 
dynamic conditional correlation (ADCC) model of Cappiello et al. (2006) in the 
multivariate framework can be considered as the most significant contributions to this 
line of literature. 
This chapter empirically investigates the performance of alternative univariate 
and multivariate models in forecasting VaR thresholds of international equity portfolios. 
An international equity portfolio is exposed to two main risk factors: equity risk and 
foreign exchange rate risk. Accordingly, a risk manager can apply two broad approaches 
to calculate aggregate portfolio VaR using parametric models. The first approach is to 
consider the whole portfolio as a single asset and apply univariate parametric models on 
portfolio returns, while the second approach is to apply multivariate models on 
                                                 
5 In general VaR models can be divided into three main categories: (i) parametric methods that estimate 
portfolio VaR by making assumption about the distribution of portfolio returns, (ii) nonparametric 
methods that estimate portfolio VaR based on portfolio’s historical returns but without making any 
assumption about the distribution of returns, and (iii) semi-parametric methods that combine 
nonparametric methods with parametric methods in order to avoid some shortcomings of parametric and 
nonparametric methods. 
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historical return series of portfolio assets or risk components. In Chapter 2 various 
criteria for backtesting VaR models are considered and their one-day-ahead forecasting 
ability is compared for several countries and under different global financial conditions.    
Chapter 2 makes several contributions to the existing literature. First, most 
previous studies, including Kuester et al. (2006) and Mancini and Trojani (2011), have 
focused on investigating the performance of alternative univariate VaR models, while 
much less is known about forecasting ability of multivariate VaR models. Furthermore, 
few studies that compare forecasting performance of univariate and multivariate VaR 
models have produced conflicting empirical results (see, e.g., Brooks and Persand, 
2003; Santos et al., 2012; McAleer and Da Viega, 2008, among others). Second, most 
previous studies have focused on investigating performance of VaR models in similar 
assets such as stock indices of developed countries (see, for instance, Sener et al., 2013; 
Taylor, 2008). However, stock markets around the world widely vary in terms of 
volume of transactions, number of investors, the level of government intervention, and 
interrelation with other stock markets. This chapter aims to investigate if VaR models 
have consistent performance in a wide range of countries. In particular, this chapter is 
among the first studies that investigates the performance of alternative VaR models in 
forecasting aggregate VaR of international equity portfolios. Finally, performance of 
alternative VaR models may vary along time and financial conditions, which has been 
less investigated in previous studies. This chapter aims to narrow this gap by examining 
forecasting ability of VaR models over crisis period and non-crisis period in accordance 
with the recent global financial crisis.  
The empirical results of Chapter 2 reveal that most VaR models have 
satisfactory performance with small number of violations during pre-crisis period, while 
the number of violations, mean deviation of violations, and maximum deviation of 
violations dramatically increase during crisis period. Furthermore, portfolio models 
incur lower number of violations compared to univariate models, while DCC and 
ADCC models perform better than CCC models during crisis period. From risk 
management perspective, most univariate models fail to pass Basel criteria for internal 
VaR models during crisis period, whereas empirical evidence on the choice between 
CCC, DCC, and ADCC models is mixed. 
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Chapter 3 investigates the determinants of nonperforming loans (NPL) with a 
special focus on house price fluctuations. The collapse of real estate bubble in the 
United States triggered the recent financial crisis, which had widespread economic and 
financial ramifications. In particular, the U.S. banking institutions suffered from a sharp 
increase in their nonperforming loans, while they had a marked contribution to the 
creation of house price bubble through their lending behaviour in the pre-crisis period. 
This demonstrates the key role that house prices play in systemically destabilising the 
entire banking system. It is argued that house prices largely affect the performance of 
loan portfolios as (i) real estate loans usually form a large portion of a bank’s aggregate 
loan portfolio, (ii) real estate assets are widely used as collateral for other loan 
categories to secure the loan repayments (see e.g. Goodhart and Hofmann, 2008; Davis 
and Zhu, 2009). Using a large panel of the insured U.S. banks, Chapter 3 employs 
dynamic panel data models to empirically investigate the impact of house price 
fluctuations on the evolution of nonperforming loans over three periods; the pre-crisis 
period of 1999-2005, the crisis period of 2006-2012, and full sample period of 1999-
2012. The analysis is further developed by examining how this relationship varies 
across different loan categories, different types of banking institutions, and different 
bank size. 
Chapter 3 complements the existing literature in several ways. First, this chapter 
is among few studies that empirically examines the impact of house prices on the 
quality of loan portfolios at bank-level. Most previous studies have focused on the role 
of house prices in undermining the banking system as a whole, and far less is known 
about the impact of house price fluctuations on individual banks (see, e.g., Reinhart and 
Rogoff, 2008; Reinhart and Rogoff, 2009; Barrell et al., 2010). Second, this chapter 
constitutes a first attempt to investigate how different loan categories are affected by 
house price developments. This is of crucial importance as the composition of loan 
portfolios widely varies across banks (see, e.g., Louzis et al., 2012). Third, differences 
in the mission and institutional structure of different types of banks may lead to 
potential differences in the dynamics of nonperforming loans of these banks (see, e.g., 
Salas and Saurina, 2002). This chapter is an attempt to narrow this gap by examining 
the linkage between house prices and quality of loan portfolios in different types of 
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banks. Fourth, risk taking incentives and lending strategies of banks depend upon their 
size and complexity (see, e.g., Tabak et al., 2011; De Haan and Poghosyan, 2012). This 
study is among the first studies that examines if larger banks are more vulnerable to 
swings in house prices, compared to smaller banks. Finally, while dynamics of house 
prices widely vary both over time and across geographical regions (see Holly et al., 
2010), the impact of time and regional variations in house prices on the evolution of 
credit risk has been largely neglected by the literature. Chapter 3 aims to narrow this 
gap.  
The empirical findings of Chapter 3 suggest that nonperforming loans across US 
banks can be explained by a mixture of idiosyncratic and systematic factors used in this 
study. Notably, a strong negative linkage between house price fluctuations and NPL is 
detected, i.e., falling house prices are tightly linked to rising NPL levels. Also, the 
impact of house price fluctuations on nonperforming loans is more pronounced during 
crisis period, indicating that the linkage between house prices and credit risk is 
asymmetric. Regarding the loan categories, it is found that the impact of house price 
fluctuations widely vary across different loan categories, with real estate loans being the 
most responsive loan category. Furthermore, it is found that commercial banks are more 
affected by adverse house price fluctuations, compared to savings institutions. Finally, 
the empirical findings suggest that falling house prices have greater impact on the 
evolution of NPL in large banks during crisis period.  
Chapter 4 investigates the impact of TARP funds on the likelihood of survival 
in recipient banking institutions. The recent subprime mortgage crisis triggered a severe 
liquidity crisis in the U.S. financial system, which eventually culminated in a series of 
unprecedented events in September 2008.  As a comprehensive response, the U.S. 
government created TARP to bailout the US financial system and restart the economy. 
The CPP was launched as an initial program under TARP to purchase preferred stock 
and equity warrants from qualified banking institutions to help them survive and 
stimulate lending activities. Over the course of the CPP, 707 financial institutions, in 48 
states, received approximately $205 billion as CPP investments. This largest ever 
government intervention in the banking sector has raised questions regarding the 
effectiveness of emergency capital injections as reliable instruments to restore banking 
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stability during periods of financial crisis. Accordingly, government bailout literature 
has been substantially expanded, while there is no consensus in the literature on how 
efficiently bank recapitalisation works (see, e.g., Diamond and Rajan, 2005; Bayazitova 
and Shivdasani, 2012; Mehran and Thakor, 2011; Hoshi and Kashyap, 2010, among 
others). Using a panel of the US commercial banks over the period 2007Q1 to 2012Q4, 
the Cox (1972) proportional hazard model is applied in this chapter to investigate the 
impact of receiving capital assistance on two different types of bank exits; exit due to 
regulatory closure and exit due to acquisition.  This analysis is further developed by 
examining how this relationship varies across large and small recipient banks. 
The main contributions of Chapter 4 to the existing literature are as follows: 
First, this study is among the first studies that examines the impact of governmental 
capital assistance on failure and acquisition of recipient banks. Previous TARP studies 
mainly focus on financial health of TARP banks throughout the program (see, e.g., 
Duchin and Sosyura, 2012; Bayazitova and Shivdasani, 2012, Wilson and Wu, 2012, 
among others) or the stock price performance of CPP recipients in response to various 
TARP events (see, e.g., Veronesi and Zingales, 2010; Kim and Stock, 2012; Liu et al., 
2013; Farruggio et al., 2013). Second, this study focuses on the performance of TARP 
recipients at bank-level, while most previous TARP studies analyse the at bank holding 
level. Finally, most recent studies on banking stability, including Cole and White (2012) 
and Berger and Bouwman (2013), focus only on bank failure, while factors affecting 
probability and timing of bank acquisition have been widely neglected. This study aims 
to narrow this gap.  
The empirical results in Chapter 4 reveal that larger recipient banks are more 
likely to avoid regulatory closure, while receiving capital assistance does not effectively 
help recipient banks to avoid technical insolvency. These findings suggest that 
governmental capital assistance serves larger banks much better than their smaller 
counterparts. Also, TARP recipients are more likely to be acquired, regardless of their 
size and financial health. Overall, the empirical findings of Chapter 4 suggest that 
receiving governmental capital assistance do not enhance the survival likelihood of 
recipient banks. 
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Chapter 5 summarises the main findings of this thesis and offers some 
suggestions regarding policy implications. It also identifies and discusses the main 
limitations of this thesis while making suggestions for future research in ways beyond 
the current scope of this thesis.  
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2. CHAPTER TWO 
EVALUATING MARKET RISK OF 
INTERNATIONAL EQUITY PORTFOLIOS 
 
2.1. INTRODUCTION 
The main function behind most depository institutions is to borrow funds from 
external sources and reinvest those funds. While lending activities have been the most 
traditional reinvestment strategy, many large banks have become substantially involved 
in market-based activities as an alternative strategy (see Berkowitz and O’Brien, 2002; 
Laeven et al., 2014). This indicates that in addition to credit risk, many large banks have 
become highly exposed to market risk.  
Furthermore, due to deregulations, technological advances, and globalisations of 
financial markets, many large banks have expanded their portfolios across the world to 
benefit from portfolio diversification and potentially higher rates of return. Indeed, these 
large banks pose significant systematic threat to the stability of financial markets they 
operate in. In response to growing calls for supervisory treatment of risks in large 
international banks, the Basel committee on banking supervision (BCBS) established 
the most comprehensive international regulatory framework by publishing Basel I 
Accord in 1988 (see BCBS, 1988). This framework has been amended several times to 
set minimum capital requirements for major sources of risks in banking institutions (see 
BCBS, 1995; BCBS, 1996a; BCBS, 2009).   
One of the main risk categories addressed by the Basel Accords is market risk, 
which is the risk of adverse movements in the value of a portfolio due to market risk 
factors, including equity risk, commodity risk, foreign exchange rate risk, and interest 
rate risk. To calculate the market risk exposure, the 1995 amendment to the Basel 
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Accord proposed adoption of Value-at-Risk (VaR) as a measure of the market risk. VaR 
is defined as a maximum expected loss for a portfolio over a given period of time and at 
a certain confidence level (see Jorion, 2007; Alexander, 2009, for a comprehensive 
discussion of VaR).  
Although the concept of VaR is easy and attractive, the estimation of VaR 
threshold can be a very complex task. According to the Basel II Accord, banks can 
either use the BCBS standardised approach or use their internal VaR models to measure 
riskiness of their portfolios. The standardized approach, however, is very conservative 
and imposes excessive capital charges as it does not take into account the diversification 
between different risk factors in a portfolio. For this reason, banks prefer to use their 
internal VaR models to measure market risk. Furthermore, to encourage banks to 
accurately forecast the riskiness of their market portfolios, the BCBS (1996b) provides a 
framework to backtest internal VaR models. Accordingly, higher capital charges are 
imposed on banks with poorly performing internal models. Also, if a bank experiences 
more than 9 violations in a year, it may be asked to either revise its VaR model or use 
the standardized model, which may dramatically damage the bank’s reputation. This in 
turn has motivated some banks to disclose overestimated VaR figures (see Pérignon et 
al., 2008).  
A desirable VaR model needs to concurrently satisfy both regulators and risk 
managers, which is a complex burden. While regulators are primarily interested in the 
number and magnitude of violations, risk managers are more interested in optimising 
and reducing regulatory capital for market risk. It is, therefore, not surprisingly that 
VaR forecasting has held the attention of many researchers and practitioners over the 
last few decades. In particular, a wide variety of alternative methods have been 
proposed to estimate VaR thresholds, indicating that choosing the best model is an 
essential task for financial institutions.
1
 
                                                 
1
 Manganelli and Engle (2001) divide the existent VaR methods into three main categories: (i) parametric 
methods that estimate portfolio VaR by making assumption about the distribution of portfolio returns, (ii) 
nonparametric methods that estimate portfolio VaR based on portfolio’s historical returns but without 
making any assumption about the distribution of returns (The most popular nonparametric approaches are 
historical simulation and Monte Carlo simulation), and (iii) semi-parametric methods that combine 
nonparametric methods with parametric methods in order to avoid some shortcomings of parametric and 
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Following the introduction of the autoregressive conditional heteroskedasticity 
(ARCH) model by Engle (1982) and the generalized ARCH (GARCH) model by 
Bollerslev (1986), many studies, including Glosten et al. (1993) and Nelson (1991), 
have focused on designing various GARCH specifications to forecast volatility in a 
univariate framework. Additionally, some studies have concentrated on modelling 
conditional correlations among risk components in a portfolio to measure portfolio 
riskiness in a multivariate framework.
2
 In a seminal work Bollerslev (1990) proposed 
the Constant Conditional Correlation (CCC) method to measure the conditional 
correlation among portfolio components. This approach was later developed by 
Dynamic Conditional Correlation (DCC) model of Engle (2002) and Tse and Tsui 
(2002), and Asymmetric DCC model of Cappiello et al. (2006).  
Compared to other VaR models, parametric GARCH models have become 
incredibly popular in risk measurement for two key reasons. First, GARCH models are 
able to capture several empirical features of financial return series, such as time-
dependent volatility, clustering and persistence of volatility, and asymmetric response to 
negative and positive shocks of the same magnitude. Second, multivariate GARCH 
models can capture marginal contribution of each asset or risk component to riskiness of 
a portfolio, which is of crucial importance for risk managers. 
An international equity portfolio is composed of two main risk factors: equity 
risk and foreign exchange rate risk. During the recent financial crisis, on the one hand, 
the U.S. dollar was depreciated vis-à-vis most currencies due to the U.S. subprime 
mortgage crisis and potential collapse of the U.S. financial system. On the other hand, 
stock prices in many countries declined dramatically due to the global financial crisis. 
                                                                                                                                               
nonparametric methods. The most popular semi-parametric methods include filtered historical simulation 
(FHS) proposed by Barone-Adesi et al. (1998), volatility-weight historical simulation proposed by Hull 
and White (1998), CaViaR model proposed by Engle and Manganelli (2004), and Extreme Value Theory 
(EVT). Furthermore, recent studies have proposed VaR models based on a combination of models either 
across (see Kuester et al., 2006) or within these categories (see Fuertes and Olmo, 2013). In particular, 
Fuertes and Olmo (2013) propose an optimal combination of two parametric methods, GARCH and 
ARFIMA models, and show that additionally exploiting intra-day information improves the accuracy of 
one-day-ahead VaR forecasts.  
2 Interested readers can refer to Bauwens et al. (2006) and Silvennoinen and Terasvirta (2009) for a 
comprehensive review of multivariate GARCH models. 
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Therefore, many large U.S. banks suffered from significant losses in their international 
equity portfolios. This in turn offers a unique laboratory to assess the forecasting ability 
of quantitative models in measuring riskiness of these portfolios. 
The study at hand investigates the performance of alternative parametric models 
in forecasting VaR thresholds of international equity portfolios. Two main approaches 
are used in this chapter to estimate VaR thresholds. The first approach is to use 
alternative univariate models on a time series of portfolio returns, while the second 
approach is to apply multivariate time series models on historical return series of 
portfolio risk components to estimate aggregate VaR of the portfolio. The analysis is 
carried out on a sample of eight countries and over two subsample periods. 
Subsequently, nine different criteria are employed to evaluate the performance of VaR 
models from both regulatory and risk management perspectives.  
This chapter complements the existing VaR literature in several ways. First, 
most previous studies, including Kuester et al. (2006) and Mancini and Trojani (2011), 
have investigated the performance of univariate VaR models, while much less is known 
about forecasting ability of multivariate VaR models. Also, few studies that compare 
forecasting performance of univariate and multivariate VaR models have produced 
mixed empirical results. Notably, Brooks and Persand (2003) show that additional 
information used in multivariate models do not improve forecasting ability of VaR 
models, while Santos et al. (2012) find that multivariate models are superior to their 
univariate counterparts in VaR forecasting. Furthermore, McAleer and Da Viega (2008) 
show that, compared to multivariate models, univariate models lead to more violations 
and lower regulatory capital requirements. This study attempts to shed more light on the 
forecasting performance of univariate and multivariate VaR models.  
Second, most previous empirical works have examined performance of 
alternative models in estimating VaR thresholds in a specific country or in a group of 
similar countries (see, for instance, Sener et al., 2013; Taylor, 2008). However, stock 
markets around the world widely vary in terms of volume of transactions, number of 
investors, the level of government intervention, and interrelation with other stock 
markets. Thus, it is of paramount importance to investigate the performance of 
alternative VaR models over a broader range of countries before making a general 
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conclusion about forecasting ability of alternative VaR models. With this target in mind, 
four different groups of countries are considered in this study: developed countries, 
industrialized emerging countries, emerging countries, and developing countries. 
Third, large international banks and hedge funds have spread their trading 
activities to stock markets in emerging and less developed countries over the last few 
years. This can be mainly due to higher rate of stock market returns in those countries, 
compared to advanced countries. Therefore, it is of crucial importance to investigate the 
performance of VaR models in forecasting aggregate portfolio risk in emerging and 
developing countries. Although some prior studies, including Gençay and Selçuk (2004) 
and Rossignolo et al. (2012), have investigated equity VaR in emerging markets, the 
author is not aware of any study that considers investment risk of international equity 
portfolios, particularly in a multivariate framework. This chapter aims to fill this gap. 
Finally, performance of alternative VaR models may vary along time and financial 
conditions, which has been less investigated in previous studies. To examine this 
important feature, this chapter examines forecasting ability of VaR models over crisis 
period and non-crisis period in accordance with the recent global financial crisis.  
In a nutshell, the empirical results reveal that most VaR models have satisfactory 
performance with small number of violations during pre-crisis period, while the number 
of violations, mean deviation of violations, and maximum deviation of violations 
dramatically increase during crisis period. Furthermore, one of the major drawbacks of 
most VaR models, univariate models in particular, is that they produce more than 9 
violations in 250 days during crisis period. Compared to univariate models, however, 
portfolio models exhibit better performance with lower number of violations during 
crisis period. Nonetheless, portfolio models produce slightly higher regulatory capital 
requirements and weaker goodness of fit. In Addition, the empirical results on the 
choice between alternative multivariate models are mixed.  
The remainder of this chapter is structured as follows. Section 2.2 describes the 
methodology and econometric framework used in this study. Section 2.3 presents the 
data and empirical results and forecasting performance of alternative VaR models are 
discussed in Section 2.4. Finally, Section 2.5 presents the main conclusions of this 
chapter. 
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2.2. METHODOLOGY 
The information set needed to estimate one-day-ahead VaR thresholds is one of 
the most critical decisions that risk managers have to make. Obviously the simplest 
choice in this respect is to use historical daily returns based on closing prices. Although 
using daily returns has been a common practice in the forecasting literature, some recent 
studies, including Fuertes et al. (2009), Fuertes and Olmo (2013), and Louzis et al. 
(2014), advocate the use of additional high-frequency intraday information to forecast 
one-day-ahead VaR more accurately. Also, Fuertes et al. (2014) advocate the use of 
daily trading volume, intraday returns and overnight returns to obtain better VaR 
estimates. In this chapter, however, only returns based on daily closing prices are used 
due to data constraints.  
This study investigates the performance of alternative parametric VaR models in 
measuring the riskiness of international equity portfolios. There are two possible 
approaches for risk managers to estimate VaR threshold of such portfolios. The first 
approach is to measure portfolio VaR by estimating univariate parametric models based 
on historical portfolio returns. However, financial portfolios are usually exposed to 
different risk factors such as equity risk, exchange rate risk, interest rate risk, 
commodity risk and credit spread risk. Therefore, the aggregate VaR figure for large 
and complex portfolios is not very informative, and risk managers tend to map their 
portfolios into the risk factors. Accordingly, the aggregate VaR of a portfolio is 
disaggregated into risk components and the contribution of each risk factor to the 
aggregate VaR figure is estimated. Disaggregating the aggregate VaR of a portfolio into 
risk factor VaR provides an essential tool for portfolio managers to decide whether to 
hedge or change their positions on different risk factors in order to achieve the optimal 
capital allocation. 
To disaggregate the portfolio VaR, this study assumes that the portfolio under 
consideration is static over the risk horizon, meaning that portfolio holdings in each risk 
component are held constant. Given that the portfolio is composed of m risk 
components, the portfolio value at time t is given by  
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𝑃𝑡 = ∑ 𝑛𝑖𝑝𝑖𝑡
𝑚
𝑖=1
, (2.1) 
where 𝑝𝑖𝑡 is the price of the 𝑖
𝑡ℎ risk component at time t and 𝑛𝑖 is the number of units of 
the 𝑖𝑡ℎ risk factor in the portfolio. Accordingly, risk factor sensitivity of the 𝑖𝑡ℎ risk 
factor at time t can be defined as  
 
𝜃𝑖𝑡 =
𝑛𝑖𝑝𝑖𝑡
𝑃𝑡
 . (2.2) 
This indicates that risk factor sensitivities vary with time and when the price of 
each risk factor changes. Therefore, total systemic return of a portfolio over the holding 
time is given by 
 
𝑟𝑝𝑡 = ∑𝜃𝑖𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑡
𝑚
𝑖=1
= 𝜽𝑡
′𝒓𝒕, 
(2.3) 
where 𝑟𝑖𝑡 is the return of 𝑖
𝑡ℎ  risk factor over the holding period and  𝜃𝑖𝑡 is portfolio 
sensitivity to the 𝑖𝑡ℎ risk factor. Thus, the expected portfolio return at time t is 
 
𝐸(𝑟𝑝𝑡|𝐼𝑡−1) = 𝜽𝑡
′𝝁𝒕, 
(2.4) 
where 𝐼𝑡−1 is the information set up to time 𝑡 − 1 and  𝝁𝒕 = [𝐸(𝑟1,𝑡),… , 𝐸(𝑟𝑚,𝑡)] is the 
vector of conditional expected returns for each risk factor over the risk horizon. 
Similarly, the variance of portfolio return at time t is 
 
𝑉𝑎𝑟(𝑟𝑝𝑡|𝐼𝑡−1) = 𝜽𝒕
′𝜴𝒕𝜽𝒕, 
(2.5) 
where 𝜴𝒕 is the time varying conditional covariance matrix of portfolio risk factor 
returns, which is defined as  
 
𝜴𝒕 = 𝐸(𝒓𝒕𝒓𝒕
′) = (
Var(r1) … Cov(r1, rm)
⋮ ⋱ ⋮
Cov(r1, rm) … Var(rm)
). (2.6) 
This covariance matrix can be decomposed into separate variance and 
correlation matrices as follows  
19 
 
 
𝜴𝒕 = 𝑫𝒕𝑹𝒕𝑫𝒕, 
(2.7) 
where 𝐃𝒕 is a diagonal matrix of conditional variances defined as   
 
𝐃𝒕 = diag{√𝜎𝑖,𝑡} =
[
 
 
 
𝜎1,𝑡 0 ⋯ 0
0 𝜎2,𝑡 ⋯ 0
⋮ ⋮ ⋱ ⋮
0 0 ⋯ 𝜎𝑚,𝑡]
 
 
 
, (2.8) 
and 𝐑𝒕 is a symmetric 𝑚 × 𝑚 conditional correlation matrix specified as  
 
𝐑𝒕 =
[
 
 
 
1 𝜌12,𝑡 ⋯ 𝜌1𝑚,𝑡
𝜌21,𝑡 1 ⋯ 𝜌2𝑚,𝑡
⋮ ⋮ ⋱ ⋮
𝜌𝑚1,𝑡 𝜌𝑚2,𝑡 ⋯ 1 ]
 
 
 
, (2.9) 
where 𝜎𝑖,𝑡 is the conditional volatility of the 𝑖
𝑡ℎ risk factor and 𝜌𝑖𝑗,𝑡 is the conditional 
pair-wise correlation of the 𝑖𝑗𝑡ℎ risk factors. In this context, various parameterizations 
for multivariate time series models have been developed to measure the conditional 
mean and conditional covariance matrix of a portfolio.
3
 The rest of this section presents 
various parameterizations used in this study for estimation of portfolio VaR based on 
conditional mean, conditional volatility, and conditional correlations of portfolio 
components. 
2.2.1. Conditional mean models 
The conditional mean of a given return time series can be modelled by an 
𝐴𝑅𝑀𝐴(𝑝, 𝑞) process given by 
                                                 
3 There are two approaches to model conditional covariance matrix 𝜴𝒕: The first approach is to model 𝜴𝒕 
directly through BEKK model proposed by Engle and Kroner (1995), while the second approach is to 
model 𝜴𝒕 indirectly via modelling 𝑹𝑡 by using alternative conditional correlation models. Using the first 
approach, however, may be less appealing in risk management due to the archetypal "curse of 
dimensionality" highlighted by Caporin and McAleer (2012). Therefore, only the second approach is 
considered in this study. 
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𝛹(𝐿)𝑟𝑡 = 𝑐 + 𝛱(𝐿)𝜀𝑡, 
(2.10) 
where L is the lag operator; 𝛹(𝐿) = 1 − 𝛹1𝐿 − ⋯− 𝛹𝑝𝐿
𝑝 and 𝛱(𝐿) = 1 − 𝛱1𝐿 − ⋯−
𝛱𝑞𝐿
𝑞 are polynomials in L; and 𝜀𝑡 is the disturbance process representing the market 
shocks that are distributed with mean 0 and 𝜎𝑡 standard deviation. One main challenge 
in fitting an 𝐴𝑅𝑀𝐴(𝑝, 𝑞) process is to find appropriate values for p and q so to remove 
the serial autocorrelation. In this context, however, it’s a common practice to model 
daily financial return series by a stationary AR(p) process (see, e.g., Giot and Laurent, 
2004; Bos et al., 2000; McAleer and Da Viega, 2008).  
2.2.2. Conditional volatility models 
In combination with conditional mean equation, the conditional variance 
equation can be estimated using alternative parameterizations. The resulting 
standardized residuals that are identically and independently distributed with zero mean 
and one standard deviation, that is 
 
𝜂𝑡 =
𝜀𝑡
𝜎𝑡
  ~ 𝑖𝑖𝑑(0, 1). (2.11) 
In what follows, alternative conditional variance models used in this study are 
presented in ascending order of complexity.  
I. Exponentially weighted moving average:  
The exponentially weighted moving average (EWMA) model is the simplest 
parametric approach considered in this study. It assigns more weight on more recent 
observations i.e. the weighting of older observations decreases exponentially. In the 
EWMA framework, the conditional variance of each return series at time t is estimated 
as 
 
𝜎𝑡
2 = 𝜆𝜎𝑡−1
2 + (1 − 𝜆)𝜀𝑡−1
2 , (2.12) 
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where 𝜎𝑡−1
2  is the conditional variance of the disturbance term at time 𝑡 − 1, and 𝜆 is the 
decay factor. RiskMetrics (1996) subjectively sets decay factor at 0.94 for analyzing 
daily data. RiskMetrics model has been very popular due to its good performance 
during different financial conditions and ease of implementation, as there is no need for 
parameter estimation. However, the main drawback of this methodology is that it 
assigns the same decay factor to all daily series. Also, the EWMA model assumes that 
disturbance term is identically and independently distributed, which is a restrictive 
assumption in financial applications. 
II. GARCH: 
Financial daily return series often exhibit volatility persistence, meaning that 
large (small) volatilities tend to be followed by other large (small) volatilities. To 
capture time varying volatility and volatility clustering features of financial return 
series, Engle (1982) proposed the autoregressive conditional heteroskedasticity (ARCH) 
models. An ARCH model of order q, ARCH(q), is defined as  
 
𝜎𝑡
2 = ω + ∑𝛼𝑗𝜀𝑡−𝑗
2
𝑞
𝑗=1
. (2.13) 
Sufficient conditions for the positivity of the conditional variance are ω > 0 and 
αj ≥ 0, for j = 1, . . , q. Bollerslev (1986) extended ARCH models by including the 
lagged conditional variance as autoregressive terms. The generalized ARCH (GARCH) 
model is defined as  
 
𝜎𝑡
2 = 𝜔 + ∑𝛼𝑗𝜀𝑡−𝑗
2
𝑞
𝑗=1
+ ∑𝛽𝑖𝜎𝑡−1
2
𝑝
𝑖=1
. (2.14) 
In this case, sufficient conditions to ensure strictly positive conditional variance 
are 𝜔 > 0, αj ≥ 0 for 𝑗 = 1, . . , 𝑞, and β ≥ 0 for 𝑖 = 1,… , 𝑝. While ARCH captures the 
short-run persistence of shocks, GARCH effect presents contribution of shocks to the 
long-run persistence. Since ARCH and GARCH models are nonlinear models, their 
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parameters can no longer be estimated by OLS methodology. Instead, the maximum 
likelihood estimation (MLE) method is used. The error term, εt, can be written as 
 
𝜀𝑡 = 𝜎𝑡𝑧𝑡, 
(2.15) 
where 𝑧𝑡 is a random variable representing market shocks. It is usually assumed that it 
is an independently and identically distributed random variable following a Gaussian 
distribution i.e. 𝑧𝑡~𝑁(0,1). However, Bollerslev (1987) suggests using symmetric 
Student-t distribution as conditional distribution of market shocks. In that case, the 
degree of freedom of the underlying distribution is an additional parameter to be 
estimated. In this chapter, both Gaussian distribution and Student-t distribution are 
considered. 
III. GJR-GARCH: 
In financial time series data a negative shock increases debt to equity ratio and is 
likely to increases volatility more than a positive shock of the same magnitude.  One of 
the main shortcomings of GARCH model is its equal sensitivity to positive and negative 
shocks in the market, which makes it incapable of taking leverage effect into account. 
To resolve this issue, researchers have moved towards asymmetric GARCH models. To 
capture asymmetric effect of positive and negative shocks, Glosten et al. (1993) suggest 
GJR-GARCH as an alternative to symmetric GARCH model. This model simply adds 
an extra parameter to the symmetric GARCH to capture the leverage effect. The model 
takes the form 
 
𝜎𝑡
2 = 𝜔 + ∑(𝛼𝑗 + 𝛾𝑑𝑡−𝑗)𝜀𝑡−𝑗
2
𝑞
𝑗=1
+ ∑𝛽𝑖𝜎𝑡−1
2
𝑝
𝑖=1
, (2.16) 
where  𝑑𝑡 is a dummy variable taking value 1 whenεt < 0, and 0 otherwise. Thus, when 
news impact is asymmetric, γ ≠ 0 , a positive shock impact, 𝛼, is distinguished from the 
impact of a negative shock, (α + γ). In this case, sufficient conditions for the positivity 
of conditional variance are ω > 0, αj + γ ≥ 0 for j = 1, . . , q, and βi ≥ 0 for i = 1,… , p.  
IV. EGARCH: 
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As seen before, to construct a GARCH model, different constraints have to be 
imposed to ensure a strictly positive conditional variance. The Exponential GARCH 
(EGARCH) introduced by Nelson (1991) handles these constraints by simply using the 
log of variance in the conditional variance formula. The specification of conditional 
variance equation for an EGARCH (p, q) model is given by  
 
𝑙 𝑛(𝜎𝑡
2) = 𝜔 + ∑𝛼𝑖  
𝜀𝑡−𝑖
𝜎𝑡−𝑖
+ ∑ 𝛾𝑘 [
|𝜀𝑡−𝑘|
𝜎𝑡−𝑘
− 𝐸 {
|𝜀𝑡−𝑘|
𝜎𝑡−𝑘
}]
𝑞
𝑘=1
𝑞
𝑖=1
+ ∑𝛽𝑗 ln(𝜎𝑡−𝑗
2 )
𝑝
𝑗=1
. (2.17) 
As this equation gives us the results for the log of conditional variance, it is 
guaranteed that the conditional variance is always positive and consequently there is no 
need to impose any parametric restrictions. EGARCH model is an alternative model to 
capture asymmetric effect of large positive and negative shocks. Furthermore, in 
financial return series, small positive shocks increase volatility more than small 
negative shocks with the same magnitude. The specification of EGARCH model has 
made advantageous to previous models reviewed in this chapter to capture such features 
of financial data. 
V. APARCH: 
The asymmetric power ARCH (APARCH) model proposed by Ding et al. 
(1993) was an extension to Taylor-Schwert GARCH (TS-GARCH) model of Taylor 
(1986) and Schwert (1990). The APARCH model is specified as   
 
𝜎𝑡
𝛿 = 𝜔 + ∑𝛼𝑗(|𝜀𝑡−𝑗| − 𝛾𝑗𝜀𝑡−𝑗)
𝛿
𝑞
𝑗=1
+ ∑𝛽𝑖𝜎𝑡−1
𝛿
𝑝
𝑖=1
, (2.18) 
where 𝛿 is the power parameter while 𝛾 captures potential asymmetric effects of market 
shocks. In this case, 𝜔 > 0, 𝛼𝑗 ≥ 0, with at least one 𝛼𝑗 > 0, 𝛽𝑖 ≥ 0, 𝛿 ≥ 0, and 
|𝛾| < 1 are necessary and sufficient conditions for the existence of moments for 
APARCH (see Ling and McAleer, 2002). In addition to some basic features including 
volatility clustering, excess kurtosis (fat tails), and asymmetry in volatility, APARCH 
models capture long-memory property of financial return series. Long-memory property 
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refers to a stylized fact of most financial return series, particularly high-frequency data, 
where correlation between absolute returns is substantially higher than that between 
squared returns. 
2.2.3. Conditional correlation models 
While 𝜎𝑖,𝑡 can be estimated by univariate volatility models, estimating 𝜌𝑖𝑗,𝑡 has 
been one of the main challenges for researchers and risk managers. In this context, 
various parameterizations for multivariate time series models have been developed to 
measure the conditional covariance matrix of a portfolio. Perhaps, the simplest 
specification to calculate 𝜌𝑖𝑗,𝑡 is the rolling correlation estimator defined as  
 
𝜌𝑖𝑗,𝑡 = 
∑ 𝜀𝑖,𝑡−𝑠𝜀𝑗,𝑡−𝑠
𝑡−1
𝑠=1
√(∑ 𝜀𝑖,𝑡−𝑠
2𝑡−1
𝑠=1 )(∑ 𝜀𝑗,𝑡−𝑠
2𝑡−1
𝑠=1 )
 . (2.19) 
However, using this specification for estimating 𝜌𝑖𝑗,𝑡 may be too strict in 
empirical applications as it does not account for various features of financial time series 
data. Therefore, in a seminal work in this area, Bollerslev (1990) proposed the Constant 
Conditional Correlation (CCC) multivariate GARCH (MGARCH) model to estimate the 
conditional correlation. In his model, the conditional covariance matrix is given by  
 
𝜴𝒕 = 𝑫𝒕𝑹𝑫𝒕, 
(2.20) 
where 𝑫𝒕 is a time varying diagonal matrix of conditional standard deviations from 
univariate GARCH processes and 𝑹 is a time invariant matrix of unconditional 
correlations of the standardized residuals. The standardized residuals are given by  
 
𝜼𝒕 = 𝑫𝒕
−𝟏𝜺𝒕. 
(2.21) 
Accordingly, each element of 𝑹 is defined as 
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𝜌𝑖𝑗 = 
∑ 𝜂𝑖,𝑡−𝑠𝜂𝑗,𝑡−𝑠
𝑡−1
𝑠=1
√(∑ 𝜂𝑖,𝑡−𝑠
2𝑡−1
𝑠=1 )(∑ 𝜂𝑗,𝑡−𝑠
2𝑡−1
𝑠=1 )
 . (2.22) 
Despite the parsimony of CCC models, the assumption of constant conditional 
correlations may be too restrictive in empirical applications. Engle (2002) extended the 
CCC model and proposed Dynamic Conditional Correlation (DCC) model by relaxing 
the assumption of constant conditional correlation and allowing 𝑹 to be time varying. 
Accordingly, 𝑹𝒕 is defined as  
 
𝑹𝒕 = 𝑸𝒕
∗−𝟏𝑸𝒕𝑸𝒕
∗−𝟏, (2.23) 
where 
 
𝑸𝒕 = (1 − 𝛼 − 𝛽)?̅? + 𝛼𝜺𝒕−𝟏𝜺𝒕−𝟏
′ + 𝛽𝑸𝒕−𝟏, 
(2.24) 
where 𝑸𝒕 ≡ [𝑞𝑖𝑗,𝑡], ?̅? is the unconditional covariance matrix of the standardized 
residuals, and 𝑸𝒕
∗ is a diagonal matrix that contains the square roots of the diagonal 
element of 𝑸𝒕. This model is covariance stationary if 𝛼 + 𝛽 < 1. Thus, the conditional 
correlation between the 𝑖𝑗𝑡ℎ risk factors at time t is given by 
 
𝜌𝑖𝑗,𝑡 = 
𝑞𝑖𝑗,𝑡
√𝑞𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑞𝑗𝑗,𝑡
 . (2.25) 
One of the main drawbacks of the DCC model is that it does not account for 
potential asymmetric effects of market shocks on the conditional correlations between 
financial return series. Therefore, Cappiello et al. (2006) incorporate leverage effect into 
the conditional correlation and propose the asymmetric dynamic conditional correlation 
(ADCC) model, which takes the following form 
 
𝑸𝒕 = (1 − 𝛼 − 𝛽)?̅? − 𝛿Γ̅ + 𝛼𝜺𝒕−𝟏𝜺𝒕−𝟏
′ + 𝛽𝑸𝒕−𝟏 + 𝛿ξ𝑡−1ξ𝑡−1
′
, (2.26) 
where Γ̅ = [ξ
𝑡
ξ
𝑡
′
] and ξ
𝑡
= 𝐼(𝜀𝑡 < 0)o 𝜀𝑡; the I(.) is an indicator function taking on value 
1 if the argument is true, and 0 otherwise, whereas ‘o’ represents the Hadamard product. 
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In this case, necessary and sufficient conditions for 𝑄𝑡 to be positive definite include 
(1 − 𝛼 − 𝛽)?̅? − 𝛿Γ̅ and 𝑄0 to be positive definite. 
2.2.4. VaR estimation 
In general, VaR of a specific portfolio is a function of two fundamental 
parameters set by regulators: (i) confidence level representing the expected probability 
that portfolio return falls below VaR figure, and (ii) risk horizon representing the time 
period over which the potential loss is estimated. Accordingly, VaR is defined as the 
maximum potential loss in the value of the portfolio over a certain risk horizon and with 
certain confidence level. Mathematically, a portfolio VaR over a specific holding period 
is given by  
 
Pr(𝑟ℎ < −𝑉𝑎𝑅ℎ|𝐼𝑡−1) = 𝛼,   
(2.27) 
where h is the holding period and 𝑟ℎ is the change in portfolio value over the holding 
period, and (1 − α) is the VaR confidence level. Making an assumption about portfolio 
return distribution, parametric VaR models is given by 
 
𝑉𝑎𝑅ℎ
1−∝ = Φ−1(1 − 𝛼)?̂?ℎ − ?̂?ℎ, 
(2.28) 
where Φ−1(1 − 𝛼) is the standardized 𝛼-quantile of the assumed distribution while  ?̂?ℎ 
and ?̂?ℎ denote the expected mean and standard deviation of portfolio’s return 
distribution over the holding period, respectively. Another approach is to derive the 
aggregate portfolio VaR from univariate conditional mean and covariance of portfolio 
risk components. Once 𝜎𝑖,𝑡 and 𝜌𝑖𝑗,𝑡 for all risk factors are estimated, the aggregate 
portfolio VaR can be estimated as follows 
 
𝑉𝑎𝑅(𝑟𝑝𝑡|𝐼𝑡−1) = Φ
−1(1 − 𝛼)𝜽𝒕
′𝜴𝒕𝜽𝒕. 
(2.29) 
Furthermore, the contribution of each risk factor to aggregate VaR can be 
determined by estimating stand-alone VaR and marginal VaR of each risk factor. As its 
name indicates, the stand-alone VaR of a specific risk factor is its VaR when it is 
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isolated from the rest of portfolio, i.e., its correlation with other risk factors is not taken 
into account.  
 
𝑆𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑑 − 𝑎𝑙𝑜𝑛𝑒 𝑉𝑎𝑅𝑋𝑖 = Φ
−1(1 − 𝛼)√𝜽𝑿𝒊
′ 𝜴𝒕𝜽𝑿𝒊  , 
(2.30) 
where θXi is the sensitivity vector when all risk factor sensitivities except sensitivity to 
𝑋𝑖is set to zero. Stand-alone VaRs are not additive, meaning that sum of all stand-alone 
components is greater than the portfolio VaR, unless all risk factors are perfectly 
correlated. 
Marginal VaR, on the other hand, is a measure of each risk factor’s contribution 
to the aggregate VaR of a portfolio.  In other words, marginal VaR of a risk factor is a 
measure of how total portfolio VaR changes given a (small) change in the position of 
that risk factor. Let 𝑓(𝜽) be the aggregate VaR of a portfolio as defined in Equation 
(2.30). Taking the first partial derivative of 𝑓(𝜽) with respect to each risk component, 
𝜃𝑖, produces the following gradient vector 
 
𝒈(𝜽) = (𝑓1(𝜽),… , 𝑓𝑚(𝜽))
′
=
Φ−1(1 − 𝛼)𝜴𝒕 𝜽𝒕
√𝜽𝒕
′𝜴𝒕𝜽𝒕
,   (2.31) 
where  
 
𝑓𝑖(𝜽) =
𝜕𝑓(𝜽)
𝜕𝜃𝑖
,                     𝑖 = 1, … ,𝑚; (2.32) 
Accordingly, the marginal VaR of the 𝑖𝑡ℎ risk factor is defined as  
 
𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑙 − 𝑉𝑎𝑅𝑋𝑖 = 𝜃𝑖𝑓𝑖(𝜽) = 𝜽𝑿𝒊
′ 𝒈(𝜽). (2.33) 
Using the first order of Taylor expansion, sum of marginal VaR is given by  
 
𝑓(𝜃) ≈ 𝜃′𝑔(𝜃) = ∑𝜃𝑖𝑓𝑖(𝜃)
𝑚
𝑖=1
.   (2.34) 
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Thus, it is proven that sum of marginal VaR of all risk factors in a portfolio is 
approximately equal to portfolio VaR figure, which is one of the main advantageous of 
parametric VaR models over their counterparts.  
2.3. DATA 
To investigate the performance of alternative models in forecasting one-step 
ahead VaR of international equity portfolios, historical daily equity indices and foreign 
exchange rates data of eight countries are used in this chapter. The countries that are 
included in this study can be divided into four groups based on their level of economic 
developments. The main reason for inclusion of a wide range of countries is that 
characteristics and nature of stock markets vary widely across countries with different 
level of economic developments. The sample countries include Japan and the United 
Kingdom as developed countries, India, Brazil, Chile and Philippines as emerging 
counties while Tunisia and Egypt represent developing countries. In addition, due to 
their large and fast-growing economies, Brazil and India are distinguished from Chile 
and Philippines. Brazil and India can be classified as advanced emerging countries, 
while Philippines and Chile are considered as emerging countries.  
Equity indices and exchange rate data were obtained from Datastream. Equity 
indices include FTSE 100 index (UK), NIKKEI225 index (Japan), BOVESPA index 
(Brazil), CNX 500 index (India), IPSA index (Chile), PSEI index (Philippines), 
TUNINDEX index (Tunisia), and EGX 30 index (Egypt). Furthermore, the US dollar is 
employed as the benchmark currency in this study since the focus of this thesis is on the 
US banks and US dollar is the most widely used currency in the world.
4
  
The sample period under consideration is from January 1999 to December 2010. 
In this study, the one-day ahead conditional variances, conditional correlations, and 
                                                 
4
 Among sample countries, UK, and Chile have free float exchange rate systems; Japan has free float 
exchange rate system, while its central bank monitors various indicators in conducting monetary policy; 
India has floating exchange rate system, while its central monitors various indicators in conducting 
monetary policy; Philippines and Brazil have floating exchange rate system under inflation-targeting 
framework; Tunisia has crawl-like exchange rate arrangement; Egypt has stabilized exchange rate 
arrangement. 
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VaR thresholds are estimated based on a rolling window of 1,000 observations. 
Accordingly, the forecasting period starts from January 1, 2003, and ends in December 
31, 2010, while observations before January 2003 are used for estimation purposes only. 
This forecasting period enables the author to evaluate the performance of alternative 
VaR models in different global economic conditions. More specifically, the forecasting 
period includes two sub-periods: the pre-crisis period from January 1, 2003, to 
December 31, 2006, and the crisis period from January 1, 2007, to December 31, 2010. 
Daily return series for each time series is obtained from the following formula 
 
𝑅𝑡 = log (
𝑃𝑡
𝑃𝑡−1
), (2.35) 
where 𝑃𝑡 is daily value of equity indices or exchange rates at time t. Graphical 
illustrations of synchronous daily foreign exchange rates and equity returns across 
sample countries are given in Figure 2.1. All return series exhibit volatility clustering at 
different time periods, indicating the presence of ARCH effects, which need to be 
modelled by an appropriate time series model. Also, all stock markets exhibit high 
volatility during global financial crisis, which originated by the US subprime mortgage 
crisis.  
Furthermore, exchange rates exhibit sharp drops during the global financial 
crisis, indicating that the US banks that spread their trading portfolios across the world 
suffered severely from depreciation of both equity prices and exchange rates.  
Table 2.1 presents the descriptive statistics for equity returns in local currency, 
exchange rates, and equity returns in the US dollar over the period January 1, 2003, and 
December 31, 2010. For each return series, basic descriptive statistics, Jarque-Bera test 
of normality, and Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) test of stationarity are presented. It 
appears that mean and median values observed for all series are close to zero while the 
range of daily returns is very similar for most series. In all sample countries, standard 
deviation of equity returns are higher than that of exchange rates, indicating that equity 
markets are more volatile than foreign exchange markets. Estimated skewness is 
slightly different from zero while all series have positive kurtosis. Not surprisingly, the 
Jarque-Bera test statistics reject the null hypothesis of normality for all return series 
conside 
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Figure 2.1. Daily stock price returns (blue line) and corresponding exchange rates 
(red line) over the period January 1, 2002-December 30, 2010. 
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Table 2.1. Descriptive statistics for equity returns in local currency, exchange rate 
returns, and equity returns in US dollars. 
       Statistics 
                U
K
 
J
a
p
a
n
 
In
d
ia
 
B
ra
zi
l 
C
h
il
e
 
P
h
il
ip
p
in
es
 
T
u
n
is
ia
 
E
g
y
p
t 
E
q
u
it
y
 r
e
tu
rn
s 
(L
C
) 
Mean 0.0002 0.0001 0.0009 0.0010 0.0008 0.0007 0.0007 0.0013 
Median 0.0002 0.0000 0.0015 0.0016 0.0007 0.0000 0.0002 0.0011 
Maximum  0.0938 0.1323 0.1503 0.1368 0.1180 0.0937 0.0325 0.1837 
Minimum  -0.0927 -0.1211 -0.1288 -0.1210 -0.0621 -0.1309 -0.0500 -0.1799 
SD 0.0126 0.0155 0.0167 0.0195 0.0104 0.0136 0.0051 0.0184 
Skewness -0.0909 -0.4650 -0.5501 -0.0727 0.0716 -0.6147 -0.3816 -0.4096 
Kurtosis 12.031 11.854 11.791 7.698 14.605 11.099 14.968 14.340 
CoV 65.062 184.109 18.810 20.154 13.631 20.053 7.047 14.432 
Jarque-Bera 7098.5 6895.6 6828.7 1923.4 11718.7 5838.4 12512.8 11245.9 
ADF test -22.643 -34.633 -41.821 -45.836 -39.839 -39.776 -37.488 -39.592 
F
o
re
ig
n
 e
x
ch
a
n
g
e 
ra
te
 r
e
tu
rn
s Mean 0.0000 0.0002 0.0000 0.0003 0.0002 0.0001 0.0000 0.0000 
Median 0.0001 0.0000 0.0000 0.0008 0.0002 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Maximum  0.0447 0.0461 0.0307 0.1194 0.0393 0.0127 0.0353 0.0147 
Minimum  -0.0392 -0.0308 -0.0246 -0.0846 -0.0546 -0.0131 -0.0270 -0.0155 
SD 0.0066 0.0068 0.0039 0.0116 0.0072 0.0035 0.0046 0.0019 
Skewness -0.0885 0.4760 -0.0761 -0.0919 -0.5171 -0.0974 0.1883 -0.6037 
Kurtosis 7.3754 6.9930 9.3286 14.9188 8.6652 4.0039 6.4036 16.1031 
CoV -493.61 37.11 115.63 40.52 34.77 37.36 -138.20 -51.56 
Jarque-Bera 1668.3 1466.0 3486.5 12367.8 2885.3 91.0 1020.2 15064.1 
ADF test -42.861 -47.056 -43.504 -46.321 -45.021 -44.372 -45.110 -17.307 
E
q
u
it
y
 r
e
tu
rn
s 
(U
S
D
) 
Mean 0.0002 0.0003 0.0009 0.0013 0.0010 0.0008 0.0007 0.0012 
Median 0.0006 0.0004 0.0020 0.0022 0.0000 0.0004 0.0007 0.0012 
Maximum  0.1222 0.1164 0.1811 0.1893 0.1455 0.0933 0.0384 0.1874 
Minimum  -0.1054 -0.1119 -0.1282 -0.1655 -0.1167 -0.1391 -0.0636 -0.1829 
SD 0.0153 0.0156 0.0186 0.0265 0.0140 0.0151 0.0069 0.0189 
Skewness -0.0667 -0.2764 -0.3612 -0.3095 -0.3309 -0.6472 -0.1719 -0.5536 
Kurtosis 13.514 8.430 11.666 8.342 14.973 9.813 9.431 14.878 
CoV 84.933 58.262 20.218 21.143 14.406 19.568 9.916 16.161 
Jarque-Bera 9618.2 2592.2 6579.4 2517.3 12509.8 4184.1 3608.2 12381.1 
ADF test -21.924 -36.735 -41.393 -43.307 -41.666 -39.537 -28.682 -40.343 
Note: Entries in bold are significant at 1% level. 
 
considered in this study. Finally, in order to test the stationarity of the return series, the 
ADF test is calculated. The ADF test statistics indicate that all return series are 
stationary. 
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Table 2.2. Pairwise correlation between equity returns and exchange rate returns. 
Country Correlation  Country  Correlation  
UK 0.2000*** Chile  0.2382*** 
Japan -0.0995*** Philippines 0.3205*** 
India 0.4099*** Tunisia  -0.0028 
Brazil  0.4128*** Egypt  0.0134 
Note: ***, **, and * entries are statistically significant at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively. 
 
Table 2.2 presents pairwise correlation coefficients of equity returns and 
exchange rate returns. It appears that, apart from developing countries, estimated 
correlation coefficients are statistically significant at 1% significance level. 
Furthermore, with the exception of Japan, the correlation coefficient between equity 
returns and exchange rate returns are positive across all developed and emerging 
countries. This is not surprising as higher equity return in a country may indicate that 
the economy is growing and therefore the exchange rate will be appreciated.  
2.4. EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
In this Section, forecasting ability of alternative parametric VaR models 
described in Section 2.2 is investigated. Following Basel Accords, VaR thresholds are 
calculated for one day horizon and with 99% confidence level. As a fundamental 
assumption in parametric VaR models, it is first assumed that market shocks follow 
normal distribution. However, the normality assumption is often too restrictive for 
financial return series (see Bollerslev, 1987; Sajjad et al., 2008). In fact, many studies, 
including Bollerslev (1987) and McAleer et al. (2013), suggest that market shocks 
follow a Student-t distribution as they can be approximately modelled by a unimodal 
symmetric distribution that has fatter tails than the normal distribution.
5
 Therefore, 
following McAleer et al. (2008), Şener et al. (2012), and McAleer et al. (2013), this 
                                                 
5 There are also other distributional assumptions for market shocks in forecasting literature. In particular, 
Giot and Laurent (2003, 2004) take into account the leverage effects in market shocks, and advocate 
using the skewed Student-t distribution as an alternative assumption for the distribution of market shocks. 
They show that the assumption that market shocks follow a skewed Student distribution leads to superior 
forecasting performance in APARCH models. 
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study considers both normal and Student-t distributions as underlying assumption for 
market shocks. 
2.4.1. General review of violations 
The first step in comparing forecasting ability of alternative VaR models is to 
review the number of violations. A violation occurs if the realized return on a portfolio 
in a day is lower than the forecasted VaR for that day. Given that the number of 
violations is obtained, it is possible to evaluate the probability of a violation occurring 
when a specific VaR model is used. Although the number of violations is the primary 
focus of regulators when evaluating a VaR model, regulators are also interested in the 
pattern and distribution of violations, such as average deviation from estimated VaR 
thresholds and maximum potential deviation from VaR estimates when a given model is 
employed (see BCBS, 1996a,; BCBS, 1996b). This enables regulators to estimate the 
magnitude of losses when a violation occurs.  
Table 2.3 reports number of violations, average size of the violations beyond 
VaR estimates, and maximum size of violations beyond VaR estimates for all sample 
countries during pre-crisis period. Each table contains four blocks corresponding to four 
different methods employed to model the correlation between equity returns and foreign 
exchange rate returns. The first block presents the results for univariate VaR models, the 
second block corresponds to the CCC model, the third block relates to the DCC VaR 
models, and the last block corresponds to ADCC VaR models. 
In general, it appears from Table 2.3 that the number of violations remains 
relatively low during pre-crisis period, regardless of the model under consideration. 
This finding is robust across all countries and all models. Choosing 1% significance 
level for VaR estimation, a well performing model should produce ten violations in 
each sample period, i.e., one violation per 100 estimations. Number of violations range 
from 5 to 25 in the sample countries, which indicates that all VaR models have 
satisfactory performance from regulators’ point of view. Among univariate models, 
RiskMetrics, GJR-t, EGARCH-t, and APARCH-t produce lower number of violations, 
compared to other VaR models.  
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Table 2.3. General overview of violations during the period 2003-2006.  
Models 
UK Japan Brazil India 
NV 
AD of 
violations 
NV 
AD of 
violations 
NV 
AD of 
violations 
NV 
AD of 
violations 
Mean Max Mean Max Mean Max Mean Max 
U
n
iv
a
ri
a
te
 m
o
d
el
s 
RiskMetrics 8 0.337 0.693 10 0.935 2.629 11 0.725 2.442 18 1.392 4.848 
GARCH 21 0.413 0.903 14 0.922 3.362 14 0.619 2.765 20 1.258 5.09 
GARCH-t 16 0.386 0.768 13 0.958 3.244 11 0.744 2.671 19 1.373 4.999 
GJR 18 0.42 1.088 14 0.807 3.272 9 0.878 3.049 24 1.189 5.069 
GJR-t 13 0.392 0.834 9 0.901 2.332 7 0.978 2.976 19 1.23 4.444 
EGARCH 21 0.41 0.992 13 0.891 3.38 9 1.045 3.241 25 1.139 5.428 
EGARCH-t 15 0.38 0.778 10 0.886 2.998 10 0.805 3.017 19 1.223 4.884 
APARCH 22 0.431 1.074 16 0.793 3.406 10 0.953 3.253 23 1.238 5.076 
APARCH-t 15 0.389 0.954 15 0.743 3.222 9 0.913 3.006 19 1.192 4.517 
C
C
C
 m
o
d
el
s 
GARCH 17 0.343 0.846 10 1.068 3.113 13 0.639 2.92 18 1.315 4.804 
GARCH-t 10 0.375 0.685 10 1.012 3.074 12 0.63 2.623 19 1.299 4.707 
GJR 13 0.361 0.976 9 1.067 3.001 9 0.76 2.875 22 1.211 4.815 
GJR-t 8 0.373 0.902 10 0.964 2.982 7 0.848 2.804 19 1.142 4.137 
EGARCH 16 0.391 1.142 10 0.913 3.069 9 0.805 3.178 23 1.194 5.247 
EGARCH-t 12 0.355 0.98 11 0.744 2.954 9 0.719 3.014 17 1.279 4.674 
APARCH 16 0.429 1.154 10 0.927 3.115 10 0.707 3.203 23 1.178 4.973 
APARCH-t 12 0.39 1.033 9 0.836 3 8 0.76 3 17 1.257 4.31 
D
C
C
 m
o
d
el
s 
RiskMetrics 9 0.301 0.65 11 0.924 2.674 9 0.941 2.313 18 1.384 4.895 
GARCH 13 0.38 0.878 12 0.894 2.792 12 0.765 2.445 17 1.308 4.446 
GARCH-t 10 0.292 0.777 12 0.851 2.751 11 0.776 2.473 18 1.288 4.33 
GJR 11 0.356 1.085 10 0.952 2.683 9 0.848 2.873 22 1.164 4.466 
GJR-t 7 0.339 1.018 9 1.014 2.574 7 0.967 2.802 19 1.083 3.716 
EGARCH 16 0.345 1.237 9 1 2.76 9 0.824 3.177 23 1.14 4.976 
EGARCH-t 12 0.292 1.086 9 0.921 2.626 9 0.747 3.012 17 1.211 4.354 
APARCH 16 0.373 1.248 9 1.008 2.806 9 0.837 3.201 23 1.123 4.699 
APARCH-t 13 0.297 1.14 8 0.926 2.673 9 0.702 2.998 17 1.188 3.985 
A
D
C
C
 m
o
d
el
s 
GARCH 13 0.349 1.008 12 0.915 2.69 11 0.844 2.54 23 1.198 4.821 
GARCH-t 9 0.281 0.917 12 0.872 2.648 10 0.868 2.568 18 1.244 4.245 
GJR 11 0.33 1.196 11 0.891 2.582 10 0.779 2.968 21 1.191 4.386 
GJR-t 7 0.298 1.135 10 0.943 2.467 9 0.766 2.9 19 1.053 3.62 
EGARCH 16 0.322 1.333 9 1.031 2.661 10 0.76 3.272 23 1.118 4.914 
EGARCH-t 12 0.265 1.192 11 0.781 2.521 10 0.693 3.11 19 1.046 4.28 
APARCH 15 0.372 1.343 9 1.039 2.708 10 0.768 3.298 24 1.052 4.636 
APARCH-t 11 0.318 1.248 9 0.841 2.569 10 0.646 3.097 16 1.218 3.911 
Note: Entries in this table include Number of violations (NV), mean and maximum of absolute deviation 
(AD) of violations for each model. This table includes four blocks. First block includes univariate models, 
while other blocks include different multivariate models.  
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Table 2.3. (Continued)  
Models 
Chile Philippines Tunisia  Egypt 
NV 
AD of 
violations 
NV 
AD of 
violations 
NV 
AD of 
violations 
NV 
AD of 
violations 
Mean Max Mean Max Mean Max Mean Max 
U
n
iv
a
ri
a
te
 m
o
d
el
s 
RiskMetrics 17 0.509 2.483 14 0.869 5.705 5 0.15 0.252 14 1.299 3.253 
GARCH 22 0.63 3.199 16 1.025 5.811 11 0.179 0.455 13 1.212 3.447 
GARCH-t 19 0.594 3.008 13 1.179 5.759 9 0.144 0.385 11 1.27 3.664 
GJR 21 0.575 3.019 14 0.994 5.611 11 0.178 0.468 13 1.185 3.314 
GJR-t 17 0.555 2.813 13 0.956 5.546 10 0.143 0.405 12 1.232 3.825 
EGARCH 21 0.589 2.921 14 1.073 5.442 17 0.154 0.49 14 1.073 5.442 
EGARCH-t 18 0.54 2.712 13 1.075 5.373 11 0.162 0.409 13 1.121 3.394 
APARCH 22 0.578 2.919 13 1.192 5.495 19 0.153 0.549 12 1.114 3.542 
APARCH-t 17 0.593 2.717 13 1.102 5.402 11 0.166 0.457 13 1.149 3.654 
C
C
C
 m
o
d
el
s 
GARCH 12 0.677 2.891 14 1.008 5.692 7 0.081 0.182 10 1.387 3.829 
GARCH-t 8 0.774 2.671 13 0.987 5.633 10 0.141 0.397 10 1.316 3.971 
GJR 12 0.636 2.832 15 0.89 5.697 6 0.103 0.179 11 1.424 4.012 
GJR-t 8 0.678 2.557 13 0.974 5.643 7 0.11 0.319 11 1.309 3.953 
EGARCH 12 0.599 2.831 14 1.012 5.62 6 0.082 0.129 12 1.3 3.609 
EGARCH-t 7 0.752 2.575 14 0.981 5.565 5 0.093 0.146 11 1.121 2.65 
APARCH 12 0.624 2.755 13 1.092 5.634 5 0.105 0.188 13 1.189 3.642 
APARCH-t 8 0.773 2.515 14 0.983 5.573 5 0.095 0.172 10 1.265 2.78 
D
C
C
 m
o
d
el
s 
RiskMetrics 17 0.51 2.359 13 0.912 5.722 5 0.143 0.275 13 1.227 3.113 
GARCH 13 0.586 2.581 14 0.996 5.676 8 0.073 0.182 10 1.391 3.834 
GARCH-t 9 0.605 2.333 13 0.973 5.616 5 0.089 0.152 10 1.319 3.974 
GJR 14 0.518 2.516 14 0.942 5.68 7 0.096 0.179 11 1.426 4.015 
GJR-t 9 0.539 2.202 12 1.041 5.626 8 0.096 0.202 11 1.311 3.955 
EGARCH 13 0.516 2.515 12 1.169 5.602 7 0.074 0.112 12 1.304 3.614 
EGARCH-t 8 0.577 2.224 14 0.969 5.547 6 0.079 0.146 11 1.129 2.658 
APARCH 13 0.559 2.441 13 1.083 5.616 6 0.083 0.15 13 1.193 3.647 
APARCH-t 9 0.609 2.167 13 1.046 5.554 6 0.074 0.118 10 1.273 2.788 
A
D
C
C
 m
o
d
el
s 
GARCH 16 0.531 2.56 12 1.036 5.626 7 0.12 0.29 10 1.305 3.618 
GARCH-t 11 0.52 2.31 12 0.954 5.564 6 0.075 0.152 10 1.274 3.839 
GJR 15 0.545 2.495 12 1.003 5.631 7 0.132 0.293 11 1.387 3.893 
GJR-t 12 0.44 2.178 12 0.938 5.574 8 0.12 0.284 11 1.271 3.83 
EGARCH 16 0.476 2.493 14 0.913 5.548 8 0.079 0.196 14 0.913 5.548 
EGARCH-t 11 0.453 2.2 13 0.929 5.49 6 0.097 0.166 8 1.372 2.27 
APARCH 15 0.549 2.42 13 0.987 5.562 7 0.089 0.217 14 1.049 3.418 
APARCH-t 13 0.453 2.144 13 0.94 5.497 6 0.094 0.195 10 1.134 2.411 
Note: Entries in this table include Number of violations (NV), mean and maximum of absolute deviation 
(AD) of violations for each model. This table includes four blocks. First block includes univariate models, 
while other blocks include different multivariate models.  
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Among multivariate models, however, there is no clear pattern on which models 
perform better to forecast VaR during pre-crisis period across all countries. 
Nonetheless, the number of violations slightly reduces in most countries when 
multivariate models are used. Furthermore, empirical results show that using Student-t 
distribution as an assumption for the distribution of market shocks leads to lower 
number of violations across all models and countries. 
In addition, there is no significant variation in mean deviation and maximum 
deviation of violations across alternative VaR models. However, mean deviation and 
maximum deviation of violations largely vary across different countries, which may 
reflect the dissimilarities in the pattern of fluctuations in international equity portfolios. 
For instance, mean and maximum deviations of violations in Tunisia are much smaller 
than those in other countries. However, when Japan and Philippines are compared, 
mean deviations of violations are very similar, while maximum deviation of violations 
is much higher in Philippines. 
 Although most VaR models have satisfactory performance during pre-crisis 
period, the story changes during crisis period. Table 2.4 presents the general overview 
of violations during crisis period. It appears that the number of violations dramatically 
increases during crisis period for all VaR models and across all countries, while a large 
variation is observed across countries. For instance, the number of violations is much 
higher in the UK compared to those in Japan.  
Just like pre-crisis period, it is observed that multivariate models produce lower 
number of violations compared to univariate models, indicating that incorporating more 
information in VaR models leads to more accurate VaR estimation. Among multivariate 
models, however, no superior model can be selected due to inconsistent performance of 
alternative VaR models across different countries. For instance, CCC models perform 
reasonably well in Japan while DCC models and ADCC models have better 
performance for most other countries. 
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Table 2.4. General overview of violations during the period 2007-2010.  
Models 
UK Japan Brazil India 
NV 
AD of 
violations 
NV 
AD of 
violations 
NV 
AD of 
violations 
NV 
AD of 
violations 
Mean Max Mean Max Mean Max Mean Max 
U
n
iv
a
ri
a
te
 m
o
d
el
s 
RiskMetrics 25 0.927 3.533 16 1.36 3.27 24 1.222 4.439 21 1.165 6.452 
GARCH 48 0.954 4.143 14 1.053 2.634 26 1.341 4.294 30 1.296 5.076 
GARCH-t 37 0.931 3.481 14 1.028 2.787 24 1.355 4.234 31 1.235 5.257 
GJR 46 1.017 4.217 15 0.642 1.609 30 1.16 4.171 38 1.178 4.073 
GJR-t 41 0.885 3.641 20 0.817 2.54 27 1.138 4.074 30 1.095 3.671 
EGARCH 51 1.057 4.926 18 0.717 1.92 32 1.338 4.84 41 1.11 3.661 
EGARCH-t 41 0.917 4.321 14 0.566 1.642 31 1.28 4.748 27 1.187 3.362 
APARCH 50 1.014 4.722 18 0.66 2.098 33 1.338 4.833 38 1.174 3.728 
APARCH-t 37 0.968 4.244 14 0.94 2.138 33 1.172 4.605 30 1.093 3.202 
C
C
C
 m
o
d
el
s 
GARCH 30 0.948 3.761 14 0.765 2.244 28 1.242 4.46 24 1.153 5.031 
GARCH-t 23 0.9 3.271 12 0.802 2.354 25 1.287 4.408 22 1.248 5.539 
GJR 30 0.926 3.972 11 0.599 1.109 25 1.235 4.415 27 1.185 3.634 
GJR-t 22 0.939 3.491 10 0.666 1.262 20 1.398 4.331 21 1.199 3.336 
EGARCH 31 0.97 4.521 17 0.692 1.825 29 1.368 5.132 32 1.119 3.633 
EGARCH-t 23 0.989 4.088 11 0.663 1.327 29 1.278 4.977 18 1.377 3.717 
APARCH 32 0.939 4.655 16 0.756 2.287 30 1.387 5.134 31 1.15 3.435 
APARCH-t 25 0.864 4.182 14 0.603 1.553 29 1.285 4.871 20 1.276 3.618 
D
C
C
 m
o
d
el
s 
RiskMetrics 22 1.021 3.506 18 1.198 3.231 22 1.329 4.344 21 1.152 6.404 
GARCH 27 0.85 3.286 17 1.033 2.889 24 1.356 4.325 22 1.187 5.022 
GARCH-t 18 0.885 3.047 17 0.945 3.042 23 1.322 4.268 21 1.226 5.531 
GJR 23 0.932 3.503 19 0.649 1.906 23 1.245 4.28 26 1.166 3.568 
GJR-t 16 1.029 2.984 14 0.758 2.032 20 1.293 4.19 20 1.188 3.328 
EGARCH 24 0.943 4.058 22 0.952 2.883 26 1.365 4.796 31 1.066 3.626 
EGARCH-t 19 0.871 3.585 18 0.847 2.062 25 1.324 4.635 17 1.354 3.71 
APARCH 25 0.925 4.198 21 0.975 3.349 29 1.294 4.805 30 1.094 3.407 
APARCH-t 18 0.84 3.685 19 0.841 2.307 25 1.33 4.534 19 1.235 3.611 
A
D
C
C
 m
o
d
el
s 
GARCH 26 0.854 3.301 18 0.999 2.928 24 1.354 4.31 30 1.152 5.535 
GARCH-t 18 0.856 3.072 17 0.971 3.084 23 1.32 4.252 21 1.181 5.519 
GJR 21 0.991 3.398 19 0.659 2.007 23 1.241 4.265 24 1.225 3.563 
GJR-t 16 1.003 2.871 14 0.773 2.148 20 1.288 4.174 17 1.357 3.316 
EGARCH 24 0.899 3.956 23 0.923 2.872 25 1.426 4.772 29 1.104 3.616 
EGARCH-t 18 0.872 3.474 19 0.814 2.052 25 1.331 4.611 16 1.389 3.7 
APARCH 24 0.923 4.096 21 0.988 3.338 29 1.299 4.781 28 1.132 3.397 
APARCH-t 16 0.913 3.575 21 0.774 2.353 25 1.338 4.51 18 1.255 3.6 
Note: Entries in this table include Number of violations (NV), mean and maximum of absolute deviation 
(AD) of violations for each model. This table includes four blocks. First block includes univariate models, 
while other blocks include different multivariate models.  
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Table 2.4. (Continued)  
Models 
Chile Philippines Tunisia  Egypt 
NV 
AD of 
violations 
NV 
AD of 
violations 
NV 
AD of 
violations 
NV 
AD of 
violations 
Mean Max Mean Max Mean Max Mean Max 
U
n
iv
a
ri
a
te
 m
o
d
el
s 
RiskMetrics 14 1.208 4.175 24 1.115 5.915 14 0.543 3.558 22 1.463 12.91 
GARCH 48 0.828 5.435 36 1.033 6.453 30 0.464 3.727 21 1.616 13.4 
GARCH-t 34 0.892 5.219 33 1.032 6.451 29 0.43 3.667 20 1.616 13.64 
GJR 39 0.925 5.543 24 1.023 5.738 31 0.45 3.747 21 1.486 13.49 
GJR-t 29 0.994 5.349 22 1.052 5.6 29 0.445 3.686 20 1.611 15.46 
EGARCH 41 0.965 5.492 27 1.025 6.367 41 0.413 4.224 27 1.025 6.367 
EGARCH-t 33 0.972 5.192 25 1.05 6.333 37 0.424 4.192 16 1.812 15.31 
APARCH 43 0.944 5.486 28 1.002 6.31 43 0.39 4.252 19 1.606 14.51 
APARCH-t 33 1 5.202 25 1.073 6.39 37 0.42 4.22 17 1.715 15.18 
C
C
C
 m
o
d
el
s 
GARCH 16 1.103 4.202 25 1.068 6.025 13 0.556 3.172 20 1.677 13.32 
GARCH-t 13 1.094 3.871 23 1.08 6.183 29 0.443 3.693 20 1.632 13.57 
GJR 16 1.095 4.432 26 1.008 6.073 18 0.501 3.422 21 1.534 14.35 
GJR-t 14 0.984 4.06 25 0.951 5.893 21 0.511 3.502 19 1.587 14.23 
EGARCH 22 1.001 4.584 26 1.079 6.569 11 0.727 3.795 18 1.792 14.3 
EGARCH-t 16 1.014 4.123 24 1.064 6.474 10 0.623 2.695 18 1.618 15.11 
APARCH 19 1.099 4.556 27 1.047 6.451 14 0.608 3.82 18 1.737 14.27 
APARCH-t 13 1.171 3.932 26 1.001 6.64 13 0.53 2.743 17 1.721 15.03 
D
C
C
 m
o
d
el
s 
RiskMetrics 14 1.19 4.05 22 1.211 5.916 14 0.516 3.182 21 1.54 12.92 
GARCH 14 1.046 3.476 25 0.996 5.85 13 0.549 3.107 20 1.68 13.32 
GARCH-t 12 0.942 3.087 21 1.094 6.003 9 0.734 2.65 20 1.635 13.57 
GJR 17 0.829 3.757 23 1.044 5.903 19 0.469 3.359 21 1.536 14.35 
GJR-t 12 0.857 3.318 21 1.033 5.715 12 0.567 2.751 19 1.588 14.23 
EGARCH 18 0.972 3.942 24 1.092 6.405 13 0.609 3.741 18 1.795 14.3 
EGARCH-t 14 0.861 3.394 21 1.125 6.283 10 0.601 2.626 18 1.616 15.11 
APARCH 18 0.973 3.847 23 1.154 6.287 14 0.583 3.767 18 1.738 14.27 
APARCH-t 12 0.989 3.186 22 1.104 6.468 12 0.531 2.679 17 1.718 15.03 
A
D
C
C
 m
o
d
el
s 
GARCH 14 1.037 3.472 23 1.075 5.818 14 0.512 3.084 20 1.66 13.31 
GARCH-t 10 1.123 3.083 20 1.143 5.97 9 0.68 2.58 20 1.61 13.56 
GJR 17 0.822 3.753 23 1.037 5.872 19 0.462 3.337 21 1.513 14.35 
GJR-t 12 0.847 3.314 21 1.025 5.683 12 0.545 2.729 18 1.654 14.23 
EGARCH 18 0.971 3.939 23 1.134 6.375 13 0.607 3.721 23 1.134 6.375 
EGARCH-t 13 0.931 3.39 21 1.119 6.249 11 0.542 2.601 18 1.589 15.11 
APARCH 18 0.972 3.843 23 1.147 6.257 15 0.544 3.748 18 1.725 14.27 
APARCH-t 11 1.074 3.181 20 1.207 6.437 10 0.614 2.656 17 1.694 15.03 
Note: Entries in this table include Number of violations (NV), mean and maximum of absolute deviation 
(AD) of violations for each model. This table includes four blocks. First block includes univariate models, 
while other blocks include different multivariate models.  
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In addition to the number of violations, there is a sharp increase in mean 
deviation and maximum deviation of violations for most VaR models and across 
majority of sample countries during the crisis period. In particular, mean deviation of 
violations increases between 2 to 4 times in countries like UK and Tunisia, while 
maximum deviation of violations is between 3 to 20 times higher in Tunisia and Egypt. 
Among the sample countries, Japan is the only country that has lower mean deviation 
and maximum deviation of violations during crisis period for most VaR models. This 
may be related to the consequences of the collapse of asset price bubble until the mid-
2000s in Japan. In other words, Japanese economy faced distressing experiences during 
the first sub-sample period.  
In summary, general overview of violation patterns across VaR models and 
different countries indicate that (i) the number of violations, mean deviation of 
violations, and maximum deviation of violations dramatically increase during crisis 
period, (ii) multivariate models produce less violations compared to univariate models 
while DCC and ADCC models perform better than CCC models during crisis period, 
and (iii) the assumption that market shocks follow Student-t distribution leads to more 
accurate and conservative VaR estimations.   
2.4.2. Christoffersen tests 
It is also possible to assess out-of-sample forecasting performance of VaR 
models statistically. Christoffersen (1998) introduced three likelihood ratio (LR) tests of 
unconditional coverage, independence, and conditional coverage to evaluate the 
frequency of violations when using a specific VaR models. Accordingly, the frequency 
of violations in a well performing VaR model remains statistically close enough to the 
expected frequency of violations while violations are serially uncorrelated. This 
approach is based on the hit function of a VaR model which is defined as follows 
 
𝐼𝑡+1 = [
1, 𝑖𝑓 𝑟𝑡+1 < 𝑉𝑎𝑅𝑡+1
0, 𝑖𝑓 𝑟𝑡+1 ≥ 𝑉𝑎𝑅𝑡+1
, (2.36) 
where  𝑟𝑡+1 is the return of the portfolio in day 𝑡 + 1 and 𝑉𝑎𝑅𝑡+1 is the VaR estimate 
for day 𝑡 + 1. The first LR statistic in Christoffersen’s approach is related to the test of 
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unconditional coverage which was originally introduced by Kupiec (1995). The 𝐿𝑅𝑈𝐶  
test statistic is defined as follows 
 
𝐿𝑅𝑈𝐶 = −2[𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝛼
𝑥(1 − 𝛼)𝑁−𝑥) − log((0.01𝑥)(0.99𝑁−𝑥))] ~ χ2(1), (2.37) 
where 𝑥 = ∑ 𝐼𝑡+1 is the total number of violations, N is the number of forecasts, 
and 𝛼 = 𝑥/𝑁 is the average number of violations. Under the null hypothesis of correct 
unconditional coverage, the 𝐿𝑅𝑈𝐶  statistic is asymptotically distributed as a  χ
2(1).  In 
other words, when null hypothesis is accepted, it indicates that average number of 
violations, 𝐸(𝑥 𝑁⁄ ), is equal to the expected number of violations, 𝑝. 
The second LR test statistic in Christoffersen’s (1998) approach corresponds to 
the test of serial independence of violations based on a first-order Markov stochastic 
process. Accordingly, this test examines if the probability of a violation occurring at 
time 𝑡 depends on the existence of a violation at time 𝑡 − 1. Denoting violation state 
with 1 and non-violation state with 0, the number of states in a Markov chain process is 
denoted as 𝑛00, 𝑛10, 𝑛01, and 𝑛11. Accordingly, the transition matrix of violations and 
non-violations is defined as  
 
Π = (
𝜋00 𝜋01
𝜋10 𝜋11
), (2.38) 
where 
 
𝜋00 =
𝑛00
𝑛00+𝑛01
 ,  𝜋01 =
𝑛01
𝑛00+𝑛01
 ,   𝜋00 =
𝑛10
𝑛10+𝑛11
 ,  𝜋11 =
𝑛11
𝑛10+𝑛11
. (2.39) 
Thus, the 𝐿𝑅𝑆𝐼 test of serial independence is defined as  
 
𝐿𝑅𝑆𝐼 = −2 𝑙𝑜𝑔 [
(1 − 𝜋2)
(𝑛00+ 𝑛10)𝜋2
(𝑛01+ 𝑛11)
(1 − 𝜋01)𝑛00(1 − 𝜋11)𝑛10𝜋01
𝑛01𝜋11𝑛11
] ~  χ2(1). (2.40) 
The 𝐿𝑅𝑆𝐼 test statistic is also asymptotically distributed as a χ
2(1) under the null 
hypothesis of serial independence against the alternative of first-order Markov 
dependence. Finally, Christoffersen (1998) combined the first two tests and introduced a 
joint test of coverage and independence called conditional coverage test which is 
defined as 
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𝐿𝑅𝐶𝐶 = 𝐿𝑅𝑈𝐶 + 𝐿𝑅𝑆𝐼 . 
(2.41) 
The 𝐿𝑅𝐶𝐶 test statistic of conditional coverage is asymptotically distributed as 
a  χ2(2)  under the joint null hypothesis. 
Table 2.5 presents the results of Christoffersen’s (1998) backtesting tests for 
alternative VaR models during the period January 1, 2003, to December 31, 2006. In 
particular, for each VaR model, three LR tests are presented: test of unconditional 
coverage (UC), test of serial independence (SI), and test of conditional coverage (CC). 
Lower 𝐿𝑅𝑈𝐶  statistic indicates that the VaR model provides better coverage, while a 
𝐿𝑅𝑈𝐶  statistic of zero indicates that the model provides full coverage, i.e., the number of 
realized violations is consistent with the confidence level of the VaR model. In general, 
the empirical evidence by the 𝐿𝑅𝑈𝐶  test statistics indicates that almost all VaR models 
provide statistically satisfactory coverage at 1% significance level across all countries 
and during the pre-crisis period. However, when the significance level increases to 10% 
some VaR models fail to provide satisfactory coverage. This is consistent with the 
results obtained by general overview of violations as the 𝐿𝑅𝑈𝐶  statistic is based on the 
number of violations.  
Furthermore, compared to univariate models, multivariate models provide better 
coverage across most countries. Among univariate models, RiskMetrics, GJR-t, 
EGARCH-t, and APARCH-t produce lower number of violations, compared to other 
VaR models.  
Among multivariate models, however, there is no consistent evidence on which 
model produces lower 𝐿𝑅𝑈𝐶  statistic during pre-crisis period and across all countries. 
Nonetheless, most multivariate VaR models pass the UC test at 1 % and 5% 
significance levels. Furthermore, compared to univariate models, multivariate models 
provide better coverage across most countries. Among univariate models, RiskMetrics, 
GJR-t, EGARCH-t, and APARCH-t produce lower number of violations, compared to 
other VaR models. Among multivariate models, however, there is no consistent 
evidence on which model produces lower 𝐿𝑅𝑈𝐶  statistic during pre-crisis period and 
across all countries. Nonetheless, most multivariate VaR models pass the UC test at 1 % 
and 5% significance levels. Furthermore, empirical results of UC test provide 
conflicting evidence on the choice of distributional assumption for market shocks. 
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Table 2.5. LR tests of unconditional coverage, serial independence and conditional 
coverage during the period 2003-2006  
Models 
UK Japan Brazil India 
UC SI CC UC SI CC UC SI CC UC SI CC 
U
n
iv
a
ri
a
te
 m
o
d
el
s 
RiskMetrics 0.19 1.67 1.86 0.00 0.09 0.09 0.04 0.11 0.15 2.27 1.68 3.95 
GARCH 4.03 3.07 7.10 0.62 0.76 1.38 0.62 0.17 0.80 3.40 1.12 4.52 
GARCH-t 1.34 3.31 4.64 0.36 0.11 0.47 0.04 0.07 0.11 2.81 1.24 4.06 
GJR 2.27 3.85 6.12 0.62 0.76 1.38 0.05 0.07 0.12 6.18 0.51 6.69 
GJR-t 0.36 4.48 4.84 0.05 0.06 0.10 0.44 0.04 0.48 2.81 0.39 3.20 
EGARCH 4.03 3.07 7.10 0.36 0.87 1.23 0.05 0.07 0.12 6.97 0.09 7.05 
EGARCH-t 0.95 3.57 4.52 0.00 0.87 0.87 0.00 0.06 0.06 2.81 0.19 3.00 
APARCH 4.71 2.84 7.54 1.34 0.57 1.90 0.00 0.09 0.09 5.42 0.15 5.58 
APARCH-t 0.95 3.31 4.26 0.95 0.66 1.61 0.05 0.07 0.12 2.81 0.19 3.00 
C
C
C
 m
o
d
el
s 
GARCH 1.78 2.03 3.81 0.00 0.09 0.09 0.36 0.87 1.23 2.27 1.12 3.39 
GARCH-t 0.00 1.00 1.00 0.00 0.09 0.09 0.16 0.09 0.25 2.81 1.38 4.19 
GJR 0.36 2.94 3.30 0.05 0.07 0.12 0.05 0.07 0.12 4.71 0.43 5.14 
GJR-t 0.19 1.29 1.48 0.00 0.06 0.06 0.44 0.04 0.48 2.81 0.35 3.17 
EGARCH 1.34 2.23 3.57 0.00 0.09 0.09 0.05 0.07 0.12 5.42 0.15 5.58 
EGARCH-t 0.16 0.87 1.04 0.04 0.07 0.11 0.05 0.07 0.12 1.78 0.19 1.97 
APARCH 1.34 2.23 3.57 0.00 0.09 0.09 0.00 0.09 0.09 5.42 0.15 5.58 
APARCH-t 0.16 2.45 2.61 0.05 0.06 0.10 0.19 0.06 0.24 1.78 0.24 2.02 
D
C
C
 m
o
d
el
s 
RiskMetrics 0.05 1.47 1.52 0.04 0.11 0.15 0.05 0.07 0.12 2.27 1.68 3.95 
GARCH 0.36 0.87 1.23 0.16 0.13 0.29 0.16 1.00 1.16 1.78 1.12 2.90 
GARCH-t 0.00 0.66 0.66 0.16 0.13 0.29 0.04 0.09 0.13 2.27 1.38 3.65 
GJR 0.04 1.13 1.18 0.00 0.09 0.09 0.05 0.07 0.12 4.71 0.43 5.14 
GJR-t 0.44 0.09 0.53 0.05 0.06 0.10 0.44 0.04 0.48 2.81 0.35 3.17 
EGARCH 1.34 2.23 3.57 0.05 0.07 0.12 0.05 0.07 0.12 5.42 0.15 5.58 
EGARCH-t 0.16 1.00 1.16 0.05 0.07 0.12 0.05 0.06 0.10 1.78 0.39 2.17 
APARCH 1.34 2.23 3.57 0.05 0.07 0.12 0.05 0.07 0.12 5.42 0.15 5.58 
APARCH-t 0.36 2.23 2.59 0.19 0.04 0.23 0.05 0.07 0.12 1.78 0.15 1.93 
A
D
C
C
 m
o
d
el
s 
GARCH 0.36 0.87 1.23 0.16 0.13 0.29 0.04 0.11 0.15 5.42 0.15 5.58 
GARCH-t 0.05 0.49 0.53 0.16 0.13 0.29 0.00 0.09 0.09 2.27 1.38 3.65 
GJR 0.04 0.11 0.15 0.04 0.11 0.15 0.00 0.09 0.09 4.03 0.39 4.42 
GJR-t 0.44 0.09 0.53 0.00 0.09 0.09 0.05 0.07 0.12 2.81 0.35 3.17 
EGARCH 1.34 2.23 3.57 0.05 0.07 0.12 0.00 0.09 0.09 5.42 0.47 5.89 
EGARCH-t 0.16 1.13 1.30 0.04 0.09 0.13 0.00 0.09 0.09 2.81 0.43 3.24 
APARCH 0.95 2.45 3.40 0.05 0.07 0.12 0.00 0.09 0.09 6.18 0.12 6.29 
APARCH-t 0.04 2.03 2.08 0.05 0.06 0.10 0.00 0.09 0.09 1.34 0.15 1.49 
Note: This table presents the results of three likelihood ratio (LR) tests proposed by Christoffersen (1998) 
for all sample countries. The LR tests include unconditional coverage (UC), serial independence (SI), and 
conditional coverage (CC). Critical values for UC and SI tests are 2.706, 3.841, and 6.635 for 10%, 5% 
and 1% significance level, respectively. Critical values for CC test are 4.605, 5.991, and 9.210 for 10%, 
5% and 1% significance level, respectively. Entries in bold denote significance at 1% level. 
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Table 2.5. (Continued)  
Models 
Chile Philippines Tunisia Egypt 
UC SI CC UC SI CC UC SI CC UC SI CC 
U
n
iv
a
ri
a
te
 m
o
d
el
s 
RiskMetrics 1.78 0.49 2.26 0.62 0.17 0.80 1.34 0.02 1.37 0.62 0.76 1.38 
GARCH 4.71 1.24 5.95 1.34 0.23 1.56 0.04 0.11 0.15 0.36 0.15 0.51 
GARCH-t 2.81 1.12 3.93 0.36 0.15 0.51 0.05 0.07 0.12 0.04 0.11 0.15 
GJR 4.03 1.38 5.41 0.62 0.17 0.80 0.04 0.11 0.15 0.36 0.15 0.51 
GJR-t 1.78 1.52 3.30 0.36 0.15 0.51 0.00 0.07 0.07 0.16 1.00 1.16 
EGARCH 4.03 1.38 5.41 0.62 0.17 0.80 1.78 0.49 2.26 0.62 0.87 1.49 
EGARCH-t 2.27 1.38 3.65 0.36 0.15 0.51 0.04 0.07 0.11 0.36 0.87 1.23 
APARCH 4.71 1.24 5.95 0.36 0.15 0.51 2.81 0.35 3.16 0.16 0.13 0.29 
APARCH-t 1.78 1.24 3.02 0.36 0.15 0.51 0.04 0.11 0.15 0.36 0.87 1.23 
C
C
C
 m
o
d
el
s 
GARCH 0.16 1.00 1.16 0.62 0.17 0.80 0.44 0.04 0.48 0.00 0.09 0.09 
GARCH-t 0.19 0.11 0.29 0.36 0.15 0.51 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.09 0.09 
GJR 0.16 0.13 0.29 0.95 0.20 1.15 0.82 0.03 0.85 0.04 1.13 1.18 
GJR-t 0.19 0.11 0.29 0.36 0.15 0.51 0.44 0.04 0.48 0.04 1.13 1.18 
EGARCH 0.16 0.13 0.29 0.62 0.17 0.80 0.82 0.03 0.85 0.16 1.00 1.16 
EGARCH-t 0.44 0.06 0.50 0.62 0.17 0.80 1.34 0.02 1.37 0.04 1.13 1.18 
APARCH 0.16 0.13 0.29 0.36 0.15 0.51 1.34 0.02 1.37 0.36 0.87 1.23 
APARCH-t 0.19 0.09 0.28 0.62 0.17 0.80 1.34 0.02 1.37 0.00 1.29 1.29 
D
C
C
 m
o
d
el
s 
RiskMetrics 1.78 0.49 2.26 0.36 0.15 0.51 1.34 0.02 1.37 0.36 0.87 1.23 
GARCH 0.36 0.15 0.51 0.62 0.17 0.80 0.19 0.06 0.24 0.00 0.09 0.09 
GARCH-t 0.05 0.15 0.19 0.36 0.15 0.51 1.34 0.03 1.38 0.00 0.09 0.09 
GJR 0.62 0.17 0.80 0.62 0.17 0.80 0.44 0.04 0.48 0.04 1.13 1.18 
GJR-t 0.05 0.13 0.17 0.16 0.13 0.29 0.19 0.04 0.23 0.04 1.13 1.18 
EGARCH 0.36 0.15 0.51 0.16 0.13 0.29 0.44 0.04 0.48 0.16 1.00 1.16 
EGARCH-t 0.19 0.09 0.28 0.62 0.17 0.80 0.82 0.03 0.85 0.04 1.13 1.18 
APARCH 0.36 0.15 0.51 0.36 0.15 0.51 0.82 0.03 0.85 0.36 0.87 1.23 
APARCH-t 0.05 0.15 0.19 0.36 0.15 0.51 0.82 0.03 0.85 0.00 1.29 1.29 
A
D
C
C
 m
o
d
el
s 
GARCH 1.34 0.57 1.90 0.16 0.13 0.29 0.44 0.04 0.48 0.00 0.09 0.09 
GARCH-t 0.04 0.20 0.24 0.16 0.13 0.29 0.82 0.02 0.84 0.00 0.09 0.09 
GJR 0.95 0.20 1.15 0.16 0.13 0.29 0.44 0.04 0.48 0.04 1.13 1.18 
GJR-t 0.16 0.17 0.34 0.16 0.13 0.29 0.19 0.04 0.23 0.04 1.13 1.18 
EGARCH 1.34 0.57 1.90 0.62 0.17 0.80 0.19 0.06 0.24 0.62 1.00 1.62 
EGARCH-t 0.04 0.17 0.22 0.36 0.15 0.51 0.82 0.03 0.85 0.19 1.67 1.86 
APARCH 0.95 0.66 1.61 0.36 0.15 0.51 0.44 0.04 0.48 0.62 0.76 1.38 
APARCH-t 0.36 0.20 0.56 0.36 0.15 0.51 0.82 0.03 0.85 0.00 1.29 1.29 
Note: This table presents the results of three likelihood ratio (LR) tests proposed by Christoffersen (1998) 
for all sample countries. The LR tests include unconditional coverage (UC), serial independence (SI), and 
conditional coverage (CC). Critical values for UC and SI tests are 2.706, 3.841, and 6.635 for 10%, 5% 
and 1% significance level, respectively. Critical values for CC test are 4.605, 5.991, and 9.210 for 10%, 
5% and 1% significance level, respectively. Entries in bold denote significance at 1% level. 
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More specifically, in most VaR models assuming that market shocks follow Student-t 
distribution leads to lower 𝐿𝑅𝑈𝐶  statistics while, in some cases, normality assumption 
produces equal or lower 𝐿𝑅𝑈𝐶  statistic. 
The second column of backtesting results for each country presents the serial 
independence test statistics. It appears that violation patterns of none of the VaR models 
exhibit serial dependence at 1% significance level. However, the null hypothesis of no 
serial dependence is rejected for some VaR models at higher significance levels. 
Furthermore, compared to univariate models, multivariate models provide lower SI test 
statistics across most countries. For instance, most univariate VaR models in the UK fail 
to pass serial independence test while most multivariate models produce statistically 
satisfactory 𝐿𝑅𝑆𝐼 statistics.  
Finally, the last column of backtesting results for each country presents 
conditional coverage test statistics. In general, the empirical findings of the 𝐿𝑅𝐶𝐶 test 
statistics are very similar to the findings of UC and SI tests as the CC test statistics are 
the sum of 𝐿𝑅𝑈𝐶  and 𝐿𝑅𝑆𝐼 test statistics. For instance, the empirical evidence by the 
𝐿𝑅𝐶𝐶 test statistics indicates that all VaR models provide statistically satisfactory 
coverage at 1% significance level across all countries and during the pre-crisis period. 
Also, multivariate models provide lower 𝐿𝑅𝐶𝐶 statistics for most VaR models and 
across most countries. In addition, assuming that market shocks follow Student-t 
distribution leads to lower 𝐿𝑅𝐶𝐶 test statistics across most VaR models and across most 
sample countries.   
Although most VaR models produce statistically satisfactory results during pre-
crisis periods, it is also crucial to investigate the performance of VaR models during 
crisis periods. With this target in mind, Table 2.6 presents Christoffersen’s (1998) 
backtesting results of VaR models during the crisis period.  In general, the empirical 
evidence by the 𝐿𝑅𝑈𝐶  test statistics indicates that most univariate VaR models fail to 
provide statistically satisfactory coverage at 1% significance level across most sample 
countries. This reflects the high number of violations across univariate VaR models 
during crisis period. However, these results improve when multivariate models are 
employed, which indicates that incorporating more information in VaR modelling 
enhances the performance of VaR models. Among multivariate models, it appears that 
employed, which indicates that incorporating more information in VaR modelling  
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Table 2.6. LR tests of unconditional coverage, serial independence and conditional 
coverage during the period 2007-2010. 
Models 
UK Japan Brazil India 
UC SI CC UC SI CC UC SI CC UC SI CC 
U
n
iv
a
ri
a
te
 m
o
d
el
s 
RiskMetrics 6.97 0.56 7.52 1.34 0.57 1.90 6.18 0.51 6.69 4.03 0.15 4.18 
GARCH 33.03 0.02 33.05 0.62 0.17 0.80 7.79 0.60 8.40 11.43 0.05 11.48 
GARCH-t 18.92 0.34 19.26 0.62 0.17 0.80 6.18 0.47 6.65 12.42 0.01 12.43 
GJR 30.28 0.34 30.62 0.95 0.20 1.15 11.43 0.81 12.24 20.09 0.09 20.18 
GJR-t 23.75 1.84 25.59 3.40 0.32 3.72 8.66 0.65 9.31 11.43 0.12 11.55 
EGARCH 37.31 0.07 37.38 2.27 0.29 2.56 13.43 0.92 14.35 23.75 0.03 23.78 
EGARCH-t 23.75 0.03 23.78 0.62 0.23 0.85 12.42 0.86 13.28 8.66 0.15 8.81 
APARCH 35.86 0.05 35.92 2.27 0.29 2.56 14.48 0.98 15.46 20.09 0.07 20.16 
APARCH-t 18.92 0.01 18.92 0.62 0.17 0.80 14.48 0.98 15.46 11.43 0.19 11.63 
C
C
C
 m
o
d
el
s 
GARCH 11.43 0.81 12.24 0.62 0.17 0.80 9.55 0.70 10.25 6.18 0.00 6.18 
GARCH-t 5.42 0.65 6.07 0.16 0.11 0.27 6.97 0.51 7.48 4.71 0.01 4.72 
GJR 11.43 0.81 12.24 0.04 0.11 0.15 6.97 0.56 7.52 8.66 0.70 9.36 
GJR-t 4.71 0.70 5.41 0.00 0.09 0.09 3.40 0.35 3.75 4.03 0.80 4.83 
EGARCH 12.42 0.86 13.28 1.78 0.26 2.03 10.48 0.75 11.23 13.43 0.34 13.78 
EGARCH-t 5.42 0.60 6.03 0.04 0.11 0.15 10.48 0.75 11.23 2.27 0.70 2.97 
APARCH 13.43 0.00 13.43 1.34 0.23 1.56 11.43 0.81 12.24 12.42 0.40 12.82 
APARCH-t 6.97 0.65 7.62 0.62 0.15 0.77 10.48 0.75 11.23 3.40 0.62 4.02 
D
C
C
 m
o
d
el
s 
RiskMetrics 4.71 0.43 5.14 2.27 0.41 2.68 4.71 0.43 5.14 4.03 0.15 4.18 
GARCH 8.66 0.65 9.31 1.78 0.26 2.03 6.18 0.51 6.69 4.71 0.00 4.71 
GARCH-t 2.27 0.47 2.74 1.78 0.23 2.00 5.42 0.47 5.89 4.03 0.03 4.06 
GJR 5.42 0.47 5.89 2.81 0.32 3.13 5.42 0.47 5.89 7.79 0.80 8.59 
GJR-t 1.34 0.35 1.69 0.62 0.15 0.77 3.40 0.35 3.75 3.40 1.12 4.52 
EGARCH 6.18 0.51 6.69 4.71 0.43 5.14 7.79 0.60 8.40 12.42 0.40 12.82 
EGARCH-t 2.81 0.51 3.32 2.27 0.29 2.56 6.97 0.56 7.52 1.78 1.12 2.90 
APARCH 6.97 0.56 7.52 4.03 0.39 4.42 10.48 0.75 11.23 11.43 0.47 11.90 
APARCH-t 2.27 0.43 2.70 2.81 0.29 3.10 6.97 0.56 7.52 2.81 0.90 3.71 
A
D
C
C
 m
o
d
el
s 
GARCH 7.79 0.60 8.40 2.27 0.29 2.56 6.18 0.51 6.69 11.43 0.00 11.44 
GARCH-t 2.27 0.39 2.66 1.78 0.26 2.03 5.42 0.47 5.89 4.03 0.04 4.07 
GJR 4.03 0.39 4.42 2.81 0.32 3.13 5.42 0.47 5.89 6.18 0.12 6.29 
GJR-t 1.34 0.32 1.66 0.62 0.15 0.77 3.40 0.35 3.75 1.78 0.19 1.97 
EGARCH 6.18 0.51 6.69 5.42 0.47 5.89 6.97 0.56 7.52 10.48 0.01 10.49 
EGARCH-t 2.27 0.47 2.74 2.81 0.29 3.10 6.97 0.56 7.52 1.34 0.19 1.53 
APARCH 6.18 0.51 6.69 4.03 0.39 4.42 10.48 0.75 11.23 9.55 0.62 10.17 
APARCH-t 1.34 0.43 1.77 4.03 0.29 4.32 6.97 0.56 7.52 2.27 0.15 2.42 
Note: This table presents the results of three likelihood ratio (LR) tests proposed by Christoffersen (1998) 
for all sample countries. The LR tests include unconditional coverage (UC), serial independence (SI), and 
conditional coverage (CC). Critical values for UC and SI tests are 2.706, 3.841, and 6.635 for 10%, 5% 
and 1% significance level, respectively. Critical values for CC test are 4.605, 5.991, and 9.210 for 10%, 
5% and 1% significance level, respectively. Entries in bold denote significance at 1% level. 
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Table 2.6. (Continued)  
Models 
Chile Philippines Tunisia Egypt 
UC SI CC UC SI CC UC SI CC UC SI CC 
U
n
iv
a
ri
a
te
 m
o
d
el
s 
RiskMetrics 0.62 0.76 1.38 6.18 2.42 8.60 0.62 5.21 5.83 4.71 2.84 7.54 
GARCH 33.03 2.05 35.09 17.77 0.78 18.55 11.43 2.79 14.22 4.03 1.38 5.41 
GARCH-t 15.55 0.34 15.89 14.48 0.29 14.77 10.48 3.00 13.47 3.40 1.52 4.92 
GJR 21.29 0.09 21.38 6.18 0.51 6.69 12.42 2.60 15.01 4.03 0.24 4.27 
GJR-t 10.48 0.03 10.51 4.71 0.19 4.90 10.48 3.22 13.69 3.40 0.29 3.69 
EGARCH 23.75 0.40 24.15 8.66 0.04 8.70 23.75 2.11 25.85 8.66 0.49 9.14 
EGARCH-t 14.48 0.47 14.95 6.97 0.09 7.05 18.92 1.76 20.68 1.34 0.23 1.56 
APARCH 26.30 0.29 26.59 9.55 0.03 9.57 26.30 0.91 27.21 2.81 0.35 3.16 
APARCH-t 14.48 0.40 14.88 6.97 0.09 7.05 18.92 2.07 20.98 1.78 0.49 2.26 
C
C
C
 m
o
d
el
s 
GARCH 1.34 0.57 1.90 6.97 0.90 7.86 0.36 2.94 3.30 3.40 1.52 4.92 
GARCH-t 0.36 0.17 0.53 5.42 1.12 6.54 10.48 1.67 12.15 3.40 1.52 4.92 
GJR 1.34 0.23 1.56 7.79 0.80 8.59 2.27 3.85 6.12 4.03 0.24 4.27 
GJR-t 0.62 0.23 0.85 6.97 0.90 7.86 4.03 3.22 7.25 2.81 0.35 3.16 
EGARCH 4.71 0.43 5.14 7.79 0.80 8.59 0.04 3.54 3.58 2.27 0.41 2.68 
EGARCH-t 1.34 0.39 1.73 6.18 1.00 7.18 0.00 4.29 4.29 2.27 0.41 2.68 
APARCH 2.81 0.32 3.13 8.66 0.70 9.36 0.62 2.68 3.31 2.27 0.41 2.68 
APARCH-t 0.36 0.32 0.68 7.79 0.80 8.59 0.36 1.00 1.36 1.78 0.49 2.26 
D
C
C
 m
o
d
el
s 
RiskMetrics 0.62 0.76 1.38 4.71 2.84 7.54 0.62 2.68 3.31 4.03 3.07 7.10 
GARCH 0.62 0.76 1.38 6.97 2.23 9.20 0.36 2.94 3.30 3.40 1.52 4.92 
GARCH-t 0.16 0.13 0.29 4.03 1.38 5.41 0.05 1.67 1.72 3.40 1.52 4.92 
GJR 1.78 0.26 2.03 5.42 1.12 6.54 2.81 3.57 6.38 4.03 0.24 4.27 
GJR-t 0.16 0.20 0.36 4.03 1.38 5.41 0.16 3.22 3.38 2.81 0.35 3.16 
EGARCH 2.27 0.29 2.56 6.18 1.00 7.18 0.36 2.94 3.30 2.27 0.41 2.68 
EGARCH-t 0.62 0.23 0.85 4.03 1.38 5.41 0.00 3.89 3.89 2.27 0.41 2.68 
APARCH 2.27 0.29 2.56 5.42 1.12 6.54 0.62 2.68 3.31 2.27 0.41 2.68 
APARCH-t 0.16 0.23 0.39 4.71 1.24 5.95 0.16 1.13 1.30 1.78 0.49 2.26 
A
D
C
C
 m
o
d
el
s 
GARCH 0.62 0.76 1.38 5.42 1.12 6.54 0.62 2.68 3.31 3.40 1.52 4.92 
GARCH-t 0.00 0.15 0.15 3.40 1.52 4.92 0.05 1.47 1.52 3.40 1.52 4.92 
GJR 1.78 0.26 2.03 5.42 1.12 6.54 2.81 3.57 6.38 4.03 0.24 4.27 
GJR-t 0.16 0.20 0.36 4.03 1.38 5.41 0.16 3.22 3.38 2.27 0.41 2.68 
EGARCH 2.27 0.29 2.56 5.42 1.12 6.54 0.36 2.94 3.30 5.42 0.41 5.84 
EGARCH-t 0.36 0.23 0.59 4.03 1.38 5.41 0.04 3.89 3.94 2.27 0.41 2.68 
APARCH 2.27 0.29 2.56 5.42 1.12 6.54 0.95 0.66 1.61 2.27 0.41 2.68 
APARCH-t 0.04 0.23 0.27 3.40 1.52 4.92 0.00 1.47 1.47 1.78 0.49 2.26 
Note: This table presents the results of three likelihood ratio (LR) tests proposed by Christoffersen (1998) 
for all sample countries. The LR tests include unconditional coverage (UC), serial independence (SI), and 
conditional coverage (CC). Critical values for UC and SI tests are 2.706, 3.841, and 6.635 for 10%, 5% 
and 1% significance level, respectively. Critical values for CC test are 4.605, 5.991, and 9.210 for 10%, 
5% and 1% significance level, respectively. Entries in bold denote significance at 1% level. 
 
 
47 
 
enhances the performance of VaR models. Among multivariate models, it 
appears that DCC models and ADCC models have better performance and produce 
lower 𝐿𝑅𝑈𝐶  test statistics. Nonetheless, the null hypothesis of correct unconditional 
coverage is rejected for some DCC and ADCC VaR models at 5% and 10% significance 
levels. Furthermore, empirical results show that, in most VaR models, normality 
assumption for market shocks results in high 𝐿𝑅𝑈𝐶  statistics, thereby weaker conditional 
coverage. This finding lends support to the results obtained by McAleer and da Viega 
(2008).  
The second column of backtesting results for each country in Table 2.6 presents 
the serial independence test statistics. Although most VaR models failed to provide 
correct conditional coverage during crisis period, all VaR models pass the test of serial 
independence at 1% significance level. In other word, the null hypothesis of no serial 
dependence is accepted for all VaR models at 1% significance level. This finding is 
robust across all countries and for most VaR models even when the significance level is 
increased to 5% or 10%. One of the main shortcomings of Christoffersen’s 𝐿𝑅𝑆𝐼 test is 
that it only considers first order dependence, i.e., violations are only considered to be 
serially dependent if they occur in consecutive days. This is perhaps the main reason 
why most VaR models pass the serial independence test. Finally, the last column of 
backtesting results for each country in Table 2.6 presents conditional coverage test 
statistics. In general, it appears that the estimated 𝐿𝑅𝐶𝐶 statistics are very similar to the 
𝐿𝑅𝑈𝐶  statistics. This is not surprising as 𝐿𝑅𝐶𝐶 test statistics are the sum of 𝐿𝑅𝑈𝐶  and 
𝐿𝑅𝑆𝐼 test statistics, while estimated SI statistics are much lower than 𝐿𝑅𝑈𝐶  statistics in 
most VaR models. Therefore, the empirical evidence by the 𝐿𝑅𝐶𝐶 test statistics indicates 
that most VaR models fail to provide statistically satisfactory coverage at 1% 
significance level during crisis period.  However, portfolio models provide lower 𝐿𝑅𝐶𝐶 
statistics for most VaR models and across most countries. Furthermore, the Student-t 
distributional assumption for market shocks results in lower 𝐿𝑅𝐶𝐶 test statistics across 
most VaR models and across most sample countries.   
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2.4.3. Regulatory capital charges 
According to Basel accords, banks are required to set aside regulatory capital to 
buffer market risk exposure. The amount of market risk capital charges (MRCC) is to be 
based on the VaR estimates generated by internal VaR models. In particular, banks are 
required to compute VaR threshold on a daily basis and with 99% confidence level. The 
daily VaR figure is then scaled up by a reasonable approach to calculate VaR for a 10-day 
holding period.
6
 Accordingly, capital requirements is set as the higher of the previous day 
VaR figure and the average of VaR figures over the last 60 business days, multiplied by 
a scaling factor, (3 + 𝑘). More specifically, the MRCC is calculated based on the 
following formula
7
  
 
 
𝑀𝑅𝐶𝐶𝑡 = 𝑚𝑎𝑥 {𝑉𝑎𝑅𝑡−1;
(3 + 𝑘)
60
∑𝑉𝑎𝑅𝑡−𝑖
60
𝑖=1
}. (2.42) 
 
The scaling factor is set by individual supervisory authority and must not be 
lower than 3. Indeed, the scaling factor equals 3 plus a varying factor, k, which acts as a 
penalty for poorly performing internal models. The varying factor ranges from 0 to 1 
according to the backtesting results of the internal model over the last 250 business 
days. To determine k, the BCBS (1996b) provides a framework which defines three 
zones distinguished by three colours: green, yellow, and red. The Basel Accord penalty 
zones are summarized in Table 2.7. Internal models that fall in the green zone are 
favourable models from regulatory point of view, while the yellow zone corresponds to 
internal models with dubious performance. Furthermore, an internal model with more 
than 9 violations in 250 business days falls into the red zone, where the bank is required 
to either revise its internal VaR model or adopt the standardized method.  
                                                 
6 One of the interesting features of GARCH family models is that 10-day ahead VaR can be easily 
derived from 1-day-ahead VaR threshold. 
7
 The 2009 amendment to Basel II market risk framework adds an additional term called stressed VaR to 
the MRCC. However, stressed VaR is not considered in this study as the model used for stressed VaR can 
be different and the stress period can be chosen arbitrarily. 
49 
 
Table 2.7. Basel Accord penalty zones for 250 business days 
Zone Number of violations Increase in scaling factor  
Green 0-4 0.00 
Yellow 5 0.40 
 6 0.50 
 7 0.65 
 8 0.75 
 9 0.85 
Red 10+ 1.00 
 
Risk managers are not only concerned with the accuracy of risk models, but also 
favour models that impose lower regulatory capital charges (McAleer et al., 2010). In 
this chapter, the mean daily capital charges (MDCC) of alternative VaR models are 
compared to determine favourable VaR models from risk management perspective. 
Furthermore, this chapter determines VaR models that fall into the red zone to avoid 
promoting poorly performing VaR models that lead to lower MDCC. This approach has 
been widely used in the recent VaR studies (see, e.g., McAleer et al., 2013; Louzis et 
al., 2014; McAleer, 2009, among others) 
Another approach to assess the efficiency of alternative VaR models is to 
measure their goodness of fit to the realized portfolio losses. Accordingly, goodness of 
fit of a VaR model is calculated through the root mean squared error (RMSE) which is 
defined as follows 
 
𝑅𝑀𝑆𝐸 = √𝐸[(𝑉𝑎𝑅𝑡 − 𝐿𝑡)2] = √
1
𝑇
 ∑(𝑉𝑎𝑅𝑡 − 𝐿𝑡)2
𝑇
𝑡=1
 , (2.43) 
where 𝐿𝑡 is the actual loss on a portfolio at date 𝑡 and 𝑇 is the total number of out-of-
sample observations. In this context, a desirable VaR model, from risk management 
perspective, should produce low RMSE and impose low capital requirement.  
To evaluate alternative VaR models from risk management standpoint, Table 2.8 
presents the RMSE and MDCC for all sample countries during pre-crisis period. In 
addition, bold MDCC denotes VaR models that fall into red zone by producing more 
than 9 violations in 250 business days during the pre-crisis period. From Table 2.8, it 
appears that the magnitude of RMSE widely varies across sample countries. For 
50 
 
instance, RMSE figures in Brazil and Egypt are much higher than those in the UK, 
Tunisia, and Chile. One possible explanation for this finding is that return series in 
Brazil and Egypt are not as clustered as those in the UK or Chile (see Figure 2.1). In 
such cases, large losses largely increase VaR figures while they are followed by small 
losses. Furthermore, there is no clear and consistent evidence on which VaR model 
produces lower RMSE during pre-crisis period and across all countries. Nonetheless, 
most multivariate VaR models produce higher RMSE figures compared to univariate 
models. The empirical results also reveal that assuming that market shocks follow 
Student-t distribution leads to higher RMSE. This indicates that Student-t distribution 
assumption may lead to lower number of violations mainly because it creates larger 
VaR figures. 
The empirical results of the MDCC show that most VaR models do not exceed 
more than 9 violations in every 250 days during pre-crisis period while there is no clear 
evidence on which VaR model produces lower MDCC during pre-crisis period. 
However, it is found that multivariate models and Student-t distribution assumption for 
market shocks impose slightly higher capital charges, which is consistent with McAleer 
and da Viega’s (2008) findings.  
Table 2.9 presents RMSE and MDCC results for alternative VaR models during 
crisis period. It appears that both RMSE and MDCC largely increase for all VaR models 
during crisis period. More importantly, most univariate VaR models and some 
multivariate models produce more than 9 violations in a 250 business day period. This 
indicates that many VaR models fall into the red zone at some point during the crisis, 
meaning that they have to be either reviewed or replaced by the standardized model 
which imposes very high capital requirements.  
The most striking finding of this chapter is that performance of VaR models is 
highly sensitive to the underlying portfolio and no VaR model, particularly among 
multivariate models, is found to be superior to its counterparts across all countries. In 
addition, there is mixed evidence on which model produces the lowest RMSE across all 
sample countries, while multivariate models lead to higher RMSE in most cases. 
Finally, it is found that assuming that market shocks follow Student-t distribution lead 
51 
 
to lower RMSE and higher MDCC for most VaR models and across most sample 
countries.  
 
 
Table 2.8. Capital requirements and goodness of fit during the period 2003-2006.   
Models 
UK Japan Brazil India 
RMSE MDCC RMSE MDCC RMSE MDCC RMSE MDCC 
U
n
iv
a
ri
a
te
 m
o
d
el
s 
RiskMetrics 2.580 6.627 5.612 9.546 13.815 15.199 8.495 11.166 
GARCH 1.566 6.008 4.707 9.106 13.720 15.433 7.403 10.550 
GARCH-t 1.935 6.204 5.062 9.372 13.999 15.196 7.481 10.411 
GJR 1.645 5.961 4.731 9.203 13.458 14.570 5.769 10.049 
GJR-t 2.030 6.264 5.686 9.627 14.157 14.874 7.196 10.434 
EGARCH 1.494 5.916 4.413 8.760 13.304 14.523 5.251 9.874 
EGARCH-t 1.872 6.119 5.548 9.566 13.740 14.834 6.463 10.336 
APARCH 1.495 5.986 4.389 8.906 13.324 14.831 5.286 9.842 
APARCH-t 1.877 6.130 4.773 9.138 14.024 14.822 6.493 10.328 
C
C
C
 m
o
d
el
s 
GARCH 1.721 5.998 5.336 9.365 13.772 15.465 7.923 10.720 
GARCH-t 2.140 6.201 5.654 9.569 14.206 15.454 7.938 10.681 
GJR 1.728 5.839 5.319 9.364 13.810 14.956 6.095 10.132 
GJR-t 2.141 6.165 5.336 9.368 14.563 15.179 7.545 10.719 
EGARCH 1.609 5.808 5.394 9.452 13.636 14.891 5.508 10.037 
EGARCH-t 1.926 6.002 5.615 9.640 14.145 15.107 6.814 10.477 
APARCH 1.605 5.781 5.297 9.367 13.601 14.883 5.527 10.085 
APARCH-t 1.981 6.152 5.638 9.622 14.475 15.146 6.839 10.460 
D
C
C
 m
o
d
el
s 
RiskMetrics 2.626 6.644 5.652 9.725 14.144 14.929 8.535 11.181 
GARCH 1.867 5.854 5.574 9.664 13.939 15.194 8.117 10.525 
GARCH-t 2.325 6.340 5.906 9.873 14.398 15.035 8.130 10.721 
GJR 1.883 5.964 5.556 9.460 14.023 14.873 6.249 10.188 
GJR-t 2.336 6.303 5.865 9.655 14.800 15.196 7.742 10.779 
EGARCH 1.759 5.913 5.632 9.519 13.808 14.821 5.622 10.087 
EGARCH-t 2.115 6.138 5.871 9.677 14.332 15.037 6.979 10.530 
APARCH 1.760 5.889 5.529 9.432 13.768 14.813 5.641 10.135 
APARCH-t 2.171 6.349 5.891 9.690 14.666 15.180 7.005 10.513 
A
D
C
C
 m
o
d
el
s 
GARCH 1.928 5.982 5.609 9.670 13.849 14.990 6.627 10.321 
GARCH-t 2.403 6.375 5.944 9.880 14.311 15.176 8.221 10.745 
GJR 1.950 5.927 5.592 9.668 13.966 14.838 6.325 10.123 
GJR-t 2.421 6.337 5.904 9.694 14.745 15.160 7.839 10.805 
EGARCH 1.823 5.935 5.669 9.526 13.730 14.783 5.684 10.079 
EGARCH-t 2.200 6.346 5.911 9.891 14.257 14.998 7.069 10.724 
APARCH 1.826 5.902 5.566 9.439 13.695 14.776 5.704 10.218 
APARCH-t 2.252 6.351 5.929 9.698 14.595 15.142 7.095 10.314 
Note: Root mean squared errors (RMSE) and mean daily capital charges (MDCC) are presented for each 
country. Entries in bold denote models that incur more than 10 violations in 250 business days during pre-
crisis period. 
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Table 2.8. (Continued)   
Models 
Chile Philippines Tunisia  Egypt 
RMSE MDCC RMSE MDCC RMSE MDCC RMSE MDCC 
U
n
iv
a
ri
a
te
 m
o
d
el
s 
RiskMetrics 2.605 7.254 4.887 8.667 0.897 3.845 8.467 11.830 
GARCH 1.947 7.212 5.032 9.111 0.661 3.450 7.857 11.410 
GARCH-t 2.273 7.390 5.109 8.895 0.741 3.623 10.000 12.050 
GJR 2.020 7.245 4.860 8.842 0.680 3.493 8.222 11.590 
GJR-t 2.391 7.462 5.334 9.054 0.744 3.635 9.925 12.240 
EGARCH 1.979 7.097 4.997 8.939 0.617 3.630 4.997 8.939 
EGARCH-t 2.336 7.306 5.379 9.125 0.690 3.528 10.120 12.400 
APARCH 1.985 7.222 4.967 8.763 0.592 3.635 8.287 11.760 
APARCH-t 2.353 7.268 5.419 9.141 0.676 3.501 9.898 12.240 
C
C
C
 m
o
d
el
s 
GARCH 2.785 7.373 5.123 9.055 0.923 3.912 8.880 11.450 
GARCH-t 3.494 7.857 5.475 9.139 0.723 3.588 9.650 11.710 
GJR 2.767 7.347 5.111 9.139 0.913 3.906 9.320 11.820 
GJR-t 3.482 7.836 5.351 9.068 0.885 3.881 10.020 12.170 
EGARCH 2.746 7.349 5.166 9.159 0.955 3.971 8.814 11.750 
EGARCH-t 3.480 7.848 5.468 9.355 1.040 4.108 12.590 13.510 
APARCH 2.738 7.341 5.169 8.917 0.945 3.952 8.954 11.830 
APARCH-t 3.459 7.829 5.515 9.378 1.023 4.084 12.090 13.320 
D
C
C
 m
o
d
el
s 
RiskMetrics 2.504 7.145 4.934 8.762 0.870 3.778 8.585 11.800 
GARCH 2.607 7.146 5.097 9.038 0.935 3.943 8.854 11.430 
GARCH-t 3.273 7.689 5.445 9.120 1.000 4.056 9.636 11.700 
GJR 2.586 7.121 5.090 8.966 0.925 3.937 9.307 11.800 
GJR-t 3.263 7.670 5.326 9.026 0.955 3.993 10.010 12.160 
EGARCH 2.553 7.097 5.137 8.888 0.968 4.004 8.789 11.720 
EGARCH-t 3.245 7.681 5.430 9.333 1.053 4.141 12.530 13.470 
APARCH 2.549 7.090 5.139 8.898 0.958 3.985 8.931 11.810 
APARCH-t 3.227 7.659 5.476 9.198 1.037 4.117 12.030 13.280 
A
D
C
C
 m
o
d
el
s 
GARCH 2.521 7.222 5.222 8.940 0.925 3.921 9.585 11.820 
GARCH-t 3.162 7.618 5.591 9.185 1.014 4.089 10.030 11.920 
GJR 2.504 7.049 5.219 9.020 0.917 3.915 9.687 12.020 
GJR-t 3.157 7.602 5.475 9.115 0.943 3.969 10.420 12.380 
EGARCH 2.477 7.202 5.249 9.074 0.956 3.980 5.249 9.074 
EGARCH-t 3.146 7.616 5.560 9.266 1.035 4.113 14.440 14.150 
APARCH 2.471 7.154 5.254 8.985 0.948 3.962 9.713 12.310 
APARCH-t 3.129 7.599 5.608 9.288 1.019 4.089 13.810 13.990 
Note: Root mean squared errors (RMSE) and mean daily capital charges (MDCC) are presented for each 
country. Entries in bold denote models that incur more than 10 violations in 250 business days during pre-
crisis period. 
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Table 2.9. Capital requirements and goodness of fit during the period 2007-2010.  
Models 
UK Japan Brazil India 
RMSE MDCC RMSE MDCC RMSE MDCC RMSE MDCC 
U
n
iv
a
ri
a
te
 m
o
d
el
s 
RiskMetrics 9.384 13.801 7.836 12.370 23.615 21.070 15.399 17.609 
GARCH 5.730 12.476 9.205 12.237 21.660 20.571 11.833 16.087 
GARCH-t 7.185 13.256 9.692 12.474 22.809 20.334 11.964 16.079 
GJR 5.478 12.346 9.077 12.180 21.459 20.824 10.289 15.298 
GJR-t 6.765 13.154 7.497 12.326 22.992 20.798 12.460 15.771 
EGARCH 4.776 11.947 7.893 12.438 18.829 20.377 9.030 15.073 
EGARCH-t 6.159 12.984 9.830 13.046 19.606 20.495 11.307 15.399 
APARCH 4.740 11.932 7.931 12.647 18.565 20.374 9.504 15.096 
APARCH-t 6.311 12.944 8.215 12.099 19.723 20.872 11.399 15.718 
C
C
C
 m
o
d
el
s 
GARCH 7.873 13.354 9.982 12.381 21.395 20.565 14.738 16.897 
GARCH-t 9.676 13.700 10.821 12.664 22.681 20.443 15.037 16.515 
GJR 7.372 13.315 9.532 11.517 19.954 19.764 12.571 15.913 
GJR-t 9.074 13.319 10.065 11.666 21.594 19.208 15.211 16.022 
EGARCH 6.378 12.880 8.245 12.463 17.626 20.162 11.032 15.711 
EGARCH-t 8.047 13.204 9.188 12.229 18.324 20.431 14.432 16.121 
APARCH 6.312 12.903 8.198 12.365 17.329 20.159 11.329 15.706 
APARCH-t 8.402 13.802 9.221 12.492 18.419 20.384 14.495 16.471 
D
C
C
 m
o
d
el
s 
RiskMetrics 9.474 13.577 7.832 12.691 23.863 20.757 15.644 17.745 
GARCH 9.970 13.947 8.408 12.373 22.632 20.343 15.728 16.936 
GARCH-t 12.246 13.736 9.124 12.667 23.983 20.519 16.120 16.643 
GJR 9.365 13.337 7.975 12.269 21.179 19.773 13.359 16.053 
GJR-t 11.511 13.139 8.845 12.006 22.929 19.648 16.236 16.405 
EGARCH 7.954 13.234 7.013 12.320 18.660 19.968 11.662 16.091 
EGARCH-t 10.044 13.583 7.803 12.610 19.401 20.047 15.444 16.032 
APARCH 7.923 13.303 6.966 12.271 18.344 20.272 11.964 16.068 
APARCH-t 10.545 13.601 7.807 12.610 19.501 20.128 15.501 16.493 
A
D
C
C
 m
o
d
el
s 
GARCH 10.222 13.977 8.330 12.420 22.698 20.370 12.815 16.727 
GARCH-t 12.554 13.879 9.043 12.588 24.050 20.547 16.319 16.768 
GJR 9.600 12.972 7.887 12.261 21.261 19.802 13.536 15.965 
GJR-t 11.799 13.320 8.753 11.999 23.013 19.676 16.458 16.005 
EGARCH 8.125 13.257 6.927 12.361 18.742 19.806 11.834 16.174 
EGARCH-t 10.256 13.526 7.712 12.696 19.485 20.075 15.693 16.041 
APARCH 8.101 13.208 6.880 12.254 18.426 20.301 12.136 16.106 
APARCH-t 10.777 13.202 7.717 12.696 19.586 20.157 15.748 16.533 
Note: Root mean squared errors (RMSE) and mean daily capital charges (MDCC) are presented for each 
country. Entries in bold denote models that incur more than 10 violations in 250 business days during 
crisis period. 
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Table 2.9. (Continued)   
Models 
Chile Philippines Tunisia  Egypt 
RMSE MDCC RMSE MDCC RMSE MDCC RMSE MDCC 
U
n
iv
a
ri
a
te
 m
o
d
el
s 
RiskMetrics 7.556 11.390 8.818 13.110 1.690 4.843 10.300 13.690 
GARCH 3.919 10.000 7.454 12.560 0.921 4.332 11.010 13.440 
GARCH-t 4.704 10.370 7.922 12.780 0.965 4.436 11.400 13.500 
GJR 3.818 9.689 9.634 13.210 0.927 4.402 12.060 13.680 
GJR-t 4.601 10.200 10.050 13.360 0.950 4.455 11.680 13.340 
EGARCH 3.555 9.810 8.512 13.110 0.802 4.307 8.512 13.110 
EGARCH-t 4.298 10.090 9.054 13.260 0.816 4.329 11.410 13.020 
APARCH 3.606 9.786 8.507 13.150 0.813 4.377 11.150 13.310 
APARCH-t 4.291 10.050 9.046 13.260 0.825 4.356 11.380 13.160 
C
C
C
 m
o
d
el
s 
GARCH 7.297 10.910 8.961 13.080 1.571 4.767 11.200 13.390 
GARCH-t 8.815 11.300 9.397 13.310 0.942 4.437 11.260 13.480 
GJR 6.938 10.630 8.920 13.170 1.345 4.444 11.090 13.260 
GJR-t 8.353 11.320 9.397 13.420 1.120 4.452 11.920 13.450 
EGARCH 5.906 10.890 7.967 12.850 1.304 4.582 10.750 13.180 
EGARCH-t 7.275 11.350 8.488 13.030 1.362 4.744 11.770 13.570 
APARCH 5.982 10.670 7.977 12.900 1.324 4.771 11.080 13.310 
APARCH-t 7.424 11.040 8.513 13.240 1.408 4.907 11.550 13.310 
D
C
C
 m
o
d
el
s 
RiskMetrics 7.502 11.370 8.852 12.990 1.730 4.894 10.290 13.520 
GARCH 8.723 10.900 9.335 13.320 1.642 4.806 11.180 13.380 
GARCH-t 10.530 11.630 9.789 13.510 1.583 4.750 11.240 13.470 
GJR 8.211 11.210 9.286 13.220 1.408 4.533 11.070 13.250 
GJR-t 9.875 11.430 9.785 13.420 1.374 4.822 11.900 13.430 
EGARCH 6.800 10.810 8.280 12.780 1.346 4.788 10.740 13.170 
EGARCH-t 8.316 11.500 8.819 13.040 1.399 4.723 11.750 13.560 
APARCH 6.919 10.890 8.290 12.740 1.367 4.839 11.060 13.300 
APARCH-t 8.596 11.300 8.848 13.110 1.444 4.919 11.520 13.300 
A
D
C
C
 m
o
d
el
s 
GARCH 8.758 10.920 9.407 13.210 1.676 4.967 11.360 13.450 
GARCH-t 10.570 11.420 9.866 13.380 1.637 4.832 11.430 13.540 
GJR 8.246 11.230 9.361 13.170 1.415 4.529 11.270 13.330 
GJR-t 9.916 11.440 9.865 13.390 1.398 4.899 12.110 13.400 
EGARCH 6.829 10.870 8.351 12.760 1.372 4.798 8.351 12.760 
EGARCH-t 8.352 11.390 8.895 13.050 1.423 4.885 12.250 13.650 
APARCH 6.950 10.910 8.360 12.770 1.394 4.911 11.230 13.370 
APARCH-t 8.635 11.180 8.924 12.970 1.470 4.885 11.910 13.430 
Note: Root mean squared errors (RMSE) and mean daily capital charges (MDCC) are presented for each 
country. Entries in bold denote models that incur more than 10 violations in 250 business days during 
crisis period. 
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2.5. CONCLUSIONS 
This chapter examines the performance of alternative parametric VaR models in 
forecasting one-day-ahead VaR thresholds for international equity portfolios. An 
international equity portfolio is composed of two major risk components: equity risk 
and foreign exchange rate risk. During the recent financial crisis, U.S. banks suffered 
from significant losses in their international equity portfolios as both exchange rates and 
equity indices dramatically declined in most countries. This in turn provides a unique 
opportunity for risk managers to assess the performance of alternative risk models in 
measuring VaR of international equity portfolios. Two main approaches can be used to 
estimate VaR threshold of international equity portfolios: (i) applying univariate VaR 
models on portfolio returns, and (ii) applying multivariate VaR models on portfolio’s 
risk components.  
In this chapter, a variety of GARCH type models have been employed to model 
conditional volatilities in both univariate and multivariate frameworks. Notably, special 
focus is given to correlations between equity indices and exchange rates by considering 
three popular conditional correlation models: namely CCC, DCC, and ADCC models. 
The performance of VaR models is investigated in eight countries and over two sample 
periods: pre-crisis period, from January 2003 to December 2006, and crisis period, from 
January 2007 to December 2010. Subsequently, nine backtesting criteria are employed 
to evaluate the performance of VaR models from both regulatory and risk management 
perspectives. 
Overall, from regulatory perspective, the empirical results reveal that most VaR 
models have satisfactory performance with small number of violations during pre-crisis 
period, while the number of violations, mean deviation of violations, and maximum 
deviation of violations dramatically increase during crisis period. Furthermore, 
multivariate models incur lower number of violations compared to univariate models, 
while DCC and ADCC models perform better than CCC models during crisis period. 
This in turn indicates that multivariate models are more favourable to regulators, 
compared to univariate models. In addition, the assumption that market shocks follow 
Student-t distribution leads to more accurate and conservative VaR estimations over 
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both sub-sample periods. From risk management perspective, however, portfolio 
models produce slightly higher regulatory capital requirement and weaker goodness of 
fit, while most univariate models produce more than 10 violations in 250 business days 
across most sample countries. Furthermore, there is mixed evidence on the choice of 
portfolio models among CCC, DCC, and ADCC models. 
These findings have several important implications for regulators and 
policymakers. They underline the necessity of imposing more capital requirements for 
internal VaR models during crisis periods. This is mainly because most VaR models are 
likely to fail to perform satisfactorily during periods of financial crisis. As a solution for 
this issue, the 2009 amendment to the Basel Accord proposed adding stressed VaR to 
the calculation of market risk capital charges. However, adding stressed VaR to capital 
charges during a non-crisis state may lead to excessive capital requirements, which may 
in turn increase risk-taking appetite of bank managers. Another striking implication is 
that none of VaR models considered in this study is able to pass all specification tests 
and satisfy both regulators and risk managers concurrently. Indeed, this underlines the 
need for further research on developing better performing VaR models, particularly 
during crisis periods.   
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3. CHAPTER THREE 
HOUSE PRICES AND EVOLUTION OF 
NONPERFORMING LOANS: EVIDENCE 
FROM THE UNITED STATES 
 
3.1. INTRODUCTION 
The recent subprime mortgage crisis in the United States has demonstrated the 
key role that house prices play in destabilising the financial system. From the late 
1990s, there was a sharp increase in subprime mortgages fuelled by low interest rates 
and lax lending standards. However, while the quality of banks’ loan portfolios was 
deteriorating by the constant growth of the subprime mortgages, the default rates 
remained artificially low due to rapid house price appreciation. These protracted booms 
in house prices and low default rates encouraged banks to heavily invest in the real 
estate market as well as mortgage related securities. This further increased house prices 
and led to the creation of a speculative real estate bubble, which eventually burst in the 
subsequent years. 
The collapse of real estate bubble exerted enormous pressure on banks that were 
highly exposed to the real estate market. In particular, many banking institutions 
suffered from severe liquidity shortages due to a sharp increase in their nonperforming 
real estate loans. Falling house prices undermined the value of real estate collaterals, 
which motivated many subprime mortgage borrowers to default on their loan 
repayments. Higher default rates in turn led to credit contraction and tightening of 
lending standards by banks. As a consequence, housing demand substantially dropped, 
while housing supply was increasing by the rising number of real estate foreclosures. 
This further reduced house prices and exacerbated deteriorating credit market 
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conditions, which severely affected the real economy and led to high nonperforming 
loans across all loan categories. 
In the light of the recent events, it is clear that understanding how house prices 
affect the quality of loan portfolios is of crucial importance for financial institutions and 
regulators interested in maintaining financial stability. In this context and due to lack of 
empirical works on the linkage between house prices and quality of loan portfolios, 
dynamic panel data models are employed in this chapter to empirically investigate the 
impact of house price fluctuations on the evolution of nonperforming loans across the 
US banking institutions. This analysis is further developed by examining how this 
relationship varies across different loan categories, different types of banking 
institutions, and different bank size. 
This chapter contributes to the existing literature in several ways. First, to the 
best of my knowledge, this study is among few studies that empirically examine the 
impact of house prices on the quality of loan portfolios at bank-level.
8
 It is argued that 
house prices largely affect the performance of loan portfolios as (i) real estate loans 
usually form a large portion of a bank’s aggregate loan portfolio, (ii) real estate assets 
are widely used as collateral for other loan categories to secure the loan repayments 
(see, e.g., Goodhart and Hofmann, 2008; Davis and Zhu, 2009). However, most 
previous studies, including Reinhart and Rogoff (2008), Reinhart and Rogoff (2009), 
and Barrell et al. (2010), have concentrated on the role of house prices in undermining 
the banking system as a whole, and far less is known on how individual banks are 
affected by swings in house prices. This chapter aims to fill this gap. 
Second, this Chapter investigates how different loan categories are affected by 
house price developments. Using aggregate nonperforming loan to examine the linkage 
between house prices and the quality of loan portfolios may be challenged as the 
composition of loan portfolios varies widely across banking institutions (see, e.g., 
Louzis et al., 2012). Therefore, it is of crucial importance to investigate the sensitivity 
of different loan categories to house price fluctuations, which helps financial regulators 
                                                 
8
 Closely related to this aspect of this study, Davis and Zhu (2009) investigate the impact of changes in 
commercial property prices on various loan portfolio performance indicators including nonperforming 
loans. 
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provide better regulatory practices for individual banks with different loan portfolio 
compositions. 
Third, potential differences between determinants of nonperforming loans across 
different types of the US banking institutions have remained undetected, despite their 
important regulatory implications. It is argued that a bank’s lending policies reflect its 
risk attitude, which in turn depends on its mission and institutional structure (see, e.g., 
Salas and Saurina, 2002). This Chapter adds to existent credit risk literature by 
examining if the impact of house prices on the evolution of nonperforming loans varies 
across two types of banking institutions: namely commercial banks (CB) and saving 
institutions (SI).
9
  
Fourth, this chapter constitutes a first attempt to assess the role of bank size on 
the linkage between house prices and nonperforming loans. Sensitivity of a bank to real 
estate market is highly associated with its lending strategies, which in turn greatly 
depend upon its size and complexity. In general, larger banks can benefit from 
economies of scale, better access to external funds, and more diversified borrowers and 
products, while their ‘too-big-to-fail’ status can create moral hazard incentives to take 
excessive risks (see, e.g., Tabak et al., 2011; De Haan and Poghosyan, 2012). 
Accordingly, it is examined if larger banks are more vulnerable to swings in house 
prices, compared to smaller banks. 
Finally, the study at hand is among the first studies that investigate the impact of 
state-level house price fluctuations on evolution of nonperforming loans during both 
boom and bust periods. It is argued that the dynamics of house prices vary widely both 
over time and across geographical regions (see, e.g., Holly et al., 2010). A close look at 
the US state-level data reveals that the recent boom and bust in the house prices were 
non-uniform across US States. While some States such as California and Florida 
experienced substantial changes in house prices over both boom and bust periods, some 
States such as Vermont and Montana only underwent rapid house price appreciation, 
and some other States such as Georgia and Michigan only faced large declines over the 
bust period. These substantial variations in regional house price dynamics reflect 
differences in the housing market supply and demand, which in turn depend on 
                                                 
9
 Savings institutions in this study include all U.S. savings banks as well as savings and loan associations. 
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demographic and socio cultural factors, local economic conditions, regional regulations 
and jurisdictions, and local financial system. Although these factors can markedly 
contribute to the diversity of credit risk within the US, the impact of time and regional 
variations in house prices on the evolution of credit risk has been largely neglected by 
the literature.  
In a nutshell, the empirical results of this chapter reveal that house prices 
significantly affect the quality of banks’ loan portfolios. More specifically, the findings 
clearly show that there is a strong negative relation between house prices and 
nonperforming loans in individual banks. In addition, it is found that real estate loans 
are more sensitive to house price fluctuations compared to other types of loans. Also, 
while house prices have significant impact on the quality of loan portfolios across 
savings banks and commercial banks, the magnitude of its impact varies depending on 
the type and mission of the institutions. Finally, it is found that the impact of falling 
house prices on credit risk is more pronounced in large banks, compared to small banks. 
The remainder of this chapter is organised as follows. Section 3.2 reviews 
relevant literature and develops the empirical hypotheses to be tested. Section 3.3 
introduces the empirical model under consideration, the estimation procedure, and 
control variables. In Section 3.4, a detailed description of the data under consideration is 
provided. Section 3.5 discusses the empirical results associated with each hypothesis 
while Section 3.6 concludes and makes several suggestions regarding policy 
implications. 
3.2. EMPIRICAL HYPOTHESES 
Credit risk refers to the risk that a borrower fails to make a scheduled payment 
on any type of debt. This has been one of the major risks faced by banking institutions, 
and it is therefore not surprising that a tremendous amount of literature has dealt with 
modelling credit risk by investigating the factors affecting the risk attitude of both 
lenders and borrowers. 
A main strand of research postulates that credit risk is tightly linked to business 
cycles (see, e.g., Pesaran et al., 2006; Koopman et al., 2005; Koopman and Lucas, 
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2005; Quagliariello, 2007, Fei et al., 2012, among others). According to this literature, 
lending standards and borrowers’ default and financing policies are closely related to 
the state of the economy in different phases of the business cycle. Most importantly, it is 
argued that the impact of macroeconomic conditions on credit risk is stronger during 
macroeconomic downturn, indicating an asymmetric pattern in the linkage between 
business cycle and credit risk (Marcucci and Quagliariello, 2009). 
One of the main macroeconomic factors that can play a key role in the evolution 
of credit risk is house price cycle. On the one hand, changes in house prices can largely 
affect the riskiness of households and mortgage borrowers as housing is a major 
component of household wealth (Flavin and Yamashita, 2002), and also wealth effects 
of housing are greater than other financial assets (Case et al., 2005). On the other hand, 
real estate assets and mortgage related securities form a major component of banks’ 
balance sheets as most banks are actively involved in different types of real estate 
investments, including mortgage lending. Accordingly, it is argued that lending policies 
and risk taking behaviour of banks are greatly affected by house price cycles (see, e.g., 
Davis and Zhu, 2009; Davis and Zhu, 2011). Furthermore, house price busts have been 
often associated with financial instability and banking crisis in the past. 
Therefore, understanding the drivers of house price cycles is of crucial 
importance and can shed light on the linkage between housing prices and credit risk. 
Like any other assets, equilibrium house prices are determined by a wide range of 
factors influencing supply and demand in the housing market. Housing supply strongly 
depends on the real construction costs as well as physical and regulatory constraints 
while the main drivers of housing demand are macroeconomic fundamentals such as 
local population growth, real disposable income, interest rate, and unemployment rate, 
suggesting that house prices and business cycles may move together (see, e.g., Leamer, 
2007; Davis and Heathcote, 2005). However, actual house prices often deviate from the 
long-run equilibrium determined by supply and demand fundamentals. Koetter and 
Poghosyan (2010) point out that sustained deviations from long-run equilibrium occur 
more frequently in the housing market compared to financial markets because of (i) 
decentralized trading of real estate, as a non-standardized asset, which implies imperfect 
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information and high transaction costs, and (ii) inelastic housing supply due to 
construction lags and limited land availability. 
Furthermore, recent consensus literature highlights the central role of financial sector in 
fuelling such deviations. According to this literature, banks’ lending behaviour greatly 
amplifies the effects of small income shocks through the real economy by altering the 
value of borrowers’ net-worth. In an influential paper, Bernanke et al. (1996) refer to 
this amplification mechanism as the “financial accelerator” or “credit multiplier”. The 
main idea behind the financial accelerator is the interplay between borrowers’ net worth 
and their borrowing capacity that arises due to credit market imperfections and 
asymmetric information between lenders and borrowers in the credit market. In this 
context, the financial accelerator mechanism can offer an explanation to changes in 
house prices beyond their fundamental values. Prospective borrowers are usually 
required to put up collateral to secure their loan repayments. Collateralised assets are 
often in the form of real estate, thereby linking aggregate borrowing capacity of firms 
and households to house prices. Rising house prices increase the value of real estate 
collaterals and feeds to greater net-worth for borrowers, which in turn further increases 
the borrowing capacity of firms and households (see, e.g., Bernanke and Gertler, 1989; 
Kiyotaki and Moore, 1997; Iacoviello, 2005).  
On the other hand, rising house prices boost the value of the pledged collaterals, 
thereby reducing the likelihood of borrowers’ defaults. This notionally improves asset 
quality and encourages banks to expand their real estate lending, which in turn leads to a 
positive feedback loop between house prices, real estate lending, and external financing 
capacity of firms and individuals. Empirical literature presents a two-way relationship 
between real estate lending and house prices. Among others, Mora (2008) finds 
empirical evidence that bank lending deeply affects the real estate market while Gimeno 
and Martinez-Carrascal (2010) and Gelarch and Peng (2005) show that real estate 
lending policies depends on house price behaviour. 
The co-movement of credit cycles and macroeconomic variables including 
house prices implies procyclicality in the banking system where most banks take same 
policy actions as they are systematically exposed to similar conditions. This in turn 
exacerbates swings in the house prices and real economy. It is argued that procyclicality 
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and trend-chasing behaviour in bank lending occurs in both lending level (Borio et al., 
2001; Berger and Udell, 2004) and lending concentration (Mei and Saunders, 1997). 
Rajan (1994) describes a similar process in real estate lending and suggests that bank 
managers have strong incentives for herding behaviour, particularly when regulatory 
oversight is lax. More importantly, Piazzesi and Schneider (2009) show that momentum 
forecasts by even a small number of optimistic investors significantly affect house 
prices. Therefore, procyclical behaviour in the housing market can feed to a rapid 
growth spiral and increase the speed of house price deviations from their fundamental 
values, which may ultimately lead to the creation of a housing bubble. Eventually, when 
the housing bubble bursts, the real economy suffers from severe consequences of 
reverse developments in house prices. Hott (2011) argues that falling house prices stem 
from sudden and fundamental changes in investors’ irrational expectations about house 
prices as a consequence of disaster myopia. In this context, corrections in house prices 
towards equilibrium can lead to reverse procyclical behaviour in the banking sector, 
which is often a prolonged process (Black et al., 2006). 
In general, adverse fluctuations in house prices have a procyclical impact on 
borrowers’ net-worth and, as a result, their ability to raise external finance. Reduced 
borrowing capacity of firms and households is associated with less spending, which 
further reduces house prices and triggers a feedback loop between house prices and 
credit market conditions. This in turn propagates financial and economic downturn. On 
the other hand, excessive risk accumulations during booming period heavily expose 
financial institutions to the real estate market and, as a result, banks severely suffer from 
high loan losses when house prices drop. This is consistent with the idea that risk builds 
up during booms and materializes itself during periods of economic downturns (see, for 
example, Borio and Lowe, 2002; Pesola, 2011).  
Against this background and despite the abundance of theoretical works on 
house prices and financial stability, research that follows this line of literature is rather 
silent on the linkage between housing market and loan performance. In particular, 
researchers have largely neglected the impact of house price fluctuations on the 
evolution of NPL while NPL is commonly used as a key indicator to trace financial 
vulnerabilities and banking crises (see, e.g., Demirgüc-Kunt and Detragiache, 2005; 
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Barrell et al., 2010). To narrow this gap, this chapter builds up on existing literature and 
offers four empirical hypotheses regarding the impact of house price fluctuations on the 
quality of banks’ loan portfolios. More specifically, the empirical hypotheses are 
formulated as follows. 
Hypothesis 1: House prices fluctuations heavily affect the quality of banks’ loan 
portfolios. 
Broadly speaking, house price fluctuations largely affect the debt servicing 
capacity of households and mortgage borrowers by altering their collateral position. 
This in turn influences homeowners’ decision process and determines those situations 
where default becomes the best financial alternative available for borrowers (see, for 
example, Kau et al., 1994; Daglish, 2009, among others). Moreover, changes in house 
prices may induce substantial spillover effects on the performance of other loan 
categories where real estate is widely used as collateral to secure loan repayments. 
Thus, it is expected that changes in house prices lead to significant variations in a 
bank’s aggregate nonperforming assets. 
Hypothesis 2: Real estate loans are more sensitive than other types of loans to house 
price fluctuations. 
Loan categories mainly vary in terms of the type of borrowers and the 
collateralised assets pledged to secure loan repayment. A fall in the market value of 
collaterals deteriorates borrowers' equity position, which can play a key role in 
borrowers' decision to default when they face financial distress. Thus, compared to 
other loan categories, real estate loans are expected to be more sensitive to adverse 
fluctuations in house prices as they are primarily secured by real estate while other loan 
types are either unsecured or secured with assets other than real estate. 
Hypothesis 3: House price changes have a non-uniform impact on the quality of loan 
portfolios in different types of depositary institutions. 
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Lending policies and risk taking behaviour of banks are highly associated with a 
wide range of internal factors, including a bank’s mission, organisational structure, 
ownership structure, depositor type, regulatory framework, and agency problems (see, 
e.g., Salas and Saurina, 2002; Laeven and Levine, 2009, for a review). In this context, 
savings institutions greatly vary from commercial banks. In particular, savings 
institutions are traditionally community-oriented organizations mandated to concentrate 
on residential mortgages to promote home ownership, whereas commercial banks are 
allowed to make various types of loans, including commercial and industrial loans.
10
 
Accordingly, savings institutions are expected to have developed more expertise in real 
estate lending, which may enable them to better forecast the dynamics of housing 
markets. Thus, compared to commercial banks, savings institutions are likely to be less 
affected by adverse house price fluctuations.  
Hypothesis 4: Larger banking institutions are more sensitive to falling house prices 
due to rapid deterioration of their asset quality during boom period. 
Sensitivity of a bank to real estate market is highly associated with its lending 
strategies which in turn greatly depend upon its size and complexity. Better access to 
external financing and ability to offer a greater range of financial products in larger 
banks enables them to quickly adjust their lending policies with soaring house prices. In 
addition, larger banks benefit from their ‘too-big-to-fail’ status as well as strong 
political and regulatory connections which create moral hazard incentives for their 
managers. This in turn may lead to excessive risk accumulations and high exposures to 
the housing market during boom period. Therefore, larger banks are expected to 
experience higher loan losses when house prices drop (see, e.g., De Nicoló, 2000; Tabak 
et al., 2011; De Haan and Poghosyan, 2012). 
 
                                                 
10 For a detailed discussion about differences between commercial banks and savings institutions see 
Madura (2014). 
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3.3. EMPIRICAL FRAMEWORK 
3.3.1. Econometric methodology 
In this chapter dynamic panel models are adopted to investigate the impact of 
real estate prices on the evolution of NPLs in individual US banks. NPL is defined as 
the sum of loans past due more than 90 days and still accruing interest plus nonaccrual 
loans that are no longer accruing interest as a percentage of total gross loans. In this 
case, using dynamic specification to model NPL is essential to account for time 
persistence of NPL and to capture the effect of omitted variables (see, for instance, 
Nkusu, 2011; Salas and Saurina, 2002). In general, a dynamic panel data model is 
specified as 
 
 𝑦𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼𝑦𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝒙𝒊𝒕
′ 𝜷 + 𝑢𝑖𝑡,            |𝛼| < 1; (3.1) 
where the subscript  𝑖 = 1,… ,𝑁 indexes cross sectional units and 𝑡 = 1,… , 𝑇  denotes 
time dimension,
11
 𝑦𝑖,𝑡−1 is the lag of dependent variable, 𝛼 is a scalar; 𝒙𝒊𝒕
′  is 1 × 𝑘 
vector of remaining explanatory variables, 𝜷 is 𝑘 × 1 vector of coefficients to be 
estimated; and 𝑢𝑖𝑡 is the error term. The error term consists of two orthogonal 
components: the time-invariant unobservable individual-specific effect, 𝜂𝑖, and 
idiosyncratic disturbance term, 𝜀𝑖𝑡, meaning that 𝑢𝑖𝑡 = 𝜂𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡. 
One of the crucial assumptions for unbiasedness property of the OLS estimator 
is the exogeneity of explanatory variables, meaning that explanatory variables are 
uncorrelated with 𝑢𝑖𝑡, 𝐸(𝑢𝑖𝑡|𝑥𝑖𝑡) = 0. However, in dynamic models this assumption is 
violated by inclusion of the lagged dependent variable in the set of explanatory 
variables. The lagged dependent variable is a function of 𝜂𝑖 and, therefore, correlated 
with the error term, 𝑢𝑖𝑡 = 𝜂𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡. In this case, using the OLS estimation method 
produce biased and inconsistent estimates (see Blundell and Bond, 1998; Bond, 2002). 
To address this issue, Arellano and Bond (1991), Arellano and Bover (1995) and 
Blundell and Bond (1998) suggested to use of the generalized method of moments 
GMM estimation method.  
                                                 
11
 Note that in unbalanced panels, 𝑇 varies among different cross-sections. 
67 
 
Arellano and Bond (1991) proposed to remove the individual effects, 𝜂𝑖, through 
the first difference transformation as below 
 
∆𝑦𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼∆𝑦𝑖,𝑡−1 + ∆𝒙𝒊𝒕
′ 𝜷 + ∆𝜀𝑖𝑡, (3.2) 
where ∆ is the first difference operator. Although this transformation removes the 
individual specific effects, two major sources of bias remain in the regression model. 
The first source of bias stems from high correlation of ∆𝑦𝑖,𝑡−1 with ∆𝜀𝑖𝑡 whereas the 
second source is the possible endogeneity of other explanatory variables. As the authors 
point out, the first difference transformation is crucial to obtain valid moment 
conditions. It allows to take 𝑦𝑖,𝑡−2 as an instrument for ∆𝑦𝑖,𝑡−1. This instrument is by 
construction highly correlated with ∆𝑦𝑖,𝑡−1 and not correlated with ∆𝜀𝑖𝑡,  for 𝑡 =
3, … , 𝑇, given that 𝜀𝑖𝑡 are not serially correlated. Similar technique can be used for other 
explanatory variables.  
When 𝑥𝑖𝑡 are strictly exogenous, current and lagged values of 𝑥𝑖𝑡
′  are not 
correlated with ∆𝜀𝑖𝑡. Therefore, adding extra valid instruments in each period, the 
instrument matrix will have the following form
12
 
 
𝑍𝑖 = [
𝑦𝑖1, 𝑥𝑖1, … , 𝑥𝑖𝑇
0
⋮
0
0
𝑦𝑖1, 𝑦𝑖2, 𝑥𝑖1, … , 𝑥𝑖𝑇
⋮
⋯
⋯
⋯
⋱
⋯
0
0
⋮
𝑦𝑖1, … , 𝑦𝑖,𝑇−2, 𝑥𝑖1, … , 𝑥𝑖𝑇
],  (3.3) 
where rows correspond to the equation (3.2) for periods t=3, 4, …, T and for i-th 
individual. This instrument matrix corresponds to the following (𝑇 − 2)(𝑇 − 1)/2  
moment conditions: 
 
𝐸[𝑍𝑖
′∆𝜀𝑖] = 0,     𝑖 = 1, 2, … ,𝑁; (3.4) 
where ∆𝜀𝑖 = (∆𝜀𝑖3, ∆𝜀𝑖4, … , ∆𝜀𝑖𝑇)
′. Equation (3.4) can be split into following equations 
                                                 
12
 This instrument matrix can be easily modified for predetermined or endogenous explanatory variables. 
When 𝑥𝑖𝑡  are endogenous, 𝐸(𝜀𝑖𝑡|𝑥𝑖𝑡) ≠ 0 and 𝐸(𝜀𝑖,𝑡−1|𝑥𝑖,𝑡−1) ≠ 0. Therefore, 𝑥𝑖𝑠  (𝑠 = 1, 2, … , 𝑡 − 2) can 
be used as valid instruments as 𝐸(𝜀𝑖𝑡|𝑥𝑖,𝑡−2) = 0. Also, 𝑥𝑖𝑠  (𝑠 = 1, 2, … , 𝑡 − 1) can be used as 
instruments when 𝑥𝑖𝑡  are predetermined or weakly exogenous, meaning that there is a feedback from 
𝜀𝑖,𝑡−1 to 𝑥𝑖𝑡  and therefore 𝐸(𝜀𝑖,𝑡−1|𝑥𝑖𝑡) ≠ 0 but 𝐸(𝜀𝑖,𝑡−1|𝑥𝑖,𝑡−1) = 0. 
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𝐸[𝑦𝑖,𝑡−𝑠∆𝜀𝑖] = 0,     𝑡 = 3,… , 𝑇 and  𝑠 ≥ 2; (3.5) 
 
𝐸[𝑥𝑖,𝑡−𝑠∆𝜀𝑖] = 0,     𝑡 = 3,… , 𝑇 and all 𝑠. (3.6) 
These orthogonality restrictions, 𝐸[𝑍𝑖
′∆𝜀𝑖] = 0, provide preliminary 
requirements for the GMM estimation. Multiplying by the instrument matrix, equation 
(3.2) takes the following vector form 
 
𝑍′∆𝑦 = 𝑍′∆𝑦−1𝛼 + 𝑍
′∆𝑋𝛽 + 𝑍′∆𝜀, (3.7) 
where ∆𝑋 is the stacked matrix of observations on ∆𝑥𝑖𝑡. Accordingly, one-step and two-
step form of the GMM estimator of (𝛼, 𝛽′) are obtained from 
 
(
?̂?
?̂?
) = ([∆𝑦−1, ∆𝑋]
′𝑍𝐴𝑁𝑍
′[∆𝑦−1, ∆𝑋])
−1([∆𝑦−1, ∆𝑋]
′𝑍𝐴𝑁𝑍
′∆𝑦). (3.8) 
Two choices for 𝐴𝑁 result in two alternative types of GMM estimators. A one-
step GMM estimator is obtained by defining 𝐴𝑁 as follow 
 
𝐴𝑁 = (
1
𝑁
∑𝑍𝑖
′𝐺𝑍𝑖
𝑁
𝑖
)
−1
, (3.9) 
where G is the following (𝑇 − 2) × (𝑇 − 2) matrix with twos in the main diagonals, 
minus ones in the first sub-diagonals, and zeros otherwise 
 
𝐺 =
[
 
 
 
2
−1
⋮
0
0
−1
2
⋮
0
0
⋯
⋯
⋱
⋯
⋯
0
0
⋮
2
−1
0
0
⋮
−1
2 ]
 
 
 
 . (3.10) 
In a two-step estimator,  𝐴𝑁 is defined as 
 
𝐴𝑁 = (
1
𝑁
∑𝑍𝑖
′∆𝜀?̂?∆𝜀?̂?
′𝑍𝑖
𝑁
𝑖
)
−1
, (3.11) 
69 
 
where ∆𝜀?̂? = (∆𝜀𝑖3̂, ∆𝜀𝑖4̂, … , ∆𝜀𝑖?̂?) are the differenced residuals from the preliminary 
consistent estimator of  (
?̂?
?̂?
). 
Although the first-differenced GMM model of Arellano and Bond (1991) delivers 
consistent estimators, it suffers from some important shortcomings. One of the main 
shortcomings is that the first difference transformation is likely to enlarge gaps in 
unbalanced panels and it is even possible that whole dataset vanishes in this 
transformation. In addition, Blundell and Bond (1998) point out the first-differenced 
GMM estimators are expected to perform poorly when instruments are weak.
13
 In other 
word, as weak instruments become less informative, the first-differenced GMM 
estimators suffer from finite sample size distortion problem, particularly when the 
number of time periods available is small. To address this problem Blundell and Bond 
(1998) propose a new framework known as system GMM to estimate dynamic panel 
data models. Their basic idea is to simultaneously estimate a system of two equations; 
one in first differences and the other one in levels. By adding the second equation 
(𝑇 − 2) extra moment conditions can be obtained in addition to the moment conditions 
of the first-differenced model. Therefore, we can exploit 𝑦𝑖,𝑡−2 as instruments for 
equations in first differences as well as ∆𝑦𝑖,𝑡−1 as instruments for equations in levels, as 
suggested by Arellano and Bover (1995). The vector of errors and matrix of instruments 
for individual i for this system can be written as 
 
     𝑢𝑖
+ =
[
 
 
 
 
 
𝜀𝑖3 − 𝜀𝑖2
⋮
𝜀𝑖𝑇 − 𝜀𝑖,𝑇−1
𝜂𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖3
⋮
𝜂𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖𝑇 ]
 
 
 
 
 
 ,         𝑍𝑖
+ =
[
 
 
 
 𝒁𝒊
0
0.
0
0
∆𝑦𝑖2
0.
0
0
0
∆𝑦𝑖3.
0
⋯
⋯
⋯
⋯
⋯
0
0
0
0
∆𝑦𝑖,𝑇−1]
 
 
 
 
 . (3.12) 
The moment conditions in system GMM are as follows  
                                                 
13
 Weak instruments are uncorrelated with the error term but they are only weakly correlated with the 
endogenous variable. Weak instrument problem in the case of the first-differenced GMM estimator 
usually occurs when time series are persistent (𝛼 → 1) and/or the relative variance of the fixed effects 
increases (𝜎𝜂
2 𝜎𝜀
2⁄ → ∞). 
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𝐸(𝑍𝑖
+′𝑢𝑖
+) = 0, (3.13) 
where new moment conditions are defined as 
 
𝐸[𝑢𝑖𝑡∆𝑦𝑖,𝑡−1] = 𝐸[(𝜂𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡)∆𝑦𝑖,𝑡−1] = 0, (3.14) 
and 
 
𝐸[𝑢𝑖𝑡∆𝑥𝑖,𝑡−1] = 𝐸[(𝜂𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡)∆𝑥𝑖,𝑡−1] = 0. (3.15) 
The key idea behind the system GMM estimator is to simultaneously estimate a 
system of two equations: one in first-differences and the other one in levels. 
Accordingly, the lagged level values are used to instrument first-differenced equation, 
while the lagged first-differenced values are used to instrument the equation in levels. 
Once the instruments matrix is constructed, the two-step system GMM estimator can be 
calculated. 
This chapter adopts two-step system GMM estimator with Windmeijer’s (2005) 
finite sample correction. In general, system GMM outperforms difference GMM and 
other preliminary models by producing less biased and more precise estimates, 
especially when 𝛼 is large (Blundell and Bond, 1998). In addition, the two-step GMM 
estimator is more efficient and also relaxes the assumption of homoscedasticity in the 
error terms (Blundell and Bond, 1998; Arellano and Bond, 1991). Finally, due to its 
dependence on estimated residuals, the two-step GMM estimator may impose a severe 
downward bias on estimated asymptotic standard errors, particularly in small samples. 
Therefore, the finite sample correction technique proposed by Windmeijer (2005) is 
applied to address this issue and provide corrected variance estimates, leading to more 
reliable asymptotic statistical inference.
14
  
Furthermore, the consistency of the GMM estimators relies upon the validity of 
instrumental variables in a sense that they are uncorrelated with the errors in the first-
                                                 
14
 Robust standard errors are reported to account for potential problems that may arise from 
heteroskedasticity and clustering of observations within banks while using the Windmeijer’s (2005) finite 
sample correction in the GMM models.  
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differenced equation as well as the fundamental assumption that the errors, 𝜀𝑖𝑡, are 
serially uncorrelated. To test the overall validity of instruments, the Hansen 
specification test is used (see Arellano and Bond, 1991; Arellano and Bover, 1995; 
Blundell and Bond, 1998). Under the null hypothesis of valid moment conditions, the 
Hansen test statistic for over-identifying restrictions is asymptotically distributed as chi-
square. In addition, Arellano and Bond (1991) propose a test to assess the assumption of 
no serial correlation in the error terms. This test is based on the hypothesis that there is 
no second-order serial correlation in the residuals of the first-difference equation, 
𝐸[∆𝜀𝑖𝑡∆𝜀𝑖,𝑡−2] = 0. This hypothesis is rejected if the 𝜀𝑖𝑡 are serially autocorrelated 
which undermines the consistency of the GMM estimators. 
3.3.2. Empirical model 
In order to investigate the linkage between house price fluctuations and 
evolution of NPLs, equation (3.1) takes the following form 
 
𝑁𝑃𝐿𝑖𝑡
ℎ = 𝛼𝑁𝑃𝐿𝑖,𝑡−1
ℎ + 𝑺𝒕
′𝜷 + 𝑰𝒊,𝒕−𝟏
′ 𝜸 + 𝜂𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡, (3.16) 
where subscript h denotes the definition of NPL regarding the corresponding hypothesis 
under consideration while subscripts i and t  denote banks and time, respectively; 𝑰𝒊,𝒕−𝟏 
is a vector of idiosyncratic variables and 𝑺𝒕 is a vector of systematic variables including 
house price fluctuations; 𝛼, 𝜷, and 𝜸 are regression coefficients; and 𝜀𝑖𝑗𝑡 is the 
disturbance term. 
As for the dependent variable, 𝑁𝑃𝐿𝑖𝑡 is defined as a percentage of 
nonperforming loans to total gross loans with regards to the hypothesis under 
consideration. Some authors, including Salas and Saurina (2002), have suggested to 
apply a logarithmic transformation on NPL to allow it to vary in the range (−∞,∞). 
However, Quagliariello (2007) argues that since NPL typically takes values in the range 
(0, 0.10), such transformation does not seem to be very useful.  
Furthermore, to avoid potential omitted variable issue in this analysis, a broad 
set of idiosyncratic and systematic variables are included in the regression as control 
variables. This section reviews control variables used in this study along with their 
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expected impact on the evolution of NPL. In addition, for ease of interpretation, a 
detailed definition of these variables is given in Table A3.1.  
I. Systematic factors 
In addition to house price fluctuations, the column entries of the matrix 𝑺𝒕 in equation 
(3.16) include the following systematic factors: 
Real gross domestic products (𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑡): Real GDP growth is widely used as a proxy for 
general macroeconomic conditions and business cycles. A well-established empirical 
literature documents that changes in macroeconomic conditions translate into changes in 
the quality of loan portfolios (see, e.g., Quagliariello, 2007; Pesola, 2011; Marcucci and 
Quagliariello, 2009). According to this literature, an expansionary phase of the 
economy is often associated with low level of NPLs as borrowers’ debt servicing 
capacity improves owing to (i) higher stream of income for firms and households, and 
(ii) rising asset prices. However, as economic upturn continues, banks risk appetite 
gradually increases and banks become more vulnerable to macroeconomic shocks. 
Subsequently, when recession begins, NPLs increases and banks tighten access to credit 
as economic prospects worsen. Therefore, NPLs are expected to illustrate an inherent 
cyclical pattern moving in line with economic cycles. 
Unemployment rate (𝑈𝑡): Unemployment rate is another key indicator of 
macroeconomic conditions and business cycle and is widely used as a determinant of 
NPL in previous studies (see, e.g., Louzis et al., 2012; Nkusu, 2011). Rising 
unemployment rate undermines ability of subprime borrowers to settle their obligations 
and may encourage them to default or terminate their loan contracts. In this regard, 
higher unemployment rate is expected to result in higher NPLs.  
Real interest rate (𝐼𝑅𝑡): Real interest rate is defined as the lending interest rate adjusted 
for inflation measured by the consumer price index. A rise in interest rate indicates higher 
borrowing costs, which in turn attenuates borrowers’ debt servicing capacity. In 
particular, subprime borrowers and adjustable rate mortgage borrowers are likely to be 
very sensitive to changes interest rates as they are usually charged with higher interest 
rates compared to prime borrowers in order to compensate the banks for higher risk 
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premiums of subprime loans (see, e.g., Demyanyk and Van Hemert, 2011; Daglish, 
2009).  
It should be noted that, following previous studies, systematic variables are treated as 
exogenous variables in this analysis (see, e.g., Louzis et al., 2012). In addition, due to 
high correlations between contemporaneous and lagged values of macroeconomic 
variables and to avoid multicollinearity issues, only contemporaneous macroeconomic 
variables in the empirical model. 
II. Idiosyncratic factors 
As far as idiosyncratic factors are concerned, the column entries of the matrix 𝑰𝒊𝒕 in 
equation (3.16) are as follows: 
Capital ratio (𝐶𝑅𝑖𝑡): Capital ratio is defined as total equity as a percentage of total 
assets. Several papers have investigated the relationship between level of bank 
capitalization and evolution of NPLs. In their seminal paper, Keeton and Morris (1987) 
argue that banks with aggressive risk taking behaviour are less willing to back their 
assets by equity. They mention high loan to asset ratio, reliance on volatile sources of 
funds and low equity to asset ratio as three features of banks that are willing to make 
loans with a higher probability of default. Furthermore, Berger and DeYoung (1997) 
examine moral hazard hypothesis and provide strong evidence that low capitalization of 
banks is associated with relatively high level of NPLs. The proposed justification links 
the increasing risk taking appetite on the part of banks’ managers due to moral hazard 
incentives when banks are highly leveraged.   
Loan to asset ratio (𝐿𝐴𝑖𝑡): Several papers have documented loan to asset ratio as an 
indicator of riskiness of bank’s asset portfolio as loans are riskier and less liquid 
compared to other types of bank assets such as cash, reserves, and government bonds 
(see, e.g., Wheelock and Wilson, 2000; Davis and Zhu, 2009). Dell’Ariccia and 
Marquez (2006) argue that making loan involves an inherent risk of maturity 
transformation, where short-term deposits are converted into long-term loans. 
Therefore, higher lending may imply higher risk of maturity transformation and is likely 
to be linked with relax lending standards and weak internal controls as banks may 
sacrifice their long-term stability in favour of short-term reputation concerns. 
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Accordingly, higher loan to asset ratio is expected to be associated with higher riskiness 
and NPLs across banks. 
Inefficiency (𝐼𝑁𝐸𝑖𝑡): Inefficiency is defined as the ratio of non-interest expenses to the 
sum of interest and non-interest income. Net interest expenses in this definition don’t 
include the amortization expenses of intangible assets. The relationship between 
inefficiency and NPL is complex. In an early study, Berger and DeYoung (1997) 
propose two possible hypotheses on the linkage between NPL and cost efficiency. On 
one hand, bad management hypothesis indicates that inefficiency may be the result of 
low quality of managerial skills in banks, which subsequently leads to higher level of 
NPLs. On the other hand, according to the skimping hypothesis, inefficiency may be 
associated with lower NPL because inefficient banks incur higher costs and expend 
more resources to monitor borrowers. Inefficient banks with risk-averse managers tend 
to trade off reduced income for reduced asset risk. Podpiera and Weill (2008) and 
Louzis et al. (2012) provide empirical evidence in favour of the bad management 
hypothesis, while Salas and Saurina (2002) and Shehzad et al. (2010) estimate 
insignificant effect of efficiency on impaired loans. 
Net interest margin (𝑁𝐼𝑀𝑖𝑡): Net interest margin is defined as the net interest income as 
a percentage of average earning assets. 𝑁𝐼𝑀𝑖𝑡 can be used as a proxy for both 
profitability and riskiness of a loan portfolio. However, the linkage between profitability 
and NPL is ambiguous. Louzis et al. (2012) refer to the bad management hypothesis 
and argue that high profitability is a sign of efficient management and is therefore 
associated with lower NPL. Also, Salas and Saurina (2002) argue that banks with low 
net interest margin are more pressured to revenue creation and may change their credit 
policy and make riskier loans. Thus, low net interest margin is associated with higher 
NPLs in the future. On the other hand, Quagliariello (2007) argues that higher net 
interest margin is associated with riskier loan portfolios as banks charge higher interest 
rate on riskier borrowers. From this point of view, low net interest margin is associated 
with lower NPLs. 
Log of total assets (𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖𝑡): Some papers have investigated the linkage between 
diversification and NPLs by employing bank size as a proxy for diversification 
opportunities.  For instance, Salas and Saurina (2002) report a negative relationship 
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between NPLs and bank size. According to their view, large banks have better risk 
management practices which eventually lead to lower credit risk and NPLs.  
Loan portfolio concentration (𝐿𝐶𝑖𝑡): Loan portfolio concentration is an indicator of a 
bank’s lending policies, which can largely affect the quality of its loan portfolio.  Loan 
portfolio concentration in this study is defined as the Herfindahl–Hirschman index of three 
major loan categories in a bank: real estate loans, commercial and industrial loans, and 
consumer loans. Higher loan portfolio concentration in a bank indicates that the bank is 
more exposed to certain markets and may severely suffer when those markets crash 
(Rossi et al., 2009). On the other hand, banks that specialise their lending activities to 
certain sectors may develop their expertise in those sectors. Therefore, they have better 
knowledge and understanding of market conditions, making their portfolios less risky 
(Tabak et al., 2011). Overall, an asymmetric linkage between loan portfolio 
concentration and NPL is expected. In other words, more concentrated banks face less 
NPL during economic expansion, while less diversified banks suffer from higher NPL 
during crisis period. 
As for idiosyncratic factors, it is a common practice to use lagged bank-specific 
variables in modelling NPL and loan losses (see, e.g., Berger and DeYoung, 1997; 
Tabak et al., 2011; Louzis et al., 2012; Davis and Zhu, 2009). Notably, inclusion of 
lagged variables is crucial for (i) avoiding simultaneity effects between NPL and bank-
specific variables, and (ii) accounting for the potential time delay between changes in 
managerial decisions and changes in the quality of loan portfolios as reported in the 
balance sheet data. This in turn allows to consider bank-specific variables as exogenous 
variables, which is essential to overcome the problem of too many instruments pointed 
out by Roodman (2009). 
3.4. DATA 
This study is based on annual panel data of the US banking institutions over the 
period 1999-2012. The dataset comprises a combination of macroeconomic and 
idiosyncratic variables obtained from different sources. Bank specific variables were 
extracted from the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) database, which 
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provides balance sheet and income statement data for individual insured banks in the 
US banking system.
15
  
House prices were retrieved from the Federal Housing Finance Agency (FHFA) 
database, which provides state-level House Price Index (HPI) data.
16
 State-level GDP 
growth rate and unemployment rate data were retrieved from the Bureau of Economic 
Analysis (BEA) and the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS), respectively. Finally, interest 
rate and inflation rate were obtained from the Federal Reserve Economic Data (FRED). 
Note that house prices, GDP growth rates and interest rates are considered in real terms.  
 
Table 3.1. Geographical distribution of sample banks throughout U.S. states. 
State Abb. 
Number 
of Banks State Abb. 
Number 
of Banks State: Abb. 
Number 
of Banks 
         
Alabama  AL 232 Kentucky KY 360 North Dakota ND 131 
Alaska AK 10 Louisiana LA 236 Ohio OH 449 
Arizona AZ 97 Maine ME 49 Oklahoma OK 361 
Arkansas AR 267 Maryland MD 182 Oregon OR 77 
California CA 618 Massachusetts MA 258 Pennsylvania PA 401 
Colorado CO 280 Michigan MI 253 Rhode Island RI 21 
Connecticut CT 109 Minnesota MN 602 South Carolina SC 160 
Delaware DE 63 Mississippi MS 141 South Dakota SD 128 
D.C. DC 12 Missouri MO 532 Tennessee TN 330 
Florida FL 562 Montana MT 123 Texas TX 1054 
Georgia GA 559 Nebraska NE 359 Utah UT 91 
Hawaii HI 21 Nevada NV 61 Vermont VT 29 
Idaho ID 32 New Hampshire NH 53 Virginia VA 247 
Illinois IL 1028 New Jersey NJ 226 Washington WA 154 
Indiana IN 300 New Mexico NM 92 West Virginia WV 131 
Iowa IA 535 New York NY 322 Wisconsin WI 446 
Kansas 
 
KS 460 North Carolina NC 186 Wyoming WY 64 
 
                                                 
15
 The FDIC was established in 1933 in response to large number of bank failures during the Great 
Depression that started in the late 1920s. The main mission of the FDIC is to promote public confidence 
in the US banking system by providing deposit insurance for up to $250,000 per account in membered 
banks. Also, the FDIC directly monitors and supervises more than half of the banking institutions in the 
US to preserve and promote sound banking practices.  As of December 2012, the FDIC insured deposits 
at 7,009 banking institutions with total assets of over 14.5 trillion US dollars. 
16
 The HPI is derived from data provided by Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac and is a measure of average 
house price changes in repeat sales or refinancings on the same single-family properties. The HPI data 
was available on quarterly basis and I converted it to yearly data by simple averaging. 
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The dataset was then refined by excluding (i) banks with less than 8 consecutive 
observations on all variables when full sample is considered,
17
 (ii) banks that report 
unusual values reflecting measurement errors or anomalous transactions such as major 
asset sales,
18
 (iii) banks that are headquartered in the U.S. territories such as Puerto Rico 
and Guam, and (iv) insured U.S. branches of foreign chartered institutions. The resulting 
sample is an unbalanced panel consisting of 106,276 annual observations from 8,367 
US banking institutions. Table 3.1 presents the geographical distribution of the sample 
after cleaning and filtering the data, for a brief review. Also, Table 3.2 lists all explanatory 
variables used in this study, together with their expected signs, acronyms, and data 
sources. 
Table 3.2. Summary of explanatory variables, acronyms, units, and data sources. 
Variables Acronym 
Expected 
sign 
Units Source 
 
Bank-specific variables: 
 
Loan portfolio concentration 𝐿𝐶𝑖𝑡 + Percentage FDIC Institution Directory 
Loan to asset ratio 𝐿𝐴𝑖𝑡 + Percentage FDIC Institution Directory 
Capital ratio 𝐶𝑅𝑖𝑡 - Percentage FDIC Institution Directory 
Inefficiency 𝐼𝑁𝐸𝑖𝑡 -/+ Percentage FDIC Institution Directory 
Net interest margin 𝑁𝐼𝑀𝑖𝑡 -/+ Percentage FDIC Institution Directory 
Size 𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖𝑡 -/+ Logarithm FDIC Institution Directory 
 
Local economic conditions*: 
 
 
Real GDP growth 𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑡 - Percentage Bureau of Economic Analysis  
Real interest rate 𝐼𝑅𝑡 + Percentage Federal Reserve 
Unemployment rate 𝑈𝑡 + Percentage Bureau of Labor Statistics  
Real house price growth 𝐻𝑃𝑡 - Percentage 
Federal Housing Finance 
Agency  
*Data on nominal GDP growth rate, interest rate, and house prices are adjusted for inflation by using national-level 
consumer price index data obtained from the International Financial Statistics (IFS) database. 
                                                 
17
 When sub-samples are under consideration, banks with less than 6 consecutive observations are 
dropped from the sample.  
18
Unusual values are defined as loan/assets >1, equity/assets >1, nonperforming loans/assets >1, and net 
interest margins>100% or net interest margins<-100%. 
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Table 3.3 summarises the descriptive statistics of the variables used in this 
analysis over the period 1999-2012. For each variable, mean, descriptive statistics of the 
25th and 75th percentiles are included. It appears that, on average, 1.534% of total gross 
loans in the US banks are nonperforming. More interestingly, sample banks, on average, 
faced higher NPL in real estate loans, compared to other loan categories. Average HHI 
is 0.610, indicating that loan portfolios of the US banks are highly concentrated on 
specific sectors. In addition, loans form, on average, 63.917% of asset portfolios in the 
sample banks, meaning that the U.S. banks are more concentrated lending activities. 
Overall, the sample banks seem to be well capitalized as indicated by 10.842% of 
average capital ratio. However, this indicator has a relatively large standard deviation, 
suggesting that level of capitalization varies widely among sample banks. Average NIM 
is 4.047%, indicating that the sample consists of bank with profitable and efficient loan 
portfolios. Finally, the sample includes large banks with average log of total assets of 
11.875. 
 
Table 3.3. Descriptive statistics. 
 Mean Median Std. Dev. Skewness Kurtosis 
      
NPLit  1.534 0.774 2.456 5.870 82.270 
RENPLit  1.613 0.660 2.879 5.644 71.504 
CINPLit  1.469 0.331 3.762 10.661 203.642 
CNPLit  0.863 0.290 2.306 15.938 453.234 
LCit  0.610 0.573 0.173 0.652 2.422 
LAit  63.917 65.871 15.584 -0.706 3.656 
CRit  10.842 9.768 4.916 6.197 76.090 
INEit  0.715 0.667 0.414 10.525 189.419 
NIMit  4.047 3.997 1.118 4.460 73.447 
SIZEit  11.875 11.723 1.352 1.148 6.349 
GDPt  1.875 1.970 2.402 -0.377 4.856 
IRt  3.050 3.041 1.733 0.103 1.763 
Ut  5.647 5.233 1.940 1.034 3.826 
HPt  0.701 1.113 4.945 0.095 5.775 
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Table 3.4. Cross-correlation between variables, 1999-2012. 
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NPLit  1              
RENPLit  0.90 1             
CINPLit  0.48 0.27 1            
CNPLit  0.21 0.16 0.13 1           
LCi,t−1  0.12 0.11 0.04 0.02 1          
LAi,t−1  0.06 0.07 0.03 0.02 0.19 1         
CRi,t−1  -0.02 -0.04 -0.02 -0.01 0.09 -0.37 1        
INEi,t−1  0.16 0.01 0.00 -0.01 0.05 -0.13 0.32 1       
NIMi,t−1  -0.04 -0.05 0.00 0.02 -0.16 0.12 -0.06 -0.09 1      
SIZEi,t−1  0.09 0.10 0.02 -0.02 0.23 0.20 -0.23 -0.14 -0.02 1     
GDPt  -0.16 -0.17 -0.05 -0.03 -0.10 -0.09 -0.02 -0.01 0.05 -0.05     
IRt  -0.17 -0.18 -0.04 -0.01 -0.08 0.01 0.08 -0.02 0.04 -0.09 0.13 1   
Ut  0.30 0.32 0.10 0.04 0.21 0.05 0.00 0.05 -0.06 0.17 -0.39 -0.54 1  
HPt  -0.28 -0.30 -0.08 -0.04 -0.07 -0.07 -0.02 -0.02 0.04 -0.05 0.43 0.34 -0.54 1 
Note: Coefficients in bold are significant at 5% level 
 
Table 3.4 reports the cross-correlation matrix of variables used in this study. For 
the consistency of the correlation matrix with the regression analysis, lagged values of 
bank-specific variables were used for calculating correlation coefficients among 
variables. The correlation matrix shows that among bank specific variables, real estate 
NPL (RENPL) has the highest correlation with macroeconomic variables in crisis 
period. Not surprisingly, aggregate NPL is also highly correlated with macroeconomic 
factors, which is perhaps because aggregate NPL is largely driven by real estate NPL. 
Correlations between NPL and macroeconomic factors are significantly lower for other 
loan categories. Furthermore, NPL and RENPL are significantly correlated with all 
bank-specific variables, indicating that NPL is a function of both systematic and 
idiosyncratic factors. Nevertheless, correlation coefficients between bank-specific 
variables and NPL in other loan categories are rather different in terms of magnitude 
and significance level. 
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3.5. EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
In this section, the estimated results of equation (3.16) are reported. In order to 
investigate potential asymmetric impact of house prices on the evolution of NPLs 
during boom and bust periods, the sample was split into two sub-sample periods, 1999-
2005 and 2006-2012. Accordingly, each table includes three pairs of estimation results 
with respect to three alternative sample periods; the whole period and two sub-sample 
periods.   
Furthermore, one of the main arguments of this Chapter is that NPL is highly 
affected by regional macroeconomic conditions. However, after eliminating legal 
restrictions on intrastate and interstate branching during late 20
th
 century, some U.S. 
banks either spread their branches to other states or acquired banks in other states and 
converted them into their branches. These banks, therefore, are less exposed to local 
economies and investigating the regional macroeconomic developments on their 
problem loans might be irrelevant. In order to account for this issue, the Summary of 
Deposit (SOD) database provided by the FDIC was used in this study to distinguish 
between intrastate and interstate banks. The intrastate banks are defined as those that 
operate in one state while interstate banks operate in multiple states and have offices in 
more than one state. In this study the mid-sample year was chosen as the reference year 
for distinguishing interstate and intrastate banks in the sample.
19
 Therefore, within each 
pair of estimations, the first estimated equation represents all banks including intrastate 
and interstate banks while only the intrastate banks are included in the second 
equation.
20
  
 
                                                 
19
 Despite removing the intrastate and interstate branching restrictions, most U.S. banks are still operating 
locally. This is in particular evident in pre-crisis sample where less than 500 banks operate in more than 
one state. Furthermore, the main activities of those interstate banks were carried out in the state where 
their headquarters were located.  
20
 Due to lack of state-level NPL data for interstate banks, a separate analysis on interstate banks is not 
carried out in this study. 
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3.5.1. House price fluctuations and aggregate NPL 
Table 3.5 presents the estimation results regarding the first hypothesis. Here, 
NPL is defined as the aggregate NPL in loan portfolio of a bank as a percentage of total 
gross loans. Results are reported for three pairs of equations, corresponding to three 
sampling periods under consideration. Equations (I) and (II) represent the results for the 
whole period, 1999-2012; equations (III) and (IV) show the estimation results for pre-
crisis period, 1999-2005, while equations (V) and (VI) show the estimation results for 
the crisis period, 2006-2012. In addition, equations (I), (III), and (VI) represents the 
results for all sample banks while other equations are related to estimation results for 
intrastate banks only. 
From Table 3.5 it appears that estimated coefficients for changes in house prices 
are negative and statistically significant in all models, regardless of the period under 
consideration. These empirical results strongly support hypothesis one that the quality 
of loan portfolios is highly sensitive to house price fluctuations. Furthermore, it should 
be noted that the estimated coefficients are approximately six times higher in crisis 
period, compared to pre-crisis period. This indicates that house price fluctuations have 
asymmetric effects on NPL. In other words, rising house prices have slight impact on 
the evolution of NPL, while falling house prices are associated with large increase in 
NPL levels in banks.  
As far as other macroeconomic factors are concerned, it appears that estimated 
coefficients on real GDP growth and unemployment rate as well as other main 
indicators of general macroeconomic conditions are statistically significant and carry 
the expected signs. Real GDP growth enters in equations with negative sign, while 
unemployment rate takes on positive sign across all equations. This suggests that NPL 
dynamics and business cycles are procyclical, which is consistent with the findings of 
Marcucci and Quagliariello (2008). In addition, the estimated coefficients on real 
interest rate are positive and statistically significant across all equations, indicating that 
NPL level is highly associated with borrowing costs.  
Furthermore, similar to house price fluctuations, other macroeconomic factors 
have asymmetric impact on the evolution of NPL during different phases of business 
cycles. In other words, the impact of all macroeconomic variables on NPL is more 
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pronounced during crisis period. This finding is consistent with asymmetric effects of 
the business cycle on bank credit risk found by Marcucci and Quagliariello (2009).  
 
Table 3.5. GMM estimation results of NPL for all banking institutions 
 I II III IV V VI 
1999-2012 
1999-2005 
1999-2005 2006-2012 
(5) 
(6) 
 All banks Intrastate 
banks 
All banks Intrastate 
banks 
All banks Intrastate 
banks        
NPLi,t−1  0.689*** 0.692*** 0.608*** 0.610*** 0.704*** 0.712*** 
 (0.020) (0.021) (0.069) (0.070) (0.023) (0.022) 
GDPt  -0.041*** -0.039*** -0.019*** -0.019*** -0.042*** -0.038*** 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.005) (0.005) 
IRt  0.035*** 0.035*** 0.027*** 0.029*** 0.066*** 0.065*** 
 (0.004) (0.005) (0.006) (0.006) (0.008) (0.008) 
Ut  0.102*** 0.099*** 0.033*** 0.038*** 0.081*** 0.078*** 
 (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.009) (0.009) 
HPt  -0.051*** -0.051*** -0.010*** -0.011*** -0.068*** -0.069*** 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.005) (0.005) 
LCi,t−1  0.425*** 0.405*** -0.115** -0.099*** 0.632*** 0.629*** 
 (0.053) (0.056) (0.049) (0.048) (0.105) (0.113) 
LAi,t−1  0.008*** 0.008*** 0.003*** 0.003*** 0.009*** 0.009*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
INEi,t−1  0.041 0.006 -0.090*** -0.112*** 0.031 -0.103 
 (0.041) (0.031) (0.032) (0.037) (0.149) (0.115) 
SIZEi,t−1  0.035*** 0.034*** -0.046*** -0.053*** 0.054*** 0.034** 
 (0.007) (0.008) (0.010) (0.012) (0.014) (0.014) 
CRi,t−1  -0.005** -0.004 0.004*** 0.003* -0.001 0.002 
 (0.002) (0.003) (0.001) (0.002) (0.006) (0.006) 
NIMi,t−1  0.004*** 0.038*** 0.037*** 0.041*** 0.040** 0.032* 
 (0.010) (0.010) (0.009) (0.009) (0.020) (0.018) 
Constant -1.289*** -1.235*** 0.487*** 0.554*** -1.820*** -1.473*** 
 (0.113) (0.114) (0.201) (0.213) (0.282) (0.247) 
       
No. of Observations 97,898 91,497 50,557 48,164 36,283 33,143 
Number of banks 8,367 7,821 7,337 6,986 6,081 5,554 
AR(1) test, p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
AR(2) test, p-value 0.779 0.913 0.582 0.552 0.844 0.924 
Hansen test, p-value 0.194 0.197 0.154 0.147 0.115 0.264 
Wald test, p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
The dependent variable is the ratio of nonperforming loans to total gross loans. All banks are considered in models 
(I), (III), and (VI), while interstate banks are excluded in models (II), (IV), and (VI). All models are estimated using 
the dynamic two-step system GMM estimator proposed by Blundell and Bond (1998) with Windmeijer’s finite 
sample correction. Huber-White robust standard errors are reported in the parenthesis. ***, **, and * coefficients are 
statistically significant at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively.   
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In general, significant coefficients on most bank-specific variables across 
estimated equations outlines the importance of idiosyncratic factors in explaining NPL. 
The estimated coefficient on the lagged dependent variable is positive and significant at 
1% level across all equations. However, compared to pre-crisis period, these 
coefficients are higher in crisis period, indicating that NPL is more persistent and sticky 
during crisis period. 
The empirical results show that the estimated coefficient for loan portfolio 
concentration is significant across all equations, but it gets different signs for the two 
sub-sample periods: it is positive during pre-crisis period and negative during crisis 
period. One possible explanation for this finding is that higher loan portfolio 
concentration usually indicates higher ratio of real estate loans to total gross loans in 
most US banks. Therefore, it is not surprising that banks with higher ratio of real estate 
loans to total loans experienced less NPLs when house prices were rising, while they 
dramatically suffered from high NPLs when housing bubble collapsed. Furthermore, 
loan to total assets appear to be positive and significant in all periods, which is 
consistent with the results of Davis and Zhu (2009). This indicates that banks with more 
reliance on their interest income have less liquidity and face more NPLs than their 
counterparts with more diversified sources of income. 
The impact of bank size on NPL varies across different periods under 
consideration. Smaller banks suffered from higher NPL levels during boom period. This 
indicates that smaller banks have less market power, less economies of scale, and less 
diversification opportunities among their customers and products (see, for instance, 
Salas and Saurina, 2002). On the other hand, larger banks have suffered from higher 
NPLs during crisis period. In fact, larger banks have higher agency costs and more 
difficulties in monitoring the quality of their loan portfolios. Also, larger banks may be 
more exposed to credit risk because of being engaged in complex financial innovations 
such as mortgage-related derivatives. Therefore, riskier portfolios may have left them 
more exposed to credit risk after the burst of the housing bubble.  
The sign of 𝑁𝐼𝑀𝑖𝑡 is positive and significant across all periods, indicating that 
higher 𝑁𝐼𝑀𝑖𝑡 is associated with riskier portfolios (see Quagliariello, 2007). 
Furthermore, confining this analysis to intrastate banks, it appears that the estimated 
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coefficients for intrastate banks are very similar to those obtained with the sample of all 
banks, with the exception of 𝐼𝑁𝐸𝑖𝑡.  
Table 3.5 also reports the results for the Hansen test of over-identifying 
restrictions and Arellano and Bond (1991) test for autocorrelation in the first difference 
residuals. Results show that the instruments are valid for the regressions and that the 
null hypothesis of no serial correlation cannot be rejected. In Summary, the empirical 
results strongly support the hypothesis that there is a close relationship between credit 
risk and house price fluctuations. Also, an asymmetric impact of house prices and other 
macroeconomic variables on the dynamics of NPL is found. These findings remain 
robust when analysis is confined to intrastate banks.  
3.5.2. House prices and NPL in different loan categories 
In this section, hypothesis two is tested. Three loan categories are used in this 
analysis: real estate loans, commercial and industrial loans, and consumer loans. It 
should be noted that the number of banks and observations are reduced when 
considering different loan categories because some banks heavily invest in specific 
types of loans and have no recorded data for other loan categories. Table 3.6 presents 
the system GMM estimation results of model (3.16) where 𝑁𝑃𝐿𝑖𝑡
ℎ  is defined as real 
estate NPL as a percentage of total real estate loans.  
The results show that real estate NPL (RENPL) is highly sensitive to 
macroeconomic conditions. The coefficient of house price fluctuations remains negative 
and significant in all equations and for whole sample and the intrastate subsample. This 
indicates that house prices have remarkably affected the evolution of real estate NPL in 
different economic conditions. However, this impact is much stronger during the crisis 
period, indicating an asymmetric linkage between house prices and RENPL. The same 
asymmetric pattern is observed for other macroeconomic variables. 
As regards the bank-specific factors, empirical results in Table 3.6 show that 
quality of real estate loan portfolios is highly affected by idiosyncratic factors, 
particularly in the first sample period. While all estimated coefficients of bank-specific 
factors are statistically significant during pre-crisis period, only 𝐿𝐶𝑖𝑡, 𝐿𝐴𝑖𝑡, and 𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖𝑡 
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remain significant during crisis period. In addition, the estimated coefficient of lagged 
RENPL is higher during crisis period, indicating higher time persistence in RENPL 
during economic downturn. 
 
Table 3.6. GMM estimation results of real estate NPL. 
 I II III IV V VI 
 1999-2012 1999-2005 2006-2012 
Variables All banks Intrastate All banks Intrastate All banks Intrastate 
       
NPLi,t−1  0.714*** 0.721*** 0.660*** 0.671*** 0.672*** 0.685*** 
 (0.028) (0.030) (0.069) (0.069) (0.027) (0.028) 
GDPt  -0.051*** -0.049*** -0.026*** -0.027*** -0.048*** -0.045*** 
 (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.007) 
IRt  0.036*** 0.036*** 0.034*** 0.034*** 0.079*** 0.080*** 
 (0.006) (0.006) (0.008) (0.008) (0.011) (0.011) 
Ut  0.097*** 0.092*** 0.039*** 0.042*** 0.099*** 0.093*** 
 (0.011) (0.012) (0.010) (0.011) (0.012) (0.013) 
HPt  -0.062*** -0.062*** -0.009*** -0.009*** -0.094*** -0.096*** 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.007) (0.007) 
LCi,t−1  0.448*** 0.441*** -0.066 -0.023 0.526*** 0.574*** 
 (0.067) (0.072) (0.065) (0.060) (0.141) (0.154) 
LAi,t−1  0.006*** 0.007*** 0.002** 0.002** 0.007*** 0.006*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) 
INEi,t−1  -0.054 -0.004 -0.120** -0.165*** -0.052 -0.090 
 (0.060) (0.047) (0.047) (0.057) (0.151) (0.121) 
SIZEi,t−1  0.055*** 0.046*** -0.059*** -0.075*** 0.084*** 0.047** 
 (0.009) (0.011) (0.014) (0.019) (0.018) (0.019) 
CRi,t−1  -0.004 -0.003 0.005* 0.005* -0.005 -0.001 
 (0.004) (0.005) (0.003) (0.003) (0.009) (0.010) 
NIMi,t−1  0.095*** 0.095*** 0.052*** 0.053*** 0.114*** 0.144*** 
 (0.015) (0.015) (0.012) (0.013) (0.033) (0.033) 
Constant -1.630*** -1.490*** 0.5830** 0.748** -2.361*** -1.860*** 
 (0.163) (0.169) (0.284) (0.326) (0.373) (0.358) 
       
No. of Observations 84,478 78,315 39,763 37,531 31,334 28,264 
Number of banks 6,937 6,415 5,758 5,431 5,249 4,734 
AR(1) test, p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
AR(2) test, p-value 0.649 0.699 0.198 0.189 0.489 0.476 
Hansen test, p-value 0.288 0.258 0.441 0.449 0.26789 0.291 
Wald test, p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
The dependent variable is the ratio of real estate nonperforming loans to total gross real estate loans. All banks are 
considered in models (I), (III), and (VI), while interstate banks are excluded in models (II), (IV), and (VI). All models 
are estimated using the dynamic two-step system GMM estimator proposed by Blundell and Bond (1998) with 
Windmeijer’s finite sample correction. Huber-White robust standard errors are reported in the parenthesis. ***, **, 
and * coefficients are statistically significant at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively.   
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Table 3.7. GMM estimation results of commercial and industrial NPL. 
 I II III IV V VI 
1999-2012 1999-2005 2006-2012 
Variables All banks Intrastate All banks Intrastate  All banks  Intrastate 
       
NPLi,t−1  0.317*** 0.332** 0.350*** 0.352*** 0.472*** 0.452*** 
 (0.135) (0.148) (0.034) (0.035) (0.114) (0.120) 
GDPt  -0.017*** -0.017*** -0.016** -0.016** -0.013 -0.008 
 (0.006) (0.006) (0.008) (0.008) (0.011) (0.012) 
IRt  0.027*** 0.027*** 0.072*** 0.075*** 0.039** 0.045** 
 (0.010) (0.010) (0.015) (0.016) (0.017) (0.018) 
Ut  0.130*** 0.126*** 0.125*** 0.137*** 0.130*** 0.133*** 
 (0.020) (0.022) (0.022) (0.023) (0.022) (0.023) 
HPt  -0.024*** -0.023*** 0.001 0.003 -0.031*** -0.034*** 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.005) (0.006) (0.009) (0.010) 
LCi,t−1  0.688* -0.619 0.775** 0.897*** 0.781 0.938*** 
 (0.398) (0.413) (0.268) (0.300) (0.534) (0.651) 
LAi,t−1  0.005** 0.005** 0.002 0.002 0.008** 0.007** 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) 
INEi,t−1  0.185** 0.164* 0.153 0.132 0.568* 0.496 
 (0.090) (0.092) (0.217) (0.227) (0.341) (0.372) 
SIZEi,t−1  -0.108*** -0.122*** -0.202*** -0.252*** -0.153*** -0.214*** 
 (0.033) (0.045) (0.025) (0.033) (0.041) (0.062) 
CRi,t−1  -0.017** -0.016** 0.010 0.009 0.003 -0.002 
 (0.007) (0.008) (0.009) (0.009) (0.011) (0.011) 
NIMi,t−1  0.033 0.035 0.017 0.017 -0.010 -0.004 
 (0.024) (0.021) (0.022) (0.022) (0.029) (0.030) 
Constant 0.893** 1.035* 1.899**** 2.328*** 0.699 1.483** 
 (0.427) (0.551) (0.430) (0.505) (0.504) (0.670) 
       
No. of Observations 73,204 67,621 29,803 27,956 19,261 16,862 
Number of banks 6,096 5,628 4,312 4,402 3,223 2,821 
AR(1) test, p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
AR(2) test, p-value 0.297 0.320 0.924 0.914 0.192 0.423 
Hansen test, p-value 0.162 0.165 0.336 0.328 0.382 0.282 
Wald test, p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
The dependent variable is the ratio of commercial and industrial nonperforming loans to total gross commercial and 
industrial loans. All banks are considered in models (I), (III), and (VI), while interstate banks are excluded in models 
(II), (IV), and (VI). All models are estimated using the dynamic two-step system GMM estimator proposed by 
Blundell and Bond (1998) with Windmeijer’s finite sample correction. Huber-White robust standard errors are 
reported in the parenthesis. ***, **, and * coefficients are statistically significant at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively.   
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Table 3.8. GMM estimation results of consumer NPL. 
 I II III IV V VI 
1999-2012 1999-2005 2006-2012 
 All banks Intrastate All banks Intrastate 
All banks 
All banks  Intrastate 
       
NPLi,t−1  0.316*** 0.346**** 0.232** 0.219** 0.380*** 0.352*** 
 (0.086) (0.095) (0.107) (0.108) (0.121) (0.132) 
GDPt  -0.013*** -0.014*** -0.001 -0.001 -0.017*** -0.019*** 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.006) (0.006) 
IRt  0.010** 0.010** 0.010 0.008 0.018** 0.019* 
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.009) (0.010) (0.009) (0.010) 
Ut  0.019*** 0.019*** 0.021 0.029* 0.014 0.014 
 (0.006) (0.006) (0.014) (0.015) (0.010) (0.011) 
HPt  -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 0.002 -0.012* -0.014** 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.004) (0.005) (0.007) (0.008) 
LCi,t−1  0.217** 0.216** 0.667*** 0.792*** 0.747*** 0.934*** 
 (0.090) (0.100) (0.213) (0.232) (0.241) (0.276) 
LAi,t−1  0.003*** 0.003*** 0.001 0.001 -0.002 -0.002 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) 
INEi,t−1  -0.070 -0.099 -0.140 -0.240 0.073 -0.003 
 (0.065) (0.067) (0.173) (0.184) (0.133) (0.130) 
SIZEi,t−1  -0.051*** -0.063*** -0.162*** -0.207*** -0.080*** -0.132*** 
 (0.011) (0.015) (0.028) (0.036) (0.026) (0.039) 
CRi,t−1  -0.001 -0.003 0.020** 0.010** 0.009 0.003 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.008) (0.006) 
NIMi,t−1  0.001 -0.004 0.010 0.008 0.025 0.019 
 (0.010) (0.011) (0.016) (0.017) (0.024) (0.025) 
Constant 0.696*** 0.847*** 2.215*** 2.683*** 1.005*** 1.682*** 
 (0.167) (0.209) (0.494) (0.578) (0.330) (0.431) 
       
No. of Observations 77,095 71,631 36,809 34,807 20,347 18,184 
Number of banks 6,434 5,973 45,330 5,036 3,404 3,042 
AR(1) test, p-value 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.002 0.000 0.001 
AR(2) test, p-value 0.225 0.127 0.127 0.143 0. 992 0.929 
Hansen test, p-value 0.297 0.265 0.159 0.239 0.214 0.266 
Wald test, p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
The dependent variable is the ratio of consumer nonperforming loans to total gross consumer loans. All banks are 
considered in models (I), (III), and (VI), while interstate banks are excluded in models (II), (IV), and (VI). All models 
are estimated using the dynamic two-step system GMM estimator proposed by Blundell and Bond (1998) with 
Windmeijer’s finite sample correction. Huber-White robust standard errors are reported in the parenthesis. ***, **, 
and * coefficients are statistically significant at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively.   
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The estimation results for commercial and industrial NPL (CINPL) are 
presented in Table 3.7. These results show that the determinants of CINPL are quite 
similar to those of RENPL. In general, CINPL is mainly driven by macroeconomic 
factors rather than bank-specific variables. All macroeconomic variables significantly 
affect the quality of commercial loan portfolios in both sub-sample periods, except 
house prices for which the estimated coefficients are insignificant during the first 
sample period. However, house prices significantly contributed to CINPLs in the second 
sub-period, perhaps due to spillover effects of falling house prices and deterioration of 
aggregate liquidity position in the financial system.  
Among idiosyncratic factors, bank size appears to be significant and negative 
across all periods and when all banks are considered. This reflects economies of scale 
and better diversification opportunities in larger banks. Also, LA has a positive 
significant impact on CINPL across all periods for intrastate banks.  
Estimation results for consumer NPL (CNPL) are presented in Table 3.8. As for 
the consumer NPL, the estimation results show that dynamics are rather different from 
other loan categories. The only bank-specific factor that consistently affects the quality 
of consumer loan portfolios is the banks size, which is negative and significant across 
all equations. This indicates that larger banks faced less CNPLs because they have more 
diversified credit portfolios and more scale efficiency.  
As for systematic factors, the results indicate that all macroeconomic variables 
have asymmetric impact on CNPL over two sub-sample periods. While real interest rate 
is the only macroeconomic variable that significantly contributes to CNPLs in the first 
sample period, its impact become insignificant during crisis period and quality of 
consumer loans are significantly affected by other macroeconomic variables. More 
specifically, unexpected shocks arising from rising unemployment rate, falling house 
prices and adverse economic growth largely affected borrower’s wealth in the second 
period.  This implies that borrowers can no longer use their wealth as a buffer to service 
their debt (see, for example, Nkusu, 2011; Rinaldi and Sanchis-Arellano, 2006). 
To summarise the results, comparing the estimation results of NPL in different 
loan categories, there is clear support for hypothesis two suggesting that different loan 
categories have different dynamics towards macroeconomic and bank-specific factors. 
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In general, there is empirical evidence that NPL dynamics of all loan categories are 
highly sensitive to adverse movements of house prices during the second period, with 
real estate loans being the most sensitive category to house price fluctuations. RENPL is 
also the most sensitive category to GDP growth, which can be considered as a general 
proxy for business cycle. These results clearly contradict the empirical findings of 
Louzis et al. (2012) that mortgage loans are the least sensitive category to 
macroeconomic developments.
21
 Furthermore, RENPL is the most persistent category 
of NPL across all sample periods. Finally, sensitivity of NPL to various institutional 
factors varies among different loan categories, with RENPL being most sensitive to 𝐿𝐶𝑖𝑡 
and 𝐿𝐴𝑖𝑡, while CINPL and CNPL are highly responsive to bank size.  
3.5.3. Organisational structure and aggregate NPL 
We now extend our analysis to different types of depository institutions. In order 
to do so, we follow the FDIC charter type classification and split the depository 
institutions in our sample into commercial and savings institutions. The two types of 
institutions are functionally similar as they both accept deposits and issue loans. 
However, savings institutions are traditionally community oriented organizations that 
specialize in mortgage lending, whereas commercial banks make various types of loans 
including commercial and industrial loans.
22
 
The GMM estimation results for the commercial and savings institutions are 
presented in Tables 3.9 and 3.10, respectively. From Table 6 it emerges that the quality 
of loan portfolios of the commercial banks is highly sensitive to the house price 
movements. Notably, the estimated coefficients of 𝐻𝑃𝑡 are negative and statistically 
significant across all the periods. In addition, all other macroeconomic factors as well as 
some bank-specific factors, such as 𝐿𝐶𝑖𝑡, 𝐿𝐴𝑖𝑡, and 𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖𝑡, significantly contribute to 
the NPL in commercial banks. 
                                                 
21
 However, it should be noted that real estate loan category, in this paper, includes all type of loans 
backed by real estate. 
22
 Federally chartered savings institutions are currently allowed to extend their nonmortgage lending up to 
30% of their assets. 
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From Table 3.10, however, it appears that the NPL dynamics are rather in the 
savings institutions. Unlike commercial banks, savings institutions are less sensitive to 
the institutional factors. More specifically, none of the bank-specific variables has a 
remarkable impact on NPL in the savings institutions. However, the estimated 
coefficients of the lagged dependent variables are slightly higher in the savings 
institutions, suggesting that NPL are more persistent in savings institutions. As regards 
the systematic factors, it is found that the quality of loan portfolios of the savings 
institutions is significantly affected by the macroeconomic variables. In particular, the 
NPL dynamics in the savings institutions are highly sensitive to the business cycle (see 
also Salas and Saurina, 2002). The results also show that the impact of the 
macroeconomic factors on NPL is stronger in the second period, which is consistent 
with the findings of Marcucci and Quagliariello (2009). 
As in the case of commercial banks, the estimated coefficients of 𝐻𝑃𝑡 are 
negative and statistically significant in all the equations when savings institutions are 
considered. However, compared to the commercial banks, the impact of 𝐻𝑃𝑡 on the 
NPL in the savings institutions is higher during the first period and lower in the second 
period. This indicates that commercial banks are more sensitive to house price 
developments in downturns. One possible explanation is that, like savings institutions, 
commercial banks become heavily exposed to the housing markets during a booming 
period. However, commercial banks do not specialize in mortgage lending and may 
invest in riskier real estate loans. Accordingly, commercial banks may suffer from 
higher loan losses when house prices drop. The results in Table 3.10 also show that the 
impact of house prices on the NPL is stronger during the second period for both types of 
banks, which lends support to the findings of Pan and Wang (2013), who show that the 
impact of house price fluctuations on credit risk is stronger when the growth of personal 
income falls below a certain threshold level. 
In light of these results, we conclude that house price fluctuations significantly 
affect the quality of loan portfolios across the two types of institutions, while the 
magnitude of the impact varies across commercial and savings institutions during 
different macroeconomic conditions. These results represent evidence in favour of 
hypothesis 3. 
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Table 3.9. GMM estimation results of NPL for commercial banks. 
 I II III IV V VI 
1999-2012 1999-2005 2006-2012 
 All banks Intrastate All banks Intrastate  All banks  Intrastate 
       
NPLi,t−1  0.683*** 0.666*** 0.663*** 0.661*** 0.696*** 0.696*** 
 (0.023) (0.023) (0.079) (0.080) (0.025) (0.024) 
GDPt  -0.039*** -0.035*** -0.020*** -0.021*** -0.043*** -0.039*** 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) 
IRt  0.036*** 0.035*** 0.034*** 0.034*** 0.068*** 0.065*** 
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.006) (0.008) (0.009) 
Ut  0.096*** 0.099*** 0.034*** 0.036*** 0.071*** 0.071*** 
 (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) 
HPt  -0.052*** -0.053*** -0.008*** -0.008*** -0.069*** -0.069*** 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.006) (0.006) 
LCi,t−1  0.727*** 0.690*** -0.228*** -0.209*** 1.139*** 1.092*** 
 (0.071) (0.076) (0.054) (0.060) (0.142) (0.156) 
LAi,t−1  0.009*** 0.008*** 0.004*** 0.004*** 0.010*** 0.010*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
INEi,t−1  0.012 0.009 -1.172*** -0.180*** -0.017 -0.006 
 (0.024) (0.025) (0.044) (0.044) (0.081) (0.089) 
SIZEi,t−1  0.031*** 0.030*** -0.040*** -0.048*** 0.040*** 0.026* 
 (0.007) (0.008) (0.012) (0.015) (0.013) (0.015) 
CRi,t−1  -0.001 -0.001 0.004** 0.004** 0.004 0.006 
 (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.007) (0.007) 
NIMi,t−1  0.008 0.009 0.037*** 0.037*** -0.018 -0.011 
 (0.008) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.016) (0.016) 
Constant -1.294*** -1.276*** 0.422*** 0.492*** -1.688*** -1.547*** 
 (0.099) (0.106) (0.205) (0.235) (0.214) (0.229) 
       
No. of Observations 82,427 77,6663 42,5348 40,800 30,447 28,040 
Number of banks 7,056 6,652 6,173 5,919 5,101 4,698 
AR(1) test, p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
AR(2) test, p-value 0.239 0.430 0.171 0.175 0.997 0.948 
Hansen test, p-value 0.179 0.201 0.165 0.169 0.159 0.288 
Wald test, p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
The dependent variable is the ratio of nonperforming loans to total gross loans. All banks are considered in models 
(I), (III), and (VI), while interstate banks are excluded in models (II), (IV), and (VI). All models are estimated using 
the dynamic two-step system GMM estimator proposed by Blundell and Bond (1998) with Windmeijer’s finite 
sample correction. Huber-White robust standard errors are reported in the parenthesis. ***, **, and * coefficients are 
statistically significant at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively.   
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Table 3.10. GMM estimation results of NPL for savings banks 
 I II III IV V VI 
1999-2012 1999-2005 2006-2012 
 All banks Intrastate All banks Intrastate 
All banks 
 All banks Intrastate 
       
NPLi,t−1  0.695*** 0.712*** 0.718*** 0.708*** 0.767*** 0.763*** 
 (0.044) (0.045) (0.100) (0.099) (0.039) (0.060) 
GDPt  -0.038*** -0.044*** -0.016** -0.014* -0.047*** -0.042*** 
 (0.009) (0.011) (0.007) (0.008) (0.011) (0.012) 
IRt  0.043*** 0.038*** 0.028* 0.028 0.067*** 0.067*** 
 (0.011) (0.012) (0.016) (0.017) (0.019) (0.021) 
Ut  0.136**** 0.112*** 0.037** 0.044** 0.085*** 0.087*** 
 (0.021) (0.021) (0.017) (0.019) (0.019) (0.028) 
HPt  -0.049*** -0.048*** -0.015** -0.015*** -0.059*** -0.061*** 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.012) (0.013) 
LCi,t−1  0.313* 0.494** 0.170* -0.191* 0.412 0.664* 
 (0.172) (0.201) (0.087) (0.099) (0.265) (0.341) 
LAi,t−1  0.003* 0.002** 0.001 0.001 0.004 0.003 
 (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.003) (0.003) 
INEi,t−1  0.129 -0.038 0.017 0.027 0.262 -0.478 
 (0.162) (0.134) (0.030) (0.039) (0.514) (0.405) 
SIZEi,t−1  0.045** 0.031 -0.021* -0.026* 0.092* 0.024 
 (0.022) (0.025) (0.012) (0.015) (0.048) (0.043) 
CRi,t−1  -0.014* -0.017* -0.003 -0.004 -0.004 -0.008 
 (0.008) (0.009) (0.003) (0.003) (0.011) (0.014) 
NIMi,t−1  0.158*** 0.172*** 0.066* 0.080* 0.284*** 0.207* 
 (0.064) (0.069) (0.038) (0.043) (0.108) (0.108) 
Constant -1.618*** -1.437*** -0.107 -0.111 -3.021** -1.444 
 (0.481) (0.486) (0.262) (0.299) (0.1.288) (1.098) 
       
No. of Observations 15,471 13,831 8,023 7,364 5,836 5,103 
Number of banks 1,311 1,169 1,164 1,067 980 856 
AR(1) test, p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
AR(2) test, p-value 0.578 0.551 0.187 0.121 0.492 0.345 
Hansen test, p-value 0.231 0.255 0.134 0.171 0.249 0.345 
Wald test, p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
The dependent variable is the ratio of nonperforming loans to total gross loans. All banks are considered in models 
(I), (III), and (VI), while interstate banks are excluded in models (II), (IV), and (VI). All models are estimated using 
the dynamic two-step system GMM estimator proposed by Blundell and Bond (1998) with Windmeijer’s finite 
sample correction. Huber-White robust standard errors are reported in the parenthesis. ***, **, and * coefficients are 
statistically significant at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively.   
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3.5.4. NPL determinants in large and small banks 
Hypothesis four in Section 3.2 is tested by investigating the impact of house 
price fluctuations on large and small banks. Following the FDIC and Federal Reserve 
guidelines, small banks are defined as those with average total assets of less than $500 
million during the sample period. This study only divides the sample into large and 
small banks to ensure that there is reasonable number of banks in each category. Tables 
3.11 and 3.12 present the estimation results for large banks and small banks, 
respectively. 
In general, the system GMM estimation results for small banks are very similar 
to those of all sample banks, indicating that the results in Table 3.5 are mainly driven by 
small banks. This is because the sample under consideration includes a relatively large 
number of small banks compared to large banks. As for the systematic factors, the 
results show that all macroeconomic variables significantly contribute to the evolution 
of NPL across small banks and over all sample periods. Also, the impact of 
macroeconomic variables is more pronounced during the second sub-sample period.  
As for bank-specific variables, 𝐿𝐴𝑖𝑡 and 𝑁𝐼𝑀𝑖𝑡 have positive and significant 
impact on NPL of small banks across all estimated models. The coefficients on 𝐿𝐶𝑖𝑡 and 
𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖𝑡 are also significant across all sample periods, but they obtain different signs in 
the two sub-sample periods. They enter into equations with negative sign during the 
first sub-sample period and with a positive sign in the second sub-sample periods. 
The estimation results in Table 3.12, however, show that determinants of NPL are rather 
similar in large and small banks, with a few notable exceptions. Specifically, the impact 
of falling house prices on NPL is more pronounced in large banks. This can be 
attributed to reliance on ‘too-big-to-fail’ guarantees creating excessive moral hazard as 
well as higher agency costs in large bank. Eventually, higher credit risk accumulation 
during economic expansion results in higher NPL when house prices drop. On the other 
hand, small banks suffer less from falling house prices, while they benefit more from 
rising house prices. One possible explanation is that small banks have limited access to 
external funding and might have greater incentives to efficiently monitor the riskiness 
of their portfolios. This in turn may prevent excessive accumulation of credit risk during 
booming period. Another striking finding is that large banks are more sensitive to  
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Table 3.11. GMM estimation results of NPL for banks with total assets of less than 
$500 million. 
 I II III IV V VI 
1999-2012 1999-2005 2006-2012 
 All banks Intrastate All banks Intrastate 
All banks 
 All banks Intrastate 
       
NPLi,t−1  0.772*** 0.682*** 0.457*** 0.457*** 0.703*** 0.703*** 
 (0.017) (0.028) (0.057) (0.058) (0.025) (0.025) 
GDPt  -0.037*** -0.033*** -0.017*** -0.017*** -0.037*** -0.037*** 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) 
IRt  0.035*** 0.033*** 0.016** 0.015* 0.057*** 0.055*** 
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.008) (0.008) (0.009) (0.009) 
Ut  0.064*** 0.086*** 0.036*** 0.036*** 0.075*** 0.075*** 
 (0.007) (0.009) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) 
HPt  -0.048*** -0.052*** -0.011*** -0.011*** -0.065*** -0.064*** 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.006) (0.006) 
LCi,t−1  0.348*** 0.394*** -0.361*** -0.357*** 0.783*** 0.759*** 
 (0.060) (0.064) (0.062) (0.063) (0.136) (0.142) 
LAi,t−1  0.008*** 0.008*** 0.002** 0.002** 0.010*** 0.009*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
INEi,t−1  0.004 0.013 -0.006 -0.006 -0.006 0.012 
 (0.012) (0.014) (0.005) (0.005) (0.041) (0.059) 
SIZEi,t−1  0.060*** 0.048*** -0.071*** -0.074*** 0.070*** 0.059*** 
 (0.009) (0.011) (0.018) (0.018) (0.020) (0.017) 
CRi,t−1  0.001 0.003 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 
 (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.005) (0.005) 
NIMi,t−1  0.034*** 0.034*** 0.052*** 0.053*** 0.035* 0.036* 
 (0.009) (0.009) (0.015) (0.015) (0.019) (0.019) 
Constant -1.453*** -1.394*** 1.105*** 1.137*** -1.981*** -1.843*** 
 (0.119) (0.139) (0.299) (0.305) (0.251) (0.253) 
       
No. of Observations 70,483 68,482 27,239 26,849 28,614 27,335 
Number of banks 5,762 5,594 4,698 4,630 4,823 4,605 
AR(1) test, p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
AR(2) test, p-value 0.813 0.731 0.908 0.908 0.353 0.344 
Hansen test, p-value 0.209 0.210 0.223 0.220 0.263 0.280 
Wald test, p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
The dependent variable is the ratio of nonperforming loans to total gross loans. All banks are considered in models 
(I), (III), and (VI), while interstate banks are excluded in models (II), (IV), and (VI). All models are estimated using 
the dynamic two-step system GMM estimator proposed by Blundell and Bond (1998) with Windmeijer’s finite 
sample correction. Huber-White robust standard errors are reported in the parenthesis. ***, **, and * coefficients are 
statistically significant at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively.   
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Table 3.12. GMM estimation results of NPL for banks with total assets of more 
than $500 million. 
 I II III IV V VI 
1999-2012 1999-2005 2006-2012 
 All banks Intrastate All banks Intrastate 
All banks 
 All banks Intrastate 
       
NPLi,t−1  0.547*** 0.527*** 0.687*** 0.714*** 0.644*** 0.742*** 
 (0.057) (0.059) (0.129) (0.143) (0.069) (0.047) 
GDPt  -0.062*** -0.058*** -0.023*** -0.024*** -0.078*** -0.073*** 
 (0.010) (0.010) (0.007) (0.008) (0.015) (0.017) 
IRt  0.049*** 0.051*** 0.045*** 0.050*** 0.114*** 0.112*** 
 (0.014) (0.016) (0.011) (0.013) (0.020) (0.022) 
Ut  0.192*** 0.190*** 0.035** 0.042** 0.128*** 0.073*** 
 (0.027) (0.030) (0.015) (0.018) (0.036) (0.028) 
HPt  -0.057*** -0.060*** -0.008** -0.009** -0.083*** -0.084*** 
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.003) (0.004) (0.013) (0.014) 
LCi,t−1  1.019*** 1.036*** 0.032 0.039 1.069*** 0.713** 
 (0.159) (0.178) (0.064) (0.065) (0.283) (0.288) 
LAi,t−1  0.010*** 0.009*** 0.002 0.001 0.015*** 0.008** 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.005) (0.004) 
INEi,t−1  0.117* 0.156** -0.003 -0.001 0.168** -0.081 
 (0.070) (0.077) (0.048) (0.055) (0.071) (0.217) 
SIZEi,t−1  0.061*** 0.077*** 0.021*** 0.040*** 0.064 -0.069 
 (0.020) (0.027) (0.008) (0.014) (0.053) (0.049) 
CRi,t−1  0.001 -0.007 0.003 0.001 0.025 0.022 
 (0.012) (0.007) (0.002) (0.002) (0.030) (0.032) 
NIMi,t−1  -0.008 -0.003 0.017 0.017 -0.058** -0.044** 
 (0.018) (0.018) (0.020) (0.021) (0.028) (0.021) 
Constant -2.491*** -2.603*** -0.540*** -0.807*** -3.036*** -0.204 
 (0.380) (0.454) (0.201) (0.287) (0.936) (0.815) 
       
No. of Observations 11,176 8,374 4,137 3,403 4,186 2,866 
Number of banks 967 700 705 580 716 489 
AR(1) test, p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
AR(2) test, p-value 0.946 0.702 0.941 0.925 0.492 0.898 
Hansen test, p-value 0.102 0.0966 0.127 0.141 0.137 0.0901 
Wald test, p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
The dependent variable is the ratio of nonperforming loans to total gross loans. All banks are considered in models 
(I), (III), and (VI), while interstate banks are excluded in models (II), (IV), and (VI). All models are estimated using 
the dynamic two-step system GMM estimator proposed by Blundell and Bond (1998) with Windmeijer’s finite 
sample correction. Huber-White robust standard errors are reported in the parenthesis. ***, **, and * coefficients are 
statistically significant at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively.   
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business cycles as indicated by GDP. This finding has important regulatory implications 
as the failure of a large bank can have severe impact on the banking system and the 
economy. 
As for idiosyncratic factors, the empirical results for large banks reveal that all 
bank-specific variables are insignificant during the first sample period, with the 
exception of 𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖𝑡 that takes a positive sign. This indicates that NPL in large banks is 
mostly driven by macroeconomic conditions and larger banks face higher NPL. This is 
also consistent with positive linkage between bank size and risk taking found in De 
Nicoló (2000) and Tabak et al. (2011). However, some idiosyncratic factors such as 
𝐿𝐶𝑖𝑡, 𝐿𝐴𝑖𝑡, and 𝑁𝐼𝑀𝑖𝑡 significantly affect NPL in the second sub-period. Furthermore, 
NPL appears to be highly persistence in large banks over both sample periods, while the 
estimated coefficients on lagged NPL take high value only in the second sub-sample 
period for small banks. 
 
To summarize, the empirical findings strongly support hypothesis four which 
postulates that falling house price have greater impact on the quality of loan portfolios 
in large banks, compared to small banks. In addition, large banks are more responsive to 
business cycles and are less sensitive to idiosyncratic factors during economic 
expansion. 
3.6. CONCLUSIONS 
The collapse of house price bubble in the US triggered the recent financial crisis. 
The US banking institutions suffered heavily from falling house prices, while they had a 
marked contribution to the creation of house price bubble through their lending 
behaviour in pre-crisis period. Using a large panel of the insured banking institutions in 
the US, this chapter applies dynamic panel models to investigate the linkage between 
house price fluctuations and evolution of nonperforming loans over three periods. 
Furthermore, in order to account for banking deregulation in the US, the analysis is 
carried out on all banks as well as intrastate banks.  
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Overall, the empirical results suggest that nonperforming loans across US banks 
can be explained by a mixture of idiosyncratic and systematic factors used in this study. 
With respect to hypothesis one, a strong negative linkage between house price 
fluctuations and NPL is detected i.e. falling house prices are tightly linked to rising NPL 
levels. In addition, the linkage between house prices and credit risk is asymmetric, 
meaning that the impact of house price fluctuations on NPL is stronger during crisis 
period.  
With respect to hypothesis two, strong evidence that the impact of house price 
fluctuations widely vary across different loan categories is found, with real estate loans 
being the most responsive loan category. Moreover, real estate NPLs as well as 
commercial and industrial NPLs are very sensitive to business cycle indicators, such as 
GDP growth and unemployment rate.  Also, sensitivity of NPL to various institutional 
factors vary among different loan categories, with real estate NPL being most sensitive 
to loan portfolio concentration while commercial NPL and consumer NPL being most 
responsive to bank size. 
The test of Hypothesis 3 reveals that different types of depository institutions 
react differently to the housing prices. In particular, our results show that commercial 
banks are more sensitive to the house price movements during downturns. However, 
this finding can be challenged by the fact that I have different number of savings and 
commercial banks in this analysis. Moreover, it is found that bank-specific determinants 
of NPL vary across commercial and savings institutions and over different economic 
conditions. As for the fourth hypothesis, strong evidence is found that falling house 
prices have greater impact on the evolution of NPL in large banks during crisis period. 
In addition, large banks are more sensitive to business cycle fluctuations.   
These findings have several important implications for regulators and 
policymakers. They underline the need for closely monitoring the exposure of each 
bank to house price fluctuations. This indicates that house price fluctuations can be 
considered as an important macroeconomic indicator to assess financial stability. Also, 
it is of crucial importance to control and monitor the aggregate lending level in the 
housing markets in different regions to ensure smooth flow of house prices and to avoid 
creation of severe macroeconomic imbalances such as housing bubble. As regards the 
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loan categories, different regulatory frameworks have to be designed for assessing the 
credit risk exposure of different types of loans. Finally, regulators have to carefully 
monitor the exposure of large banks to housing markets as falling house prices triggers 
a sharp increase in their NPL, which can eventually destabilise the whole banking 
system. 
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APPENDIX A3 
Table A3.1. Variable definitions 
Variable Definition 
 
𝑁𝑃𝐿𝑖𝑡 
 
(Loans that are past due more than 90 days and still accruing interest plus 
nonaccrual loans that are no longer accruing interest)/total gross loans 
 
𝑅𝐸𝑁𝑃𝐿𝑖𝑡 Nonperforming real estate loans/total real estate loans 
 
𝐶𝐼𝑁𝑃𝐿𝑖𝑡 Nonperforming commercial and industrial loans/total commercial and 
industrial loans. 
 
𝐶𝑁𝑃𝐿𝑖𝑡 Nonperforming consumer loans/total consumer loans 
 
𝐿𝐶𝑖𝑡 The Herfindahl–Hirschman index (HHI) of loan portfolio composition in each 
bank. We define three major categories of loans; real estate loans, commercial 
loans, and consumer loans. If 𝑃𝐿𝑗𝑡 represents the portfolio shares of each loan 
category, then 𝐻𝐻𝐼𝑗𝑡 = ∑ (𝑃𝐿𝑗𝑡)𝑛
23
𝑛=1   is defined as the HHI of bank j at time t. 
 
𝐿𝐴𝑖𝑡 Total gross loan/ total assets 
 
𝐶𝑅𝑖𝑡 Total capital equity/total assets 
 
𝐼𝑁𝐸𝑖𝑡 The ratio of non-interest expenses to the sum of interest and non-interest 
income. Net interest expenses don’t include the amortization expenses of 
intangible assets. 
 
𝑁𝐼𝑀𝑖𝑡 Net interest income (total interest income minus total interest 
expenses)/average earning assets  
Net interest expenses don’t include the amortization expenses of intangible 
assets.  
 
𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖𝑡 log of total assets 
 
𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑡 The state-level Gross Domestic Product (GDP) adjusted for the inflation 
according to national prices for the goods and services produced within the 
state. 
 
𝐼𝑅𝑡 The lending interest rate adjusted for inflation measured by the consumer price 
index. 
 
𝑈𝑡 The percentage of labour force without work but available to work and actively 
seeking employment. 
 
𝐻𝑃𝑡 The growth rate of house price index adjusted for inflation as measured by the 
national level consumer price index. The house price index is estimated using 
sales price and appraisal data. 
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4. CHAPTER FOUR 
CAPITAL INFUSIONS AND STABILITY OF 
RECIPIENT BANKS 
 
4.1. INTRODUCTION 
In the wake of Lehman Brothers’ bankruptcy, the U.S. financial system 
experienced an unprecedented liquidity shock due to widespread panic and lack of 
confidence among investors and financial institutions. As a response, the U.S. Congress 
passed the Emergency Economic Stabilization Act (EESA) of 2008 and authorised the 
Department of the Treasury to establish the Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP) and 
to disburse up to $700 billion to bailout the US financial system. Under TARP, the 
Department of the Treasury created the Capital Purchase Program (CPP) to stabilise the 
banking system by injecting capital into viable banks. Over the course of this program, 
707 banking institutions of all sizes in 48 states received capital assistance. 
TARP, as the largest ever government intervention in the US financial sector, 
has intensified a vigorous debate concerning the effectiveness of capital injection 
programs as reliable instruments to restore banking stability during periods of financial 
distress. Providing capital assistance to viable banks during financial crisis was 
politically justified as an essential strategy to rescue the U.S. financial system from 
imminent collapse. In this context, TARP funds were intended (i) to restores confidence 
in the banking industry by keeping large institutions facing temporary liquidity 
problems afloat, (ii) to stimulate healthy recipients to promote lending activities, and 
through that, resolving the ‘loan freeze problem’ and restarting the economy.  
Nevertheless, many pundits and researchers have raised serious concerns 
regarding the implementation of TARP which may largely distort the program from 
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serving taxpayers in the manner it was intended. First, it is argued that governmental 
assistance distorts banking competition and induces increased risk-taking incentives for 
non-recipient banks, thereby destabilising the banking system (see Hakenes and 
Schnabel, 2010; Gropp et al., 2011;, among others). On the other hand, capital infusions 
may undermine financial stability of recipient banks due to lack of transparency in the 
selection of qualifying institutions and insufficient monitoring of a recipient bank’s 
investment strategy ex post. As a consequence, government protection may create moral 
hazard incentives on the part of supported banks, resulting in excessive risk-taking and 
instability (see, e.g., Farruggio et al., 2013; Elyasiani et al., 2014; Black and 
Hazelwood, 2013). In addition, many recipient banks used TARP funds for purposes 
other than promoting lending activities which was the primary objective of TARP to 
restore credit flow in the economy.  
Furthermore, a comprehensive assessment of TARP reveals that a considerable 
number of TARP recipients have faced significant distressing experiences, such as 
failure or missing their TARP dividend payments. This gives rise to following 
questions: does capital infusion enhance stability of recipient banks? Are recipients of 
governmental capital assistance attractive acquisition targets? Does size of a bailout 
recipient affect its survival likelihood? This study attempts to provide answer to these 
questions by empirically investigating the impact of capital infusions on financial 
stability of TARP recipients. With this target in mind, the Cox proportional hazard 
model with time varying covariates is estimated. This model allows to investigate if 
receiving capital assistance affects the likelihood of failure or acquisition of banks 
controlled by a TARP recipient’s holding company.  
The empirical results in this chapter reveal that capital infusions do not play a 
significant role in stabilising recipient banks, perhaps due to severe impediments in 
implementation of these programs. Providing capital assistance did not help recipient 
banks avoid technical insolvency even though larger institutions may avoid regulatory 
closure. Smaller recipients were also less likely to avoid regulatory closure. 
Furthermore, capital infusions significantly increased acquisition likelihood of 
recipients before repayment of TARP funds, disregarding their sizes and financial 
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health. These findings have important policy implications and can help regulators and 
policymakers to provide better rescue strategies and supervisory practices in response to 
likewise crises in the future. 
This study contributes to the existing literature in several ways. First, to the best 
of my knowledge, this is the first study that analyses the impact of governmental capital 
assistance on failure and acquisition of recipient banks. Most previous TARP studies 
can be classified in two strands: the first strand concentrates on financial health of 
TARP banks throughout the program (see Duchin and Sosyura, 2012; Bayazitova and 
Shivdasani. 2012; Wilson and Wu, 2012, among others), while the second strand of 
literature investigates stock price performance of CPP recipients in response to various 
TARP events (see, e.g., Veronesi and Zingales, 2010; Kim and Stock, 2012; Liu et al., 
2013; Farruggio et al., 2013). 
Second, most previous TARP studies analyse the performance of TARP 
recipients at bank holding level, while TARP studies at bank level are scarce. An 
important contribution is Li (2013) which investigates financial characteristics of CPP 
recipients as well as the stimulus effect of TARP funds on a recipient bank’s loan 
supply. The present Chapter adds to the literature by investigating the impact of TARP 
funds on stability of banking institutions controlled by a TARP recipient. This is of 
paramount importance for providing better regulatory practices.  
Finally, most recent studies, including Cole and White (2012) and Berger and 
Bouwman (2013), have examined various factors affecting bank failures during the 
recent financial crisis, while far less is known about the financial characteristics of 
acquired banks. This chapter contributes to existing literature by documenting financial 
determinants of the U.S. banks takeover during the recent financial crisis.  
The remainder of this chapter is organised as follows. In Section 4.2, a brief 
introduction to TARP is provided and relevant empirical hypotheses are presented. 
Section 4.3 describes data and sources, econometric model and variables employed in 
this study. Empirical results are discussed in Section 4. 4. Finally, Section 4.5 concludes 
and makes some suggestions regarding policy implications. 
103 
 
4.2. EMPIRICAL HYPOTHESES 
This Section provides a brief introduction to TARP and posits the empirical hypotheses. 
4.2.1 Troubled Asset Relief Program 
The U.S. financial system experienced a severe liquidity crisis in September 
2008 when a series of distressing events occurred in various key industries. On 
September 7, 2008, the Federal Housing Finance Agency (FHFA) placed two major 
Government Sponsored Enterprises (GSE), Freddie Mac and Fannie Mae, into 
government conservatorship run by the FHFA in order to ensure financial soundness of 
these two troubled companies and stabilise the mortgage market. This was the most 
significant U.S. government intervention in private sector in decades. 
 A week later, the largest bankruptcy filing in the history of U.S. financial 
system occurred when the Lehman Brothers Holding Inc. filed for bankruptcy on 
September 15, 2008.
1
 Consequently, many other financial institutions linked to the 
Lehman Brothers Holding Inc. incurred significant losses.  For instance, the day after, 
the Reserve Primary Fund, one of the oldest and largest U.S. money market mutual 
funds, broke the buck due to writing off its debt securities issued by Lehman Brothers 
Holdings Inc. The failure of the Reserve Primary Fund triggered a run on many other 
money market mutual funds, which played a pivotal role in providing liquidity in the 
market place.
2
  
The American International Group Inc. (AIG) was another major financial 
institution facing liquidity difficulties in the tumultuous month of September. The 
company suffered from significant losses on its investments on a wide range of financial 
instruments and dramatic decline in its stock price. Consequently, the AIG’s credit 
                                                 
1 On the same day, Merrill Lynch & Co., an investment bank giant that was facing significant losses 
attributed to its exposure to Collateralised Debt Obligations (CDOs), was acquired by Bank of America.  
2
 In response to rising anxiety in money market, the U.S. Department of the Treasury launched a 
temporary guarantee program on September 19, 2008. This program provides up $50 billion from the 
Exchange Stabilization Fund to guarantee to restore the net asset value (NAV) of a participating money 
market mutual fund to $1 in the event it breaks the buck. 
104 
 
rating was downgraded by various credit rating agencies, which obliged the company to 
post significant amount of additional collateral. Unable to meet mounting demands for 
additional collateral, the company experienced a severe liquidity crisis, which placed 
the AIG on the verge of collapse.
3
  
With worsening financial conditions, many banks that were already struggling 
with their mortgage portfolios, started to experience dramatic deposit outflows. Among 
them was the Washington Mutual Bank (WaMu), the U.S. largest savings and loan 
association with total assets of over $300 million, which was declared insolvent by the 
Office of Thrift Supervision (OTS) and placed into receivership of the FDIC on 
September 25, 2008.
4
 The failure of WaMu was the largest bank failure in the history of 
the U.S. banking system, which intensified the pressure on other banking institutions 
including large banks with ‘too-big-to-fail’ status.5  
For the first time in generations, the whole financial system in the U.S. was on 
the verge of collapse due to a widespread panic and lack of trust among investors and 
financial institutions. It was out of these distressing conditions that a bipartisan majority 
of Congress passed and President Bush signed into law the Emergency Economic 
Stabilization Act (EESA) on October 3, 2008. The EESA authorised the Department of 
the Treasury to establish Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP) to stem the panic, 
restore confidence in the financial markets, and restart economic growth. 
Under the TARP, the Department of the Treasury was authorised to either 
purchase or insure up to $700 billion of troubled mortgage-related assets of financial 
institutions in order to clean up their balance sheets, enhance market liquidity and 
stabilise housing and financial markets. However, on October 14, the Department of the 
Treasury announced a revised version of the original TARP plan and launched Capital 
                                                 
3
 In an attempt to avoid the disastrous repercussions of AIG collapse, the Federal Reserve Board 
authorised the Federal Reserve Bank of New York to provide an emergency loan of up to $85 billion to 
the company on September 16, 2008. 
4
 On the same day, all assets, deposits, certain liabilities, and banking operations of WaMu were acquired 
by the JPMorgan Chase for a mere $1.9 billion and at no cost to the FDIC. 
5
 For instance, the day after the seizure of WaMu, Wachovia, the fourth largest U.S. bank at that time, 
appeared to be on the verge of failure due to large deposit outflows and significant decline in its stock 
price. Eventually, the banking operations of Wachovia Corporation were acquired by Wells Fargo on 
October 3, 2008.  
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Purchase Program (CPP) as an initial program, which was later followed by several 
other programs under TARP.
6
  
The CPP, as the largest program launched under the TARP, was designed to 
purchase up to $250 billion of preferred stock and equity warrants from viable financial 
institutions. Warrants are derivative securities that give the holder the right to purchase 
a stock at a specific exercise price until the expiration date. For each CPP investment in 
a publicly traded company, the Treasury received warrants to purchase shares of 
common stock equal to 15% of the senior preferred stock investment. These warrants 
are exercisable at any time over a ten year period and with exercise prices set at the 20-
trading day trailing average stock price of a company as of the investment date.
7
 
On October 28, 2008, the initial round of CPP investments, $115 billion, was 
allocated to eight giant banking institutions.
8
 Over the course of the program, 707 
financial institutions, in 48 states, received approximately $205 billion as CPP 
investments through December 29, 2009.
9
 In return, the CPP participating banks were 
subject to certain requirements. The shares purchased by the Treasury under CPP have 
dividend rate of 5% per year for the first five years and 9% per year afterwards. Also, 
the Treasury established certain standards and rules applicable to executive 
compensation practices of CPP recipients, for so long as the Treasury owns their shares 
or warrants.  
                                                 
6
 In general, the TARP created 13 different programs which can be broken down into five major 
programs; namely Bank Investment Programs, Credit Market Programs, AIG Assistance Program, 
Automobile Industry Support, and Housing Programs. 
7
 Upon the redemption of the senior preferred stock investment, an institution can either repurchase its 
warrants at the fair market value, or the Treasury would sell the warrants to third parties through public 
auction. 
8
 The first recipients of the CPP investments were Bank of America Corp., Goldman Sachs Group Inc., 
JPMorgan Chase & Co., Wells Fargo & Co., Bank of New York Mellon Corp., Citigroup Inc., State 
Street Corp, and Morgan Stanley. To be eligible for TARP funds, Goldman Sachs Group and Morgan 
Stanley converted from investment banks to bank holding companies in September 2008. 
9
 The treasury also purchased $20 billion in preferred stock from Bank of America Corp. and Citigroup 
Inc. However, since the CPP was notionally designed for viable institutions, this assistance came under a 
new program called under the Targeted Investment Program (TIP) which was designed to provide 
additional funds to stabilise institutions that were considered to be systematically significant.  
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Some CPP terms and conditions were amended on February 17, 2009, when 
President Obama signed into law the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act 
(ARRA). Among other changes, ARRA imposed more restrictions on the executive 
compensation practices of CPP recipients. Also, the enactment of ARRA eliminated the 
three year waiting period and allowed recipient banks to repay the CPP funds and exit 
the program, subject to consultation with the appropriate Federal banking agency.   
TARP authority was amended by Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and 
Consumer Protection Act which reduced the authorized amount to $475 billion. The 
Treasury’s authority to make investment under TARP expired on October 3, 2010, and 
since then the Treasury has been focusing on winding down remaining TARP 
investments. Of approximately $245 billion disbursed to banking institutions under 
Bank Support Programs, the Treasury has received total cash back of approximately 
$273 billion including net capital repayments, interest and dividends, and warrant 
proceeds, as of September 2013. 
4.2.2. Development of empirical hypothesis 
The largest ever government intervention in the US banking system has 
prompted researchers to evaluate the effectiveness of emergency capital injections on 
financial performance of recipient institutions. Yet, there is no consensus in the 
literature on how efficiently bank recapitalisation works. In general, stability of a TARP 
recipient is likely to be affected by three key factors: initial financial health, market 
perception towards TARP investment, and recipient’s reinvestment strategies ex post.  
Theoretically, it is argued that the effectiveness of equity capital infusions 
predominantly depends upon financial health of recipient banks ex ante. Diamond and 
Rajan (2005, 2011) point out that capital infusions to impaired banks with highly 
illiquid asset portfolios are not only of no use to help these banks survive and avoid 
under-priced fire sales but also may destroy their healthier counterparts. Empirical 
evidence by Bayazitova and Shivdasani (2012) indicates that, compared to non-
recipients, TARP recipients tended to be larger, with less stable funding resources, 
weaker capital ratios, greater derivative exposures, and better performing loan 
portfolios. Furthermore, several studies point out the key role that political and 
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regulatory connections played in distribution of TARP funds (see Duchin and Sosyura, 
2012; Li, 2013). These studies suggest that some recipient banks were not healthy at all, 
while TARP was notionally designed for healthy and viable institutions. Accordingly, 
Cornett et al. (2013) account for heterogeneity in financial health of TARP recipients 
and show that performance of recipient banks greatly differs with respect to their pre-
crisis health: healthier and larger banks are significantly more likely to repay their 
TARP funds and less likely to miss their dividend payments. 
Another important factor that affects the stability of recipient banks is market 
perception and sentiment towards recipients, which can greatly affect their stock price 
performance as well as their access to external funding and liquidity. Indeed, the 
existing literature provides two divergent views on the relationship between receiving 
bailout funds and stability of recipient banks in the short-run. On the one hand, some 
authors support ‘bailout-stability’ view and argue that capital assistance enhances 
stability of recipient banks in the short-run by improving their capital and liquidity 
position during adverse financial conditions (see Mehran and Thakor, 2011; Bayazitova 
and Shivdasani, 2012). Furthermore, capital infusions may be considered as a positive 
signal about financial health of bailout recipients, particularly considering that TARP 
funds were designed for viable banks only. Also, investors may assume that TARP 
recipients are under government’s protection and will be bailed out again by the 
government, in case of future distress (see Duchin and Sosyura, 2014). 
By contrast, advocates of ‘bailout-fragility’ view argue that capital infusions 
may serve as a distress signal about financial health of a recipient bank. Hoshi and 
Kashyap (2010) argue that applying for government funds may reduce the value of a 
bank’s existing equity by indicating that the bank is either unable to raise external funds 
elsewhere or its potential future loss is likely to be higher than the previously disclosed 
amount. Furthermore, capital infusions may induce debt overhang problem as 
government securities have priority over common shares in terms of claim on earnings 
and dividend payments. This can further undermine the current market value of a 
recipient’s existing equity. In general, previous studies have provided conflicting 
empirical evidence on how investors reacted to capital injections; Elyasiani et al. (2014) 
reveal that investors reacted positively to TARP injections, while others, including 
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Farruggio et al. (2013) and Fratianni and Marchionne (2013), find a significantly 
negative market response to capital infusions. 
The impact of capital infusions on long-run stability of a recipient bank mainly 
depends upon the bank’s risk-taking behaviour and reinvestment strategy ex post. On 
the one hand, increased capitalisation of supported banks may reduce their risk-taking 
incentives, which, in turn, enhances their likelihood of survival and long-run stability 
(Duchin and Sosyura, 2014).  Equally important, liquid capital infusions when financial 
markets are highly illiquid distorts market conditions and gives bailout recipients the 
advantage to better seize profitable investment opportunities at deep discounts. Thus, 
skilful managers can use this cheap source of financing to reduce the bank’s risk level 
via diversification of asset portfolios, thereby promoting the bank stability (Farruggio et 
al., 2013).  
On the other hand, advocates of ‘bailout-fragility’ view argue that bailout 
recipients may be more fragile in the long run. In particular, capital injections may 
induce higher risk-taking by a protected bank due to increasing moral hazard incentives 
on the part of the bank’s managers (see, e.g., Dam and Koetter, 2012; Duchin and 
Sosyura, 2014). Moreover, one of the primary purposes of TARP was to promote 
lending activities through TARP recipients. Lending cash liquid to risky borrowers 
during a period of financial distress can largely deteriorate the quality of loan portfolios 
in protected banks (Black and Hazelwood, 2013; Elyasiani, 2014). 
Building up on the existing literature, the empirical hypotheses about the impact 
of governmental capital assistance on bank stability are formulated as follows. 
Hypothesis 1: Although government bailout is not effective in preventing recipient 
banks from technical insolvency, larger recipients may avoid regulatory closure. 
Several reasons can be provided for this hypothesis. First, in the presence of 
political and regulatory connections, some unhealthy and highly illiquid banks may 
receive government funds. This, in turn, may question and stigmatise financial health of 
other recipients, and hence limit their access to external financing, reduce their share 
prices, and trigger deposit outflows. Furthermore, having no clear guidance and 
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restrictions as to how the government funds should be used may generate ex ante moral 
hazard incentives on the part of bank managers, particularly if participating in bailout 
program restricts managers’ compensation. More importantly, when facing financial 
distress, larger banks are more likely to avoid regulatory closure due to better political 
and regulatory connections as well as having ‘too-big-too-fail’ status, which ease their 
access to liquidity and external funding. 
Hypothesis 2: Bailout recipients are attractive acquisition targets, regardless of their 
size and financial health, particularly before the repayment of the bailout funds.  
There are three main reasons why the bailout recipients are more likely to be 
acquired before capital repayments. Over time, many TARP recipients struggled with (i) 
public stigma and pressure attached to the TARP investment, (ii) reduced share prices 
due to market uncertainty and stigma, (iii) potential debt overhang problems, and (iv) 
various restrictions on executive compensations. This may incentivise managers of 
recipient banks to trade some of their subsidiaries to repay government funds and exit 
TARP. Furthermore, some recipients that used TARP money to acquire other banks 
with great bargains during liquidity crisis may sell their less efficient subsidiaries to 
other banking institutions. Finally, recipients that are expected to face imminent failures 
may be acquired by other banks under regulatory pressures as well as possibilities of 
renegotiating TARP terms for acquiring institutions. 
4.3. ECONOMETRIC METHODOLOGY  
The literature of bank failure features logistic models (logit) and hazard models 
as two widely used empirical approaches to investigate and predict bank failures. Logit 
models are used to identify various risk fundamentals affecting the probability of bank 
failures in cross-sectional data and over a specific year (see, for instance, Kolari et al., 
2002; Cole and White, 2012). The main shortcoming of logit models in modelling bank 
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failures is that they are static models and do not adjust for time, while the risk of failure 
may change over time, particularly when the sampling period is long.
10
 
One way to address this issue is to apply hazard models. Hazard models are 
widely employed to analyse time to failure, that is the time it takes for a bank to fail or 
become distressed (see, for instance, Calomiris and Mason, 2003; Mannasoo and 
Mayes, 2009). Shumway (2001) shows that apart from their advantages in accounting 
for time and time varying covariates, hazard models also outperform single-period logit 
models in out of sample prediction of bankruptcy. 
Following Wheelock and Wilson (2000), Hannan and Pilloff (2009), and 
Goddard et al. (2014), the Cox (1972) proportional hazard model with time varying 
covariates is applied in this study to investigate the impact of various risk fundamentals 
including TARP indicators on the timing of closures, technical failures and acquisitions 
of U.S. commercial banks during the recent financial crisis. In this Section, the Cox 
proportional hazard model in the competing risks framework is briefly reviewed.
11
  
Let 𝑇𝑖 represent the exit time of bank i, meaning that bank i is observed at 𝐽𝑖 
distinct quarters 𝑡𝑖1 < 𝑡𝑖2 < ⋯ < 𝑡𝑖𝐽𝑖 < 𝑇𝑖 under the risk of disappearance. As 𝑇𝑖 is a 
random variable, it has a cumulative distribution function, 𝑃𝑖(𝑡) = Pr (𝑇𝑖 ≤ 𝑡), and a 
probability density function, 𝑝𝑖(𝑡) = 𝑑𝑃𝑖(𝑡) 𝑑𝑡⁄ . The cumulative density function gives 
us probability of 𝑇𝑖 ≤ 𝑡 which indicates the probability of the i-th bank exiting before 
some specified time, t. A more relevant definition in survival analysis is the survivor 
function, which is the complement of cumulative distribution function and can be 
defined as  
 
𝑆𝑖(𝑡) = Pr(𝑇𝑖 > 𝑡) = 1 − 𝑃𝑖(𝑡). (4.1) 
                                                 
10
 Panel logit models have been used in a number of studies to cover a period of banking failures (see, 
e.g., Poghosyan and Čihak, 2011; Gonzalez-Hermosillo, 1999). However, they are not as popular as cross 
sectional logit in this line of literature, particularly when number of failed banks is relatively small. An 
alternative approach in this case is to apply discrete time hazard models that are based on logistic models 
and can account for heterogeneity in panel data (see, for instance, Mannasoo and Mayes, 2009; Shumway, 
2001). 
11
 Interested readers can refer to Kalbfleisch and Prentice (2011) for a more extensive discussion. 
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The object of primary interest in survival analysis is to estimate the hazard 
function, which is defined as the instantaneous risk of a bank disappearing at time t 
conditional upon its existence up to time t. This Chapter distinguishes between two 
types of bank exit: exit due to failure and exit due to acquisition. Accordingly, the 
hazard function for each type of bank exit can be specified as 
 
ℎ𝑙(𝑡) = lim
𝑑𝑡→0
Pr (𝑡 ≤ 𝑇𝑖 < 𝑡 + 𝑑𝑡, 𝐿 = 𝑙|𝑇𝑖 ≥ 𝑡)
𝑑𝑡
=
𝑝𝑙,𝑖(𝑡)
𝑆𝑙,𝑖(𝑡)
 , (4.2) 
where l=1 denotes failure and l=2 denotes acquisition. According to the Cox hazard 
model, the hazard function for type l exit takes the following form  
 
ℎ𝑙,𝑖 (𝑡|𝒙𝒍,𝒊(𝒕)) = ℎ𝑙𝑜(𝑡) exp(𝒙𝒍,𝒊(𝒕)𝜷𝒍),   (4.3) 
where ℎ𝑙𝑜(𝑡) is an unspecified baseline hazard function, 𝒙𝒍,𝒊(𝒕) is a 1 × 𝑘 vector of time 
varying covariates, and 𝜷𝒍 is a 𝑘 × 1 vector of coefficients to be estimated. The Cox 
model is a semi-parametric model as it includes a parametric part, exp (𝒙𝒍,𝒊(𝒕)𝜷𝒍), as 
well as a nonparametric part, which is the unspecified baseline hazard function, ℎ𝑙𝑜(𝑡). 
The baseline hazard function only varies over time and is assumed to be the same for all 
banks at time t, indicating that the Cox model is a proportional hazard model, and the 
relative hazard of two banks at time t can be expressed as
12
  
 
ℎ𝑙𝑜(𝑡)exp (𝒙𝒍,𝒋(𝒕)𝜷𝒍)
ℎ𝑙𝑜(𝑡)exp (𝒙𝒍,𝒎(𝒕)𝜷𝒍)
=
exp (𝒙𝒍,𝒋(𝒕)𝜷𝒍)
exp (𝒙𝒍,𝒎(𝒕)𝜷𝒍)
 . (4.4) 
The Cox model can be estimated by maximising the partial likelihood function. 
Let 𝑇𝑗 be the exit time and d be the number of distinct observed exit times. The Cox 
likelihood function can be defined as  
                                                 
12
 Although the Cox proportional hazard model accounts for individual heterogeneity among banks 
exiting at different times, it does not capture unobserved heterogeneity among banks. However, 
Mannasoo and Mayes (2009) argue that such unobserved heterogeneity can be neglected perhaps due to 
major commonalities among banking institutions in terms of banking activities and regulations. 
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𝐿(𝜷𝒍) = 𝐿1(𝜷𝒍)𝐿2(𝜷𝒍)… 𝐿𝑑(𝜷𝒍) = ∏
exp(𝒙𝒍,𝒋(𝑻𝒋)𝜷𝒍)
∑ exp(𝒙𝒍,𝒊(𝑻𝒋)𝜷𝒍)𝑖∈𝑅𝑗
𝑑
𝑗=1
 . (4.5) 
where 𝐿𝑗 represents the conditional probability of bank exit at time 𝑇𝑗, and  𝑅𝑗 is the set 
of banks that are at risk of exit due to event l at time 𝑇𝑗. Thus, the corresponding log 
likelihood function is given by   
 
𝑙(𝜷𝒍) = ∑𝑙𝑗(𝜷𝒍)
𝑑
𝑗=1
= ∑[𝒙𝒍,𝒋(𝒕𝒋)𝜷𝒍 − log (∑ 𝑒𝑥𝑝(𝒙𝒍,𝒊(𝑻𝒋)𝜷𝒍)
𝑖∈𝑅𝑗
)]
𝑑
𝑗=1
. (4.6) 
The above log likelihood function is a partial log likelihood function as it is 
confined to d distinct exit times and does not consider times when there is no exit. 
Nonetheless, it can be treated as an ordinary log likelihood and the estimate of 𝜷𝒍 can be 
obtained by maximising the partial log likelihood function. In other words, ?̂?𝒍 is the 
unique solution of the following equation 
 
𝜕𝑙(𝜷𝒍)
𝜕𝜷𝒍
= ∑[𝒙𝒍,𝒋(𝑻𝒋) −
∑ exp(𝒙𝒍,𝒊(𝑻𝒋)𝜷𝒍)𝒙𝒍,𝒊(𝑻𝒋)𝑖∈𝑅𝑗
∑ exp(𝒙𝒍,𝒊(𝑻𝒋)𝜷𝒍)𝑖∈𝑅𝑗
]
𝑑
𝑗=1
= 0. (4.7) 
The resulting ?̂?𝒍 is consistent and asymptotically normal with mean 𝜷𝒍 and 
variance-covariance matrix equal to the matrix of the second derivatives of the Cox log 
partial likelihood function with respect to 𝜷𝒍. 
 
𝜕2𝑙(𝜷𝒍)
𝜕𝜷𝒍
2
= −∑(
∑ exp(𝒙𝒍,𝒊(𝑻𝒋)𝜷𝒍)𝒙𝒍,𝒊(𝑻𝒋)𝒙𝒍,𝒋
′ (𝑻𝒋)𝑖∈𝑅𝑗
∑ exp(𝒙𝒍,𝒊(𝑻𝒋)𝜷𝒍)𝑖∈𝑅𝑗
𝑑
𝑗=1
−
∑ exp(𝒙𝒍,𝒊(𝑻𝒋)𝜷𝒍)𝒙𝒍,𝒊 × ∑ exp(𝒙𝒍,𝒊(𝑻𝒋)𝜷𝒍)𝒙𝒍,𝒋
′ (𝑻𝒋)𝑖∈𝑅𝑗𝑖∈𝑅𝑗
[∑ exp(𝒙𝒍,𝒊(𝑻𝒋)𝜷𝒍)𝑖∈𝑅𝑗 ]
2 ). 
(4.8) 
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Once the coefficients are estimated, the baseline hazard and its corresponding 
survivor function can be obtained. It should be noted that the abovementioned 
estimation method is based on the assumption that bank exits are not tied, which is often 
violated. To handle tied exits, Breslow (1974) develops an approximation of the Cox 
partial likelihood function which takes the following form 
 
𝐿(𝜷𝒍) = ∏
exp (𝒙𝒍,𝒋(𝑻𝒋)𝜷𝒍)
∑ exp (𝒙𝒍,𝒊(𝑻𝒋)𝜷𝒍)𝑖∈𝑅𝑗
𝑑
𝑗=1
≈ ∏
exp (∑ 𝒙𝒍,𝒊(𝑻𝒋)𝑖∈𝐷𝑗 )𝜷𝒍)
[∑ exp(𝒙𝒍,𝒊(𝑻𝒋)𝜷𝒍)𝑖∈𝑅𝑗 ]
𝑑𝑗
 
𝑑
𝑗=1
, (4.9) 
where 𝑑𝑗 be the number of tied exit times due to event l and 𝐷𝑗  be the number of tied 
exits due to event l at time 𝑡𝑗. This approximation works well when the number of tied 
exits at each exit time 𝑡𝑗 is relatively smaller than the number of banks at risk, 𝑅𝑗.  
In principle, one of the main advantages of using the partial likelihood approach 
to estimate the hazard function is that it avoids problems associated with potential 
endogeneity of time varying covariates with respect to the exit time, 𝑇𝑖.
13
 In addition, 
the Cox proportional hazard model has an advantage over parametric models as it 
avoids having to make any arbitrary and possibly wrong assumption about the 
functional form of the baseline hazard. However, the estimate of 𝜷𝒍 is more efficient in 
parametric models where the baseline hazard is correctly specified. In other words, the 
cost of making no assumption about the shape of the baseline hazard function is a loss 
in efficiency.  
4.4. DATA AND VARIABLES 
4.4.1. Data description 
To investigate the impact of TARP investment on the performance of recipient 
institutions, Call report data for all commercial banks in the U.S. were obtained from 
                                                 
13
 See Wheelock and Wilson (2000) and Lancaster (1992) for detailed discussion. 
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the FDIC Institution Directory database.
14
 Data were collected over the period 2007Q1-
2012Q4, which covers the recent U.S. banking crisis. The dataset was then refined by 
removing (i) banks with missing observations, (ii) de novo banks that have been in 
operation since the beginning of 2007, (iii) banks that are not headquartered in the U.S. 
states,
15
 (iv) insured U.S. branches of foreign chartered institutions, and (v) banks that 
voluntarily relinquished the FDIC insurance or were closed without government 
assistance. The resulting sample consists of 7,405 commercial banks with 158,654 
covering the period 2007Q1-2012Q4.  
4.4.2. Failure and acquisition identification 
In this study, the exit indicator is defined as a binary dummy variable, which 
takes value one if a bank disappears, and zero otherwise. Two types of exits are 
considered in this study: exit due to failure and exit due to acquisition. The most widely 
used failure indicator is regulatory closure which occurs when a bank is declared 
insolvent and placed in receivership by its primary regulator. In such events, the FDIC, 
as the main receiver of the insured institutions, receives the insolvent bank and either 
liquidates its assets or transfer its assets to an acquiring institution. The list of closed 
banks, their closing dates, as well as their acquiring institutions is disclosed by the 
FDIC. The list includes 398 commercial banks were closed and received by the FDIC 
over the sample period.  
In addition to the closed banks, many other U.S. banks became insolvent on a 
mark-to-market basis at some point during the recent financial crisis. However, these 
banks were allowed to remain in operation either subject to various regulatory 
enforcement actions or because they were effectively bailed out by the TARP. Thus, a 
framework is established to identify banks that became technically insolvent during the 
                                                 
14
 Savings banks and savings and loan associations are not considered in this study as they have different 
organisational structure, objectives, and regulatory restrictions, compared to commercial banks.  
15 These are the banks that are headquartered in the U.S. territories such as Puerto Rico, Guam, Northern 
Marianas, U. S. Virgin Islands and American Samoa. 
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recent crisis. Accordingly, two criteria are defined for technical insolvency: technical 
insolvency occurs (i) if a bank was closed by its primary regulatory, or (ii) if a bank is 
critically undercapitalised meaning that it has tangible equity to total assets of less than 
2%, where tangible equity is total equity minus goodwill, or (iii) if a bank is unable to 
provide sufficient coverage against its nonperforming assets,
16
 where sufficient 
coverage for a bank means that sum of its equity and loan loss reserves is equal or more 
than half of its nonperforming assets.
17
 The insolvency date is taken as the earliest time 
a bank meets either of these criteria. 
Using these criteria it was found that 580 commercial banks became technically 
insolvent over the sample period. Of those, 182 banks remained in operation and 398 
banks were closed down by their primary regulators. This framework seems to be very 
helpful and informative to identify technical insolvency as picks up approximately 90% 
of banks that were closed down by regulators. 
The second type of exit investigated in this study is exit due to acquisition. The 
data on the U.S. bank acquisitions were obtained from the FDIC Institution Directory 
database, which provides detailed information on acquired institutions, their 
corresponding acquiring institutions, and acquisition date. Some acquisitions were 
related to banks that were technically insolvent and their regulatory closures were 
imminent while other acquired institutions were healthy.
18
 Thus, similar to the analysis 
of bank failures, technical insolvency criteria was used to distinguish between different 
types of acquisitions based on financial health of the acquired banks. There were 1,167 
                                                 
16
 Nonperforming assets include assets past due 30-89 days and still accruing interest, assets past due 90 
days, or more, and still accruing interest, assets in nonaccrual status, and real estate acquired through 
foreclosures. 
17
 This definition follows standard IMF stress-testing practices by implicitly assuming 50% Loss Given 
Default (LGD) for nonperforming assets. A more conservative approach could be assuming 100% LGD 
for nonperforming loans (see González-Hermosillo, 1999).  
18
 When a bank fails, the FDIC either liquidates its assets or sells the bank to an acquiring institution, 
often with financial assistance. The definition of bank acquisition in this study does not include failed 
bank acquisitions as (i) this cause an overlap between the definitions of the competing risks, (ii) the 
process of failed bank acquisition is substantially different from acquisition of operating banks, and it 
often requires government financial assistance. 
116 
 
commercial banks that were acquired over the sample period. Of those, 20 banks were 
technically insolvent when they were acquired. 
4.4.3. Explanatory variables 
To evaluate the impact of TARP investments on stability of recipient banks, 
hazard functions are estimated based on equation (4.3) as the main empirical model of 
this Chapter. The column entries of the matrix 𝒙𝒍,𝒊(𝒕) in equation (4.3) include TARP 
indicators as well as a broad set of control variables. TARP transactions data were 
retrieved from Transaction Investment Program Reports provided by the U.S. 
Department of the Treasury. Then, the Federal Reserve identification number (RSSDID) 
of each recipient institution was hand-collected by referring to the Federal Reserve 
Board National Information Center database.  The RSSDID was later used to match 
recipient holding companies with their subsidiaries.
19
 This study assumes that all 
subsidiaries of a recipient bank holding company received a fraction of the TARP funds 
and were affected by TARP investment. Therefore, over the time span of this study, 852 
commercial banks obtained TARP money, either directly or through their associated 
holding companies. 
The CPP investments had two major components; senior preferred stocks and 
equity warrants. To exit TARP, a recipient bank was required to redeem the amount of 
capital invested in the bank under CPP. Also, upon the redemption of the senior 
preferred stock investment, an institution could either repurchase its warrants at the fair 
market value, or the Treasury would sell the warrants to third parties through public 
auction. Therefore, there were three major TARP transactions for each recipient 
institution; capital injection, capital repayment, and disposition of warrants. 
Accordingly, in this study, the impact of TARP investments on the survival likelihood 
of the recipient banks is investigated by considering three alternative TARP indicators. 
TARP1 is a dummy variable that takes value of one if a bank or its bank holding 
                                                 
19
 Similar approach was used to identify recipient institutions that were not controlled by a bank holding 
company. 
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company received capital infusions under TARP, and zero otherwise. This variable 
measures the general impact of TARP funds disregarding the potential impact of 
repayment or final disposition of TARP investment on bank stability. TARP2 is a 
dummy variable that takes value of one from the time a bank or its bank holding 
company received capital infusion up to the capital repayment date, and zero otherwise. 
TARP3 is a dummy variable that takes value of one from the time a bank or its bank 
holding company received capital infusion up to the final disposition date, and zero 
otherwise. In fact, the main difference between TARP2 and TARP3 is that the latter 
controls for the impact of disposition of equity warrants, while the former only 
considers the transactions related to injection and repayments of senior stocks.  
In addition to TARP indicators and to avoid potential omitted variable bias, this 
study employs a comprehensive set of control variables that have been frequently used 
in the literature as determinants of bank failures and acquisitions. In principle, selected 
explanatory variables include several characteristics of banking institutions including 
CAMELS indicators,
20
 size, age, and ownership structure.  
Furthermore, additional explanatory variables are included to serve as proxies 
for banking sector concentration and competition as well as local economic 
conditions.
21
 Control variables used in this analysis as well as their potential impact on 
bank failure and acquisition are discussed below. Also, a summary of the explanatory 
variables under consideration, their expected impact on bank exit, and data sources are 
presented in Tables 4.1 and 4.2. 
 
                                                 
20
 CAMELS rating system is a supervisory rating system to assess the stability of individual banks. 
CAMELS stands for Capital adequacy, Asset quality, Management quality, Earnings, Liquidity, and 
Sensitivity to market risk. During an on-site bank examination, supervisory regulators assess financial 
health of a bank and assign a score from one (best) to five (worst) for each of the six CAMELS 
components in addition to the overall rating of a bank’s financial condition. 
21 Table A4.1 illustrates the geographical distribution of all banks, closed banks, and acquired banks in 
each State. It can be seen that bank closures and acquisitions are more clustered in certain States, 
suggesting that state-level banking sectors and local economic conditions may play key roles in bank 
exits. 
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Table 4.1. Variable acronyms and definitions 
 Variable Explanation 
 
Capital adequacy 
 
 
𝐶𝐴𝑃𝑖𝑡  
 
 
Total equity capital/total assets 
Asset quality 𝑁𝑃𝐿𝑖𝑡  
𝑂𝑅𝐸𝑖𝑡  
 
Nonperforming loans/total assets 
Other real estate owned/total assets 
Management 
capability: 
 
𝑀𝑁𝐺𝑖𝑡  Total noninterest expenses minus /sum of net interest 
income and noninterest income 
Earnings: 
 
𝐸𝐴𝑅𝑁𝑖𝑡  Net income after taxes/total assets 
Liquidity: 𝐽𝐶𝐷𝑖𝑡  
𝐿𝑂𝐴𝑁𝑖𝑡  
𝐹𝐸𝐷𝐹𝑖𝑡  
Jumbo certificate of deposits/total assets  
Total loans/total assets 
(Federal funds purchased-federal funds sold)/total assets 
 
Sensitivity to 
market: 
 
𝐶𝑂𝑀𝐿𝑖𝑡  
𝑅𝐸𝐿𝑖𝑡  
 
Commercial and industrial loans/total assets 
Real estate loans/total assets  
Miscellaneous 
factors: 
 
 
 
Government 
bailout: 
 
𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖𝑡  
𝐴𝐺𝐸𝑖𝑡  
𝐻𝑂𝐿𝐷𝑖𝑡  
 
 
𝑇𝐴𝑅𝑃1𝑖𝑡  
 
 
𝑇𝐴𝑅𝑃2𝑖𝑡  
 
𝑇𝐴𝑅𝑃3𝑖𝑡  
Log of total assets  
Log of bank’s age in years 
1 if 25% or more of a bank’s shares are held by a 
multibank holding company, 0 otherwise. 
 
1 if the bank or its bank holding company received 
assistance through CPP under TARP program, 0 
otherwise. 
1 if the bank or its bank holding company received CPP 
investment and before capital repayment, 0 otherwise. 
1 if the bank or its bank holding company received CPP 
investment and before final disposition, 0 otherwise. 
 
State level banking 
sector 
 
𝐶𝑂𝑁𝐶𝑡  Share of the five largest banks’ deposits to total deposits in 
each state. 
 
Local Economic 
Conditions 
𝐻𝑃𝐼𝑡  
 
 
𝑈𝑁𝐸𝑡  
 
𝐼𝑁𝐶𝑂𝑡  
The state-level growth rate of house price index adjusted 
for inflation as measured by the national level consumer 
price index. 
The state-level percentage of labour force without work 
but available to work and actively seeking employment. 
The state-level growth rate of personal income adjusted for 
the inflation according to national prices. 
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Table 4.2. Variables, their expected effects on failure and acquisitions, their units 
and data sources 
Variable 
Expected sign on 
Unit Data source 
Failure Acquisition 
 
Bank specific variables 
 
𝑪𝑨𝑷𝒊𝒕  
𝑵𝑷𝑳𝒊𝒕  
𝑶𝑹𝑬𝒊𝒕  
𝑴𝑵𝑮𝒊𝒕  
𝑬𝑨𝑹𝑵𝒊𝒕  
𝑱𝑪𝑫𝒊𝒕  
𝑬𝑨𝑹𝑵𝒊𝒕  
𝑭𝑬𝑫𝑭𝒊𝒕  
𝑪𝑶𝑴𝑳𝒊𝒕  
𝑹𝑬𝑳𝒊𝒕  
𝑺𝑰𝒁𝑬𝒊𝒕  
𝑨𝑮𝑬𝒊𝒕  
𝑯𝑶𝑳𝑫𝒊𝒕  
 
Government bailout  
 
𝑻𝑨𝑹𝑷𝟏𝒊𝒕  
𝑻𝑨𝑹𝑷𝟐𝒊𝒕  
𝑻𝑨𝑹𝑷𝟑𝒊𝒕  
- 
+ 
+ 
+ 
- 
+ 
+ 
-/+ 
+ 
+ 
- 
- 
- 
 
 
 
-/+ 
-/+ 
-/+ 
-/+ 
-/+ 
-/+ 
-/+ 
-/+ 
-/+ 
-/+ 
-/+ 
-/+ 
-/+ 
- 
- 
-/+ 
 
 
 
-/+ 
-/+ 
-/+ 
Percentage 
Percentage 
Percentage 
Percentage 
Percentage 
Percentage 
Percentage 
Percentage 
Percentage 
Logarithm  
Percentage 
Logarithm 
Level  
 
 
 
Level 
Level 
Level 
 
FDIC Institution Directory  
FDIC Institution Directory 
FDIC Institution Directory 
FDIC Institution Directory 
FDIC Institution Directory 
FDIC Institution Directory 
FDIC Institution Directory 
FDIC Institution Directory 
FDIC Institution Directory 
FDIC Institution Directory 
FDIC Institution Directory 
FDIC Institution Directory 
FDIC Institution Directory 
 
 
 
Department of the Treasury 
Department of the Treasury 
Department of the Treasury 
 
State level banking sector 
𝑪𝑶𝑵𝑪𝒕  -/+ -/+ Percentage 
 
FDIC Summary of Deposits 
Local Economic Conditions 
 
𝑯𝑷𝑰𝒕  
𝑼𝑵𝑬𝒕  
𝑰𝑵𝑪𝑶𝒕  
- 
+ 
- 
-/+ 
-/+ 
-/+ 
Percentage 
Percentage 
Percentage 
 
Federal Housing Finance Agency 
Bureau of Labor Statistics  
Bureau of Economic Analysis 
 
 
I. CAMELS rating system 
 
Capital to asset ratio (𝐶𝐴𝑃𝑖𝑡): It is a general consensus that bank’s equity can serve as a 
cushion to absorb shocks and effectively help to increase the survival time (see Berger 
and Bouwman, 2013, for a detailed discussion). However, the relationship between 
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capital and acquisition is ambiguous. Most previous studies, including Wheelock and 
Wilson (2000) and Moore (1997), report a negative linkage between capital ratio and 
likelihood of acquisition. Yet, Hannan and Pilloff (2009) argue that a reverse direction 
is also possible as banks with higher capital ratios might be less efficient in maximising 
their deposit insurance. In addition, well-capitalised banks can be very attractive targets 
for acquiring banks seeking to increase their capital level in order to maintain their 
minimum capital requirement.  
Nonperforming loans to total assets (𝑁𝑃𝐿𝑖𝑡): Nonperforming loan (NPL) is a measure 
of ex post credit risk and is often employed as a proxy for a bank’s asset quality. High 
NPL indicates pervasive problems in a bank’s lending activities and is hypothesized to 
be positively associated with the probability of failure and acquisitions, i.e., banks with 
higher NPL are more likely to be closed or acquired. 
Other real estate owned to total assets (𝑂𝑅𝐸𝑖𝑡): other real estate owned assets reflect 
non-earning bank assets primarily consisting of foreclosed real estate. ORE has been 
used as a proxy for asset quality in a number of studies, including Cole and Gunther 
(1998) and Wheelock and Wilson (2000). Higher ORE implies higher nonearning and 
substandard assets, which increases the probability of closure and timing of acquisition. 
Inefficiency ratio (𝑀𝑁𝐺𝑖𝑡): various measures of inefficiency, including cost to income 
ratio, cost efficiency, and nonparametric technical inefficiency measure based on Data 
Envelopment Analysis (DEA), have been used in the literature as a proxy for 
management quality in banks. This chapter uses inefficiency ratio defined as the ratio of 
noninterest expenses to the sum of net interest income and noninterest income as a 
measure of inefficiency.
22
 In principle, inefficiency makes banks more likely to fail and 
less attractive to be acquired.  
Return on Assets (𝐸𝐴𝑅𝑁𝑖𝑡): Return on assets (ROA) is defined as net income after tax 
as a percentage of total assets, which is included in the hazard regression as a proxy for 
bank’s earning, the fourth CAMELS component. In general, higher ROA reflects more 
efficient management skills and less financial difficulties in a bank. Thus, it is expected 
to have a negative impact on the probability of failure and acquisition. 
                                                 
22
 Amortisation expenses of intangible assets are not included in the calculation of noninterest expenses in 
the definition of inefficiency. 
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Jumbo Certificates of Deposit (𝐽𝐶𝐷𝑖𝑡): Jumbo CDs are time deposits with 
denominations greater than $100,000, which was the standard FDIC maximum deposit 
insurance coverage limit per depositor, per insured depository institutions.
23
 JCD is 
often used as a proxy for liquidity (see, for instance, Shaffer, 2012; González-
Hermosillo, 1999; Cole and Gunther, 1995). Higher JCDs implies higher funding costs 
and can be indicative of riskier and more aggressive growth strategies. Thus, banks 
heavily relying on JCDs are more likely to fail while being less attractive for acquirers. 
Gross loan to total assets (𝐿𝑂𝐴𝑁𝑖𝑡): Loans are typically considered to be less liquid and 
more risky compared to other bank assets such as investment securities (see, e.g., 
DeYoung, 2003; Wheelock and Wilson, 2000). Therefore, higher concentration on 
lending activities implies lower liquidity, which can increase the risk of failure and 
make banks less attractive targets for acquisition.     
Net federal funds purchased
24
 (𝐹𝐸𝐷𝐹𝑖𝑡): Federal funds are unsecured interbank loans 
from banks with excess reserves to banks with insufficient reserves. Net federal funds 
purchased can be used as a proxy for liquidity (see, for instance, Wheelock and Wilson, 
2000). Higher net purchased funds can be indicative of liquidity problems which make 
banks more likely to be closed. 
Percentage of commercial and industrial loans to total assets (𝐶𝑂𝑀𝐿𝑖𝑡): a commercial 
bank with higher ratio of commercial and industrial loans is more likely to face distress 
due to higher nonperforming loans during adverse economic conditions, particularly if a 
large fraction of these loans are not secured by collaterals.  
Real estate loans as a percentage of total gross loans (𝑅𝐸𝐿𝑁𝑖𝑡): It is argued that quality 
of loan portfolios is highly sensitive to real estate price fluctuations (see, for instance, 
Hott, 2011; Goodhart and Hofmann, 2007). In this study, RELN is used as a proxy for 
sensitivity to real estate market risk.
25
 Since the quality of loan portfolios is highly 
                                                 
23
 In October, 2008, the insurance coverage limit was temporarily raised to $250,000 through December, 
2010, and was later extended through December, 2013. Later on, in July, 2010, President Obama signed 
the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act and, as a result, the insurance coverage 
limit was permanently increased to $250,000. 
24
 This definition includes repurchase agreements as well. 
25
 Another possible indicator of sensitivity to market risk is the loan portfolio concentration measured by 
Herfindahl–Hirschman Index of various loan categories (see, for instance, Berger and Bouwman, 2013; 
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sensitive to real estate market real estate loans are defined as loans secured primarily by 
real estate. In principle, banks heavily relying on real estate loans are likely to 
experience significant losses during adverse real estate market conditions, indicating 
that they are more likely to be closed and less likely to be acquired. 
 
II. Miscellaneous bank-specific factors 
 
Log of total assets (𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖𝑡): Bank size is widely used in previous studies of bank failure 
and acquisition (see, for instance, Shaffer, 2012; Cole and Gunther, 1995; Arena, 2008). 
Larger banks benefit from economies of scales, more opportunities to diversify their 
products and credit portfolios, and more flexible access to external funds. Moreover, 
larger banks hold ‘too-big-to-fail’ regulatory status, which indicates that regulatory 
closure of larger institutions is very complex and might impose high costs to the FDIC 
as well as the overall economy. In general, larger banks are less likely to be closed or 
acquired. 
Log of bank’s age in years (𝐴𝐺𝐸𝑖𝑡): Due to their established reputation, older banks are 
considered to be more reliable and trustworthy for depositors and other financial 
institutions. Thus, mature banks are more stable and better equipped to face adverse 
economic conditions and are less likely to be closed or acquired. 
Multi-Bank Holding Company (MBHC) affiliation (𝐻𝑂𝐿𝐷𝑖𝑡): This study employs a 
dummy variable to distinguish between MBHC affiliates from other banking 
institutions, including independent banks as well as affiliates of one-bank holding 
companies. In principle, bank holding companies benefit from less regulatory 
restrictions and better access to liquidity and external funding. Ashcraft (2008) argues 
that MBHC affiliation is a source of strength as MBHCs can provide managerial and 
financial supports to their subsidiaries and help them avoid liquidity shortage and 
recover from financial distress during adverse economic conditions. On the other hand, I 
expect a positive relationship between MBHC affiliation and probability of being 
                                                                                                                                               
DeYoung and Torna, 2013). However, only RELN is included in the hazard model because RELN and 
loan concentration ratios are highly correlated and RELN seems to be more relevant as the recent banking 
crisis had its roots in adverse fluctuations in real estate market. 
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acquired as MBHC facing financial distress may trade their affiliates in order to survive 
or to acquire more efficient and profitable institutions. 
III. Banking sector concentration 
Percentage of deposits held by top five banks in a state (𝐶𝑂𝑁𝐶𝑡): This chapter controls 
for local market concentration and competition by measuring deposit concentration in 
five largest banks in each State. The data on branch office deposits for all FDIC-insured 
institutions was obtained from the FDIC Summary of Deposit (SOD).
26
 In general, there 
are conflicting theoretical views on the relationship between banking sector 
concentration and bank stability. Some previous studies advocate ‘concentration-
stability’ view and argue that a more concentrated banking system increases franchise 
value and make banks less likely to fail (see, e.g., DeYoung, 2003). Others, including 
Boyd and De Nicolo (2005), argue that there is potential fundamental risk-incentive 
mechanisms that makes bank take on more risk and impose higher interest spreads in 
less competitive banking sectors. According to this ‘concentration-fragility’ view, banks 
are more stable and less likely to fail in a more competitive banking system.  
IV. Local economic conditions 
 
Percentage change in state-level real House Price Index (𝐻𝑃𝐼𝑡): It was shown in the 
previous chapter that house price fluctuations significantly affect financial stability of 
banks. Therefore, it is of crucial importance to control for the impact of house prices on 
bank exits by including the growth of state-level HPI which is adjusted for inflation as 
measured by the national level consumer price index. The data on HPI was obtained 
                                                 
26
 Deposit data is used as it is the only branch-level information available in the FDIC database. In 
addition, since the FDIC-SOD data are only reported on annual basis, the quarterly COMP data is 
obtained by interpolating annual COMP data.  
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from the Federal Housing and Finance Agency (FHFA) database.
27
 Broadly speaking, 
banks are exposed to the housing market from several fronts, including direct 
investment in housing market, investment in real estate loans, investment in any other 
types of loans secured by real estate, and investment in securities tied to real estate, such 
as mortgage-backed securities. Thus, performance of banking institutions is highly 
sensitive to house price fluctuations. Daglish (2009) argues that house price 
depreciations deteriorate the quality of loan portfolios by reducing the value of pledged 
collaterals and increasing the probability of default on part of subprime borrowers. 
Thus, when confronting falling house prices, banks are more likely to fail while being 
less likely to be acquired. 
State-level unemployment rate (𝑈𝑁𝐸𝑡): To control for local economic imbalances, this 
study uses the state-level unemployment rate, which can be a proxy for the level of real 
economic activities in each state. Higher unemployment rate implies a permanent 
decline in real economic activities and is expected to make banks more likely to fail and 
less likely to be acquired. 
Percentage change in state-level real personal income (𝐼𝑁𝐶𝑂𝑡): another indicator of 
local economic conditions used in this chapter is the growth of state-level per income 
adjusted for inflation as measured by the national level consumer price index. 
Aubuchon and Wheelock (2010) show that the state-level bank failure rate is negatively 
associated with the growth of state-level real per capita income during the recent 
financial crisis. Thus, higher real personal income is expected to have a negative impact 
of the likelihood of bank failure.   
4.5. EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
In this section, the univariate analyses of covariates used in this study is 
presented. Accordingly, potential differences between these covariates among survived 
                                                 
27
 The HPI is a measure of average price fluctuations of single-family properties in repeat sales or 
refinancings of the same single-family properties. The HPI is calculated based on repeat transaction data 
of mortgages purchased or securitised by the Federal National Mortgage Association (Fannie Mae) or the 
Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation (Freddie Mac). 
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banks, closed banks, and acquired banks are examined. Then, the empirical results of 
the Cox proportional hazard estimations are presented to evaluate the impact of capital 
infusions on bank disappearance during the recent crisis. 
4.5.1. Univariate analysis 
Table 4.3 presents descriptive statistics of the covariates used in this study based 
on 158,654 observations on 7,405 U.S. commercial banks. For each covariate, the mean, 
standard deviation, the first quartile, median, and the third quartile are reported. From 
Table 4.3 it appears that, on average, the sample banks are well-capitalised with equity 
capital ratio of over 11%. However, the standard deviation of capital ratio is relatively 
large, indicating that some banks were critically undercapitalised. The sample banks, on 
average, have 1.53% of nonperforming loans to total assets and 0.65% of real estate 
foreclosure to total assets, meaning that many sample banks suffered from high levels of 
troubled assets during the recent crisis. Liquidity indicators also have relatively large 
standard deviations, suggesting that level of liquidity significantly varies among sample 
banks. Another interesting finding is that the sample banks were highly concentrated in 
real estate lending with real estate loans covering, on average, 67.5% of their loan 
portfolios. Furthermore, these results suggest that many sample banks operated in 
highly concentrated banking sectors and adverse economic conditions. 
In general, the findings from the descriptive statistics reveal that many 
covariates have relatively large standard deviations, indicating that financial 
characteristics widely vary among sample banks. To take this important feature of the 
data into account, a mean comparison test with Welch (1947) approximation was 
conducted to investigate potential variations among mean values observed for survived 
banks, closed banks, and acquired banks.
28
 Table 4.4 presents the results of mean 
comparison test. It emerges that for most variables considered, the mean values for 
survived banks are statistically different from the mean values observed for closed 
                                                 
28 The mean comparison test examines the null hypothesis that the means of two groups of banks are 
equal i.e. H0: diff = mean(group1) − mean(group2) = 0. The mean comparison test applied in this 
study is a t-test with Welch approximation to account for possible unequal variances between the two 
groups of banks. 
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banks and acquired banks. Compared to banks that disappeared, survived banks were 
older and with less real estate loans in their loan portfolios, higher commercial and 
industrial loans, lower reliance on lending activities, and more efficient. 
Despite these similarities between characteristics of closed banks and acquired 
banks in comparison with survived banks, the mean comparison tests produce 
contrasting outcomes when other explanatory variables are taken under consideration. 
Compared to survived banks, the results indicate that the mean values of NPL, ORE, 
and JCD are significantly higher in closed banks and lower in acquired banks. On the 
other hand, closed banks operated in States with larger declines in house prices, while 
acquired banks were located in states experiencing better housing market conditions. 
 
Table 4.3. Summary statistics of explanatory variables. 
 Mean SD Q1 Median Q3 
𝐶𝐴𝑃𝑖𝑡  11.19 6.07 8.68 10.05 12.13 
𝑁𝑃𝐿𝑖𝑡   1.52 2.23 0.24 0.80 1.88 
𝑂𝑅𝐸𝑖𝑡   0.65 1.40 0.00 0.15 0.68 
𝑀𝑁𝐺𝑖𝑡  0.75 2.28 0.59 0.69 0.82 
𝐸𝐴𝑅𝑁𝑖𝑡  0.50 2.60 0.28 0.80 1.26 
𝐽𝐶𝐷𝑖𝑡   16.21 8.83 10.08 14.85 20.86 
𝐿𝑂𝐴𝑁𝑖𝑡   63.66 16.35 54.34 66.15 75.41 
𝐹𝐸𝐷𝐹𝑖𝑡   -1.66 7.16 -3.47 -0.18 0.48 
𝐶𝑂𝑀𝐿𝑖𝑡  14.77 10.88 7.05 12.21 19.81 
𝑅𝐸𝐿𝑁𝑖𝑡   68.5 19.66 58.04 72.65 82.83 
𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖𝑡   12.01 1.33 11.15 11.87 12.67 
𝐴𝐺𝐸𝑖𝑡   3.89 1.03 3.26 4.38 4.66 
𝐻𝑂𝐿𝐷𝑖𝑡  0.18 0.39 0.00 0.00 0.00 
𝑇𝐴𝑅𝑃1𝑖𝑡  0.08 0.27 0.00 0.00 0.00 
𝑇𝐴𝑅𝑃2𝑖𝑡  0.06 0.24 0.00 0.00 0.00 
𝑇𝐴𝑅𝑃3𝑖𝑡  0.06 0.24 0.00 0.00 0.00 
𝐶𝑂𝑁𝐶𝑡  47.83 13.37 37.61 50.52 55.87 
𝐻𝑃𝐼𝑡   -3.60 4.22 -5.51 -3.06 -0.93 
𝑈𝑁𝐸𝑡   7.00 2.30 5.08 6.90 8.68 
𝐼𝑁𝐶𝑂𝑡   1.16 3.37 -0.52 1.51 3.35 
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Table 4.4. Univariate mean comparison test for survived, failed and acquired commercial banks. 
 
Survived Closed Acquired 
Survived vs. 
Closed 
Survived vs. 
Acquired 
Acquired vs. 
Closed 
 Mean S.E. Mean S.E. Mean S.E. t-difference t-difference t-difference 
𝐶𝐴𝑃𝑖𝑡  11.281 0.0697 8.0792 0.1370 12.047 0.2326 20.828 *** -3.155 *** 14.696 *** 
𝑁𝑃𝐿𝑖𝑡   1.3838 0.0178 5.5028 0.1444 1.1991 0.0399 -28.30 *** 4.2273 *** -28.72 *** 
𝑂𝑅𝐸𝑖𝑡   0.6057 0.0123 2.0423 0.1011 0.3423 0.0172 -14.11 *** 12.469 *** -16.58 *** 
𝑀𝑁𝐺𝑖𝑡  0.7376 0.0054 1.0691 0.1485 0.7696 0.0140 -2.232 ** -2.151 ** -2.008 ** 
𝐸𝐴𝑅𝑁𝑖𝑡  0.6564 0.0183 -3.023 0.1004 -0.847 1.1237 36.055 *** 1.3376  1.9287 * 
𝐽𝐶𝐷𝑖𝑡   16.043 0.1004 22.401 0.4713 15.013 0.2299 -13.20 *** 4.1011 *** -14.09 *** 
𝐿𝑂𝐴𝑁𝑖𝑡   63.076 0.1963 75.048 0.4503 65.404 0.4901 -25.24 *** -4.410 *** -15.13 *** 
𝐹𝐸𝐷𝐹𝑖𝑡   -1.585 0.0653 -1.809 0.2732 -2.824 0.3114 0.7984  3.8963 *** -2.451 ** 
𝐶𝑂𝑀𝐿𝑖𝑡  14.896 0.1358 11.617 0.4386 14.095 0.2957 7.1409 *** 2.4910 ** 4.666 *** 
𝑅𝐸𝐿𝑁𝑖𝑡   67.860 0.2497 82.125 0.6597 70.856 0.5544 -19.93 *** -4.541 *** -13.08 *** 
𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖𝑡   11.997 0.0171 12.487 0.0576 12.003 0.0445 -8.159 *** -0.144  -6.645 *** 
𝐴𝐺𝐸𝑖𝑡   3.9576 0.0130 2.9770 0.0566 3.6079 0.0327 16.878 *** 9.9494 *** 9.6522 *** 
𝐻𝑂𝐿𝐷𝑖𝑡  0.1547 0.0045 0.1242 0.0161 0.5549 0.0139 1.8328 * -27.28 *** 20.250 *** 
𝑇𝐴𝑅𝑃1𝑖𝑡  0.0791 0.0029 0.0262 0.0061 0.0727 0.0057 7.7962 *** 1.004  5.5747 *** 
𝑇𝐴𝑅𝑃2𝑖𝑡  0.0570 0.0023 0.0255 0.0060 0.0638 0.0051 4.9163 *** -1.225  4.8799 *** 
𝑇𝐴𝑅𝑃3𝑖𝑡  0.0612 0.0024 0.0262 0.0061 0.0660 0.0052 5.3164 *** -0.852  4.9641 *** 
𝐶𝑂𝑁𝐶𝑡  0.4764 0.0017 0.5153 0.0057 0.4840 0.0039 -6.531 *** -1.639  -4.619 *** 
𝐻𝑃𝐼𝑡   -3.497 0.0319 -6.198 0.2279 -2.692 0.1097 11.740 *** -7.044 *** 13.863 *** 
𝑈𝑁𝐸𝑡   7.0380 0.0194 7.0387 0.0639 5.7596 0.0480 -0.101  24.682 *** -16.01 *** 
𝐼𝑁𝐶𝑂𝑡   1.2012 0.0140 0.1509 0.0623 1.7022 0.0499 16.441 *** -9.655 *** 19.417 *** 
Banks 5840 
 
398 
 
1167 
  
 
 
 
 
 
Note. The mean comparison test examines the null hypothesis that the means of two groups of banks are equal i.e. H0: diff = mean(group1) − mean(group2) = 0. The 
mean comparison test applied in this study is a t-test with Welch approximation to account for possible unequal variances between the two groups of banks. ***, **, and * 
represent 1%, 5%, and 10% significance levels, respectively. 
128 
 
Table 4.5. Cross correlation matrix of explanatory variables. 
  
 
𝐶𝐴𝑃𝑖𝑡 𝑁𝑃𝐿𝑖𝑡 𝑂𝑅𝐸𝑖𝑡 𝑀𝑁𝐺𝑖𝑡 𝐸𝐴𝑅𝑁𝑖𝑡 𝐽𝐶𝐷𝑖𝑡 𝐿𝑂𝐴𝑁𝑖𝑡 𝐹𝐸𝐷𝐹𝑖𝑡 𝐶𝑂𝑀𝐿𝑖𝑡 𝑅𝐸𝐿𝑁𝑖𝑡 𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖𝑡 𝐴𝐺𝐸𝑖𝑡 𝐻𝑂𝐿𝐷𝑖𝑡 𝑇𝐴𝑅𝑃𝑖𝑡 𝐶𝑂𝑀𝑃𝑖𝑡 𝐻𝑃𝐼𝑡 𝑈𝑁𝐸𝑡 𝐼𝑁𝐶𝑂𝑡 
𝐶𝐴𝑃𝑖𝑡  1                
  𝑁𝑃𝐿𝑖𝑡  -0.151 1               
  𝑂𝑅𝐸𝑖𝑡  -0.138 0.508 1              
  𝑀𝑁𝐺𝑖𝑡  0.003 0.061 0.047 1             
  𝐸𝐴𝑅𝑁𝑖𝑡  0.201 -0.381 -0.261 -0.076 1            
  𝐽𝐶𝐷𝑖𝑡  -0.147 0.171 0.165 0.019 -0.114 1           
  𝐿𝑂𝐴𝑁𝑖𝑡  -0.282 0.204 0.088 -0.005 -0.109 0.21 1          
  𝐹𝐸𝐷𝐹𝑖𝑡  -0.23 0.047 0.024 -0.021 0.022 -0.067 0.212 1         
  𝐶𝑂𝑀𝐿𝑖𝑡  -0.028 -0.109 -0.139 -0.016 0.057 -0.021 0.25 0.031 1        
  𝑅𝐸𝐿𝑁𝑖𝑡  -0.257 0.25 0.233 0.018 -0.181 0.12 0.31 0.138 -0.659 1       
  𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖𝑡  -0.149 0.129 0.034 -0.024 -0.013 -0.021 0.193 0.315 -0.12 0.222 1      
  𝐴𝐺𝐸𝑖𝑡  -0.087 -0.15 -0.124 -0.037 0.173 -0.251 -0.225 0.061 0.06 -0.165 -0.064 1     
  𝐻𝑂𝐿𝐷𝑖𝑡  0.065 -0.025 -0.046 -0.01 0.017 -0.072 0.003 0.054 0.026 -0.026 0.106 -0.007 1    
  𝑇𝐴𝑅𝑃𝑖𝑡  -0.036 0.128 0.063 0.005 -0.085 0.039 0.089 0.069 -0.028 0.097 0.21 -0.101 0.062 1   
  𝐶𝑂𝑁𝐶𝑡  0.061 0.117 0.11 0.014 -0.058 0.073 0.044 -0.001 -0.144 0.116 0.22 -0.246 -0.052 0.081 1  
  𝐻𝑃𝐼𝑡  -0.006 -0.232 -0.14 -0.022 0.161 -0.039 -0.106 -0.052 0.117 -0.181 -0.109 0.192 0.005 -0.105 -0.226 1 
  
𝑈𝑁𝐸𝑡  -0.043 0.304 0.231 0.022 -0.154 0.126 0.002 0.096 -0.275 0.277 0.165 -0.114 -0.047 0.211 0.2 
-
0.414 
1 
 𝐼𝑁𝐶𝑂𝑡  0.018 -0.138 -0.052 -0.013 0.119 -0.04 -0.074 -0.053 0.096 -0.125 -0.054 0.059 -0.001 -0.107 -0.039 0.286 -0.447 1 
Note. Coefficients in bold are significant at 5% level 
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To take into account the differences between closed banks and acquired banks, 
the mean comparison test for acquired banks and closed banks is included in the last 
column of the Table 4.4. The results indicate that for all variables considered, mean 
values observed for acquired banks significantly differ from those for closed banks. As 
expected, closed banks have lower capital ratios, higher troubled assets, less liquidity, 
and more real estate loans, compared to acquire banks. Also, acquired institutions are 
headquartered in states with better economic conditions and less concentrated banking 
sectors. In general, the results obtained from mean comparison tests suggest that the set 
of variables considered in this study may help explain why some banks disappear, under 
the hazard regression analysis framework. 
The pairwise correlation coefficients among covariates used in this study are 
reported in Table 4.5. It emerges that most covariates are significantly correlated, while 
the magnitude of correlations varies among explanatory variables. Not surprisingly, 
there is a very high positive correlation between nonperforming assets and real estate 
foreclosures, while the real estate loans to total loans and commercial loans to total 
assets are negatively correlated. Other correlation coefficients are reasonably small and 
do not seem to cause potential multicollinearity problems between explanatory 
variables.  
4.5.2. Failure hazard estimation 
In this section, the results of the estimated Cox proportional hazard models with 
time-varying covariates are reported to examine the factors affecting the survival time 
of the US commercial banks during the recent crisis, with special focus given to the role 
of capital infusions. Table 4.6 reports the estimated results of time-to-failure hazard 
model as specified in equation (4.3) with l=1. Three pairs of equations are presented 
with respect to three alternative measures of capital infusions discussed earlier. Within 
each pair of equations, two definitions of bank failure are used: regulatory closure and 
technical insolvency. Models (I) and (II) include TARP1 as a proxy for receiving capital 
infusions, models (III) and (IV) include TARP2 representing the interval a bank holds 
bailout funds, while models (V) and (VI) include TARP3 indicating the time interval of 
receiving capital assistance and final disposition transactions. 
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In this study the estimated coefficients are reported rather than hazard ratios. 
However, the hazard ratio of a covariate can be obtained by exponentiating its estimated 
coefficient. Each exponentiated coefficient represents the respective change in failure 
hazards for a one-unit change in the corresponding covariate, holding other covariates 
constant. A positive coefficient indicates that a rise in the corresponding covariate 
increases the failure hazard, while a negative coefficient indicates that an increase in the 
relevant covariate reduces the failure hazard and increases the survival likelihood. Also, 
in order to evaluate its overall statistical significance and goodness of fit of each 
estimated model, its pseudo R-squared, and Wald test statistics are reported.
1
 
In general, the empirical results in Table 4.6 show that most covariates 
significantly affect the survival likelihood of the US commercial banks. These results 
are robust in terms of signs and magnitude of coefficients across all models. Not 
surprisingly, deteriorating CAMELS indicators significantly undermine survival 
likelihood of commercial banks. In particular, it appears that banks with lower capital 
ratios are at higher risk of closure. This result is consistent with Berger and Bouwman’s 
(2013) view that capital enhances the survival likelihood of banks during banking 
crises. This is also consistent with the Prompt Corrective Action (PCA) under the US 
regulatory framework, which penalizes banks with progressively deteriorating capital 
ratios and eventually closes banks that are critically undercapitalized. 
Furthermore, the empirical results reveal that higher𝑁𝑃𝐿𝑖𝑡  and 𝑂𝑅𝐸𝑖𝑡 are 
associated with shorter time to closure, indicating that banks with more troubled assets 
are less likely to survive during the crisis period. In addition, the FDIC closure is more 
likely for banks with higher Jumbo certificate of deposit in their asset portfolios. As 
regards the composition of loan portfolios, empirical results show that higher fraction of 
real estate loans to total loans and higher commercial and industrial loans are associated 
with higher failure hazards. Coming to the liquidity indicators, no robustly significant  
                                                 
1
 The goodness of fit in estimated models can be compared using the reported pseudo 𝑅2 calculated as 
follows 
𝑝𝑠𝑒𝑢𝑑𝑜𝑅2 = 1 − 𝑙𝑛𝐿𝑓 𝑙𝑛𝐿𝑖⁄  
where 𝑙𝑛𝐿𝑛 is the log-likelihood of the null model where all covariates are dropped, and 𝑙𝑛𝐿𝑓 is the log-
likelihood of the model with all covariates under consideration.  
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Table 4.6. Failure hazard estimation results for the US commercial banks.  
 I II III IV V VI 
Variables Closure Insolvency Closure Insolvency Closure Insolvency 
       
𝐶𝐴𝑃𝑖𝑡  -0.481*** -0.416*** -0.481*** -0.417*** -0.481*** -0.417*** 
 (0.031) (0.028) (0.031) (0.028) (0.031) (0.028) 
𝑁𝑃𝐿𝑖𝑡   0.074*** 0.076*** 0.074*** 0.076*** 0.074*** 0.076*** 
 (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) 
𝑂𝑅𝐸𝑖𝑡   0.057*** 0.063*** 0.058*** 0.063*** 0.058*** 0.063*** 
 (0.015) (0.014) (0.015) (0.014) (0.015) (0.014) 
𝐶𝑂𝑀𝐿𝑖𝑡  0.063*** 0.061*** 0.064*** 0.060*** 0.063*** 0.060*** 
 (0.018) (0.016) (0.018) (0.016) (0.018) (0.016) 
𝑅𝐸𝐿𝑖𝑡   0.046*** 0.052*** 0.046*** 0.052*** 0.046*** 0.052*** 
 (0.014) (0.012) (0.014) (0.012) (0.014) (0.012) 
𝑀𝑁𝐺𝑖𝑡  -0.004** -0.003 -0.004** -0.003 -0.004* -0.003 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
𝐸𝐴𝑅𝑁𝑖𝑡  0.058*** 0.046*** 0.058*** 0.046*** 0.058*** 0.046*** 
 (0.008) (0.007) (0.008) (0.007) (0.008) (0.007) 
𝐽𝐶𝐷𝑖𝑡   0.008* 0.009** 0.009* 0.010** 0.009* 0.010** 
 (0.005) (0.004) (0.005) (0.004) (0.005) (0.004) 
𝐿𝑂𝐴𝑁𝑖𝑡   -0.004 -0.005 -0.004 -0.005 -0.004 -0.005 
 (0.007) (0.005) (0.007) (0.005) (0.007) (0.005) 
𝐹𝐸𝐷𝐹𝑖𝑡   -0.049*** -0.032*** -0.049*** -0.032*** -0.049*** -0.032*** 
 (0.011) (0.009) (0.011) (0.009) (0.011) (0.009) 
𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖𝑡   0.166*** 0.020 0.159*** 0.014 0.159*** 0.014 
 (0.061) (0.051) (0.059) (0.050) (0.059) (0.050) 
𝐴𝐺𝐸𝑖𝑡   -0.106 -0.104* -0.104 -0.101* -0.104 -0.101* 
 (0.068) (0.059) (0.068) (0.059) (0.068) (0.059) 
𝐻𝑂𝐿𝐷𝑖𝑡  -0.463* -0.108 -0.470* -0.114 -0.469* -0.114 
 (0.251) (0.195) (0.251) (0.195) (0.251) (0.195) 
𝑇𝐴𝑅𝑃1𝑖𝑡  -0.601** -0.114     
 (0.270) (0.160)     
𝑇𝐴𝑅𝑃2𝑖𝑡    -0.574** 0.002   
   (0.277) (0.160)   
𝑇𝐴𝑅𝑃3𝑖𝑡      -0.534** -0.011 
     (0.270) (0.158) 
𝐶𝑂𝑁𝐶𝑡  0.011** 0.012*** 0.0113** 0.012*** 0.011** 0.012*** 
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
𝐻𝑃𝐼𝑡   -0.033** -0.028* -0.034** -0.029* -0.034** -0.029* 
 (0.017) (0.015) (0.017) (0.015) (0.017) (0.015) 
𝑈𝑁𝐸𝑡   -0.006 0.030 -0.007 0.028 -0.007 0.029 
 (0.045) (0.036) (0.045) (0.036) (0.045) (0.036) 
𝐼𝑁𝐶𝑂𝑡   -0.064 -0.052 -0.064 -0.052 -0.064 -0.052 
 (0.040) (0.035) (0.040) (0.035) (0.040) (0.035) 
       
Observations 158,654 157,221 158,654 157,221 158,654 157,221 
# banks 7405 7405 7405 7405 7405 7405 
# acquisitions 398 580 398 580 398 580 
LLF -2122 -3376 -2123 -3376 -2123 -3376 
Pseudo 𝑅2 0.393 0.336 0.393 0.336 0.393 0.336 
Wald test 2023 2684 2018 2682 2023 2682 
All models are estimated by the Cox proportional hazard model with time varying covariates. Models I and II, III and 
IV, and V and VI employ TARP1, TARP2, and TARP3, respectively, as proxies for government bailout. LLF 
indicates log likelihood function. The pseudo 𝑅2 evaluates the goodness of fit by comparing the log-likelihood of 
estimated models with the log-likelihood of constant-only model. The Wald test evaluates the overall significance of 
the estimated coefficients. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * represent 1%, 5%, and 
10% significance levels, respectively.  
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linkage between 𝐿𝐴𝑖𝑡 and probability of regulatory closure is found, while higher 𝐽𝐶𝐷𝑖𝑡 
and lower net Federal funds purchases are associated with higher likelihood of failure. 
Contrary to the results reported by Wheelock and Wilson (2000), it is found that banks 
with more managerial efficiency and more profitability are at greater risk of failure. 
This may reflect the fact that most closed banks incur significant losses a few quarters 
before they are closed down. Also, moral hazard incentives are higher for managers of 
banks with imminent regulatory closure. Therefore, it is not surprising that improving 
short-term profitability and efficiency is associated with lower survival likelihood.  
In addition to CAMELS indicators, a positive relationship is found between 
bank size and probability of closure, although this relationship becomes insignificant 
when considering technical insolvency. This may reflect the complexity of operations 
and products as well as higher agency costs among larger banks. Also, the results 
indicate that MBHC affiliates are at lower risk of regulatory closure, which is consistent 
with Ashcraft’s (2008) explanation that MBHC affiliation is a source of strength as 
MBHCs can provide managerial and financial supports to their subsidiaries during 
financial crises. 
Furthermore, state-level local economic conditions and banking sector 
concentrations largely affect the failure hazards of the US commercial banks. Banks 
operating in more concentrated banking sectors are more likely to fail. This is consistent 
with Boyd and De Nicolo’s (2005) view that banks take on riskier portfolios in less 
competitive banking sectors. Also, adverse house price fluctuations significantly 
increase the failure hazards, perhaps due to deteriorating the value of mortgage related 
securities as well as collateralized assets in the form of real estate. 
From Tables 4.8 and 4.9, it can be inferred that most bank-specific variables 
have similar signs, whereas the magnitude of their impact on failure hazards differs 
across large and small bank models. The only significant variable with different signs 
on the estimated coefficients is the bank size, which appears as a negative coefficient 
for small banks but a positive coefficient for large banks. These contrasting findings 
suggest that larger banks in the small bank sample are less likely to fail, reflecting scale 
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Table 4.7. Failure hazard estimation results for small banks. 
 I II III IV V VI 
Variables Closure Insolvency Closure Insolvency Closure Insolvency 
       
𝐶𝐴𝑃𝑖𝑡  -0.485*** -0.402*** -0.485*** -0.402*** -0.485*** -0.402*** 
 (0.035) (0.028) (0.035) (0.028) (0.035) (0.028) 
𝑁𝑃𝐿𝑖𝑡   0.091*** 0.092*** 0.091*** 0.092*** 0.091*** 0.092*** 
 (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) 
𝑂𝑅𝐸𝑖𝑡   0.091*** 0.093*** 0.091*** 0.093*** 0.091*** 0.093*** 
 (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) 
𝐶𝑂𝑀𝐿𝑖𝑡  0.056** 0.058*** 0.056** 0.057*** 0.056** 0.058*** 
 (0.028) (0.021) (0.028) (0.021) (0.028) (0.021) 
𝑅𝐸𝐿𝑖𝑡   0.042** 0.046*** 0.042** 0.046*** 0.042** 0.046*** 
 (0.020) (0.015) (0.020) (0.015) (0.020) (0.015) 
𝑀𝑁𝐺𝑖𝑡  -0.004 -0.003 -0.004 -0.004 -0.004 -0.004 
 (0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.004) 
𝐸𝐴𝑅𝑁𝑖𝑡  0.052*** 0.038*** 0.052*** 0.038*** 0.052*** 0.038*** 
 (0.010) (0.007) (0.010) (0.007) (0.010) (0.007) 
𝐽𝐶𝐷𝑖𝑡   0.006 0.004 0.006 0.004 0.006 0.004 
 (0.006) (0.005) (0.006) (0.005) (0.006) (0.005) 
𝐿𝑂𝐴𝑁𝑖𝑡   -0.010 -0.007 -0.010 -0.007 -0.010 -0.0075 
 (0.011) (0.008) (0.011) (0.008) (0.011) (0.008) 
𝐹𝐸𝐷𝐹𝑖𝑡   -0.034** -0.025** -0.034** -0.025** -0.034** -0.025** 
 (0.014) (0.011) (0.014) (0.011) (0.014) (0.011) 
𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖𝑡   -0.274** -0.293*** -0.276** -0.296*** -0.276** -0.296*** 
 (0.124) (0.104) (0.124) (0.104) (0.124) (0.104) 
𝐴𝐺𝐸𝑖𝑡   -0.214*** -0.197*** -0.213*** -0.196*** -0.213*** -0.196*** 
 (0.082) (0.071) (0.082) (0.071) (0.082) (0.071) 
𝐻𝑂𝐿𝐷𝑖𝑡  -0.422 0.191 -0.422 0.190 -0.422 0.190 
 (0.258) (0.181) (0.258) (0.181) (0.258) (0.181) 
𝑇𝐴𝑅𝑃1𝑖𝑡  -0.104 -0.235     
 (0.348) (0.248)     
𝑇𝐴𝑅𝑃2𝑖𝑡    -0.076 -0.174   
   (0.349) (0.248)   
𝑇𝐴𝑅𝑃3𝑖𝑡      -0.081 -0.187 
     (0.348) (0.248) 
𝐶𝑂𝑁𝐶𝑡  0.011* 0.014** 0.011* 0.014** 0.011* 0.014** 
 (0.006) (0.005) (0.006) (0.005) (0.006) (0.005) 
𝐻𝑃𝐼𝑡   -0.044* -0.019 -0.044* -0.019 -0.044* -0.019 
 (0.023) (0.019) (0.023) (0.019) (0.023) (0.019) 
𝑈𝑁𝐸𝑡   -0.064 -0.006 -0.065 -0.007 -0.065 -0.007 
 (0.059) (0.043) (0.059) (0.043) (0.059) (0.043) 
𝐼𝑁𝐶𝑂𝑡   -0.054 -0.065 -0.054 -0.065 -0.054 -0.065 
 (0.051) (0.043) (0.051) (0.043) (0.051) (0.043) 
       
Observations 116,616 115,555 116,616 115,555 116,616 115,555 
# banks 5378 5378 5378 5378 5378 5378 
# acquisitions 233 361 233 361 233 361 
LLF -1108 -1942 -1108 -1942 -1108 -1942 
Pseudo 𝑅2 0.439 0.364 0.439 0.364 0.439 0.364 
Wald test 2009 2586 2009 2584 2009 2585 
 All models are estimated by the Cox proportional hazard model with time varying covariates. Models I and II, III 
and IV, and V and VI employ TARP1, TARP2, and TARP3, respectively, as proxies for government bailout. LLF 
indicates log likelihood function. The pseudo 𝑅2 evaluates the goodness of fit by comparing the log-likelihood of 
estimated models with the log-likelihood of constant-only model. The Wald test evaluates the overall significance of 
the estimated coefficients. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * represent 1%, 5%, and 
10% significance levels, respectively. 
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Table 4.8. Failure hazard estimation results for large banks. 
 I II III IV V VI 
Variables Closure Insolvency Closure Insolvency Closure Insolvency 
       
𝐶𝐴𝑃𝑖𝑡  -0.657*** -0.566*** -0.663*** -0.567*** -0.658*** -0.568*** 
 (0.044) (0.039) (0.044) (0.039) (0.044) (0.039) 
𝑁𝑃𝐿𝑖𝑡   0.046*** 0.045*** 0.046*** 0.045*** 0.047*** 0.045*** 
 (0.016) (0.015) (0.016) (0.015) (0.016) (0.015) 
𝑂𝑅𝐸𝑖𝑡   0.035 0.044* 0.035 0.045* 0.035 0.045* 
 (0.027) (0.027) (0.027) (0.027) (0.027) (0.027) 
𝐶𝑂𝑀𝐿𝑖𝑡  0.086*** 0.059** 0.090*** 0.056** 0.087*** 0.056** 
 (0.023) (0.026) (0.023) (0.023) (0.023) (0.026) 
𝑅𝐸𝐿𝑖𝑡   0.051*** 0.057*** 0.054*** 0.056*** 0.053*** 0.056*** 
 (0.018) (0.020) (0.018) (0.019) (0.018) (0.019) 
𝑀𝑁𝐺𝑖𝑡  -0.005* -0.004 -0.005* -0.004 -0.005* -0.004 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
𝐸𝐴𝑅𝑁𝑖𝑡  0.083*** 0.057*** 0.084*** 0.057*** 0.084*** 0.057*** 
 (0.013) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) 
𝐽𝐶𝐷𝑖𝑡   -0.001 0.007 -0.001 0.007 -0.001 0.007 
 (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) 
𝐿𝑂𝐴𝑁𝑖𝑡   0.005 0.002 0.004 0.003 0.005 0.003 
 (0.009) (0.007) (0.008) (0.007) (0.008) (0.007) 
𝐹𝐸𝐷𝐹𝑖𝑡   -0.058*** -0.040*** -0.057*** -0.040*** -0.058*** -0.040*** 
 (0.015) (0.013) (0.015) (0.013) (0.015) (0.013) 
𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖𝑡   0.378*** 0.255*** 0.358*** 0.247*** 0.351*** 0.247*** 
 (0.092) (0.079) (0.083) (0.077) (0.086) (0.077) 
𝐴𝐺𝐸𝑖𝑡   0.090 0.035 0.099 0.037 0.093 0.039 
 (0.099) (0.088) (0.098) (0.088) (0.099) (0.088) 
𝐻𝑂𝐿𝐷𝑖𝑡  -0.181 -0.251 -0.209 -0.260 -0.199 -0.261 
 (0.273) (0.246) (0.273) (0.247) (0.272) (0.247) 
𝑇𝐴𝑅𝑃1𝑖𝑡  -1.659*** -0.028     
 (0.601) (0.238)     
𝑇𝐴𝑅𝑃2𝑖𝑡    -1.735*** 0.148   
   (0.646) (0.230)   
𝑇𝐴𝑅𝑃3𝑖𝑡      -1.559** 0.141 
     (0.605) (0.224) 
𝐶𝑂𝑁𝐶𝑡  0.010 0.009 0.010 0.009 0.009 0.009 
 (0.008) (0.006) (0.008) (0.006) (0.008) (0.006) 
𝐻𝑃𝐼𝑡   0.010 -0.004 0.010 -0.006 0.009 -0.006 
 (0.025) (0.022) (0.025) (0.022) (0.025) (0.022) 
𝑈𝑁𝐸𝑡   0.179*** 0.163*** 0.182*** 0.159*** 0.177*** 0.160*** 
 (0.067) (0.056) (0.067) (0.056) (0.067) (0.056) 
𝐼𝑁𝐶𝑂𝑡   0.021 0.010 0.022 0.011 0.021 0.011 
 (0.064) (0.057) (0.064) (0.057) (0.064) (0.057) 
       
Observations 42,038 41,666 42,038 41,666 42,038 41,666 
# banks 2027 2027 2027 2027 2027 2027 
# acquisitions 165 219 165 219 165 219 
LLF -691.0 -999.0 -691.0 -998.9 -692.2 -998.9 
Pseudo 𝑅2 0.439 0.387 0.439 0.387 0.438 0.387 
Wald test 786.2 1031 770.3 1030 780.8 1030 
All models are estimated by the Cox proportional hazard model with time varying covariates. Models I and II, III and 
IV, and V and VI employ TARP1, TARP2, and TARP3, respectively, as proxies for government bailout. LLF 
indicates log likelihood function. The pseudo 𝑅2 evaluates the goodness of fit by comparing the log-likelihood of 
estimated models with the log-likelihood of constant-only model. The Wald test evaluates the overall significance of 
the estimated coefficients. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * represent 1%, 5%, and 
10% significance levels, respectively.  
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efficiencies and better portfolio diversification in larger banks. However, higher 
likelihood of failure across larger banks in large bank sample may be attributed to 
higher agency costs and higher losses in complex mortgage-related products.  
Coming to the real estate foreclosures, it appears that the estimated coefficient 
on real estate foreclosures is insignificant for large banks when regulatory closure is 
under consideration, while a rise in real estate foreclosures significantly increases the 
survival likelihood in small banks. Also, bank age appears to be insignificant in large 
bank models, while it significantly affects survival likelihood of small banks. This 
indicates that bank age plays a key role in credit rating and creditworthiness of small 
banks while large banks may rely more on their ‘too-big-to-fail’ guarantees. Another 
interesting finding of this chapter is that small banks are more sensitive to state-level 
banking concentration and house price fluctuations, while higher unemployment is 
associated with higher failure hazards in larger banks. 
Furthermore, the empirical results show that the impact of capital infusions 
largely vary across small and large TARP recipients. While receiving TARP funds 
significantly reduces the probability of regulatory closure in large banks, regulators do 
not hesitate to close down ‘small enough to fail’ recipients in the event of technical 
insolvency. This may be partly because larger distressed recipients can benefit from 
‘too-big-too-fail’ guarantee and better access to liquidity and external funding via 
capital markets whereas their smaller counterparts are either privately held or thinly 
traded and In general, results in Tables 4.8 and 4.9 suggest that larger banks are much 
better served by TARP capital infusions even though it does not effectively help them 
avoid technical insolvency.   
In summary, the empirical results strongly support the hypothesis one that 
government bailout is not effective in preventing recipient banks from technical 
insolvency although larger recipients may avoid regulatory closure. 
4.5.3. Acquisition hazard estimation 
Next, it is investigated if the covariates affecting time-to-failure can also explain 
acquisition hazards of the U.S. commercial banks during the recent crisis. Table 4.9 
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presents the estimation results of time-to-acquisition model as specified in equation (2) 
with l=2. Again, the analysis of acquisition hazards differentiates among alternative 
TARP indicators as well as financial health of acquired institutions. While some 
acquisitions were related to banks facing imminent failure, other acquired institutions 
were financially healthy. Thus, within each pair of equations associated with a TARP 
indicator, two models are estimated. The first model includes all acquired banking 
institutions, whereas the second model only includes healthy acquired institutions. 
However, the results for healthy acquisition are expected to be very similar to that of all 
acquisitions as the number of acquired institutions with imminent failure is considerably 
smaller than number of acquired banks.   
In general, the empirical results indicate that most CAMELS indicators 
significantly affect time-to-acquisition of the U.S. commercial banks. In particular, 
acquired institutions tend to be less efficient and less profitable banks, which is 
consistent with the positive relationship between lower managerial quality and 
acquisition hazard found by Hannan and Pilloff (2009). This indicates that poorly 
performing banks are attractive acquisition targets for other banking institutions, 
perhaps because acquiring institutions expect that there is room for improving the 
managerial quality of the target banks. 
Consistent with the results found by Wheelock and Wilson (2000), it is found 
that acquired banks have lower real estate foreclosures in the asset portfolios. However, 
acquired institutions had significantly higher nonperforming loans to total assets and 
higher fraction of real estate loans in their loan portfolios. This may indicate that 
acquiring institutions were not optimistic about future house prices in the short run.  
As regards the liquidity indicators, my empirical results reveal that acquisition 
targets were more liquid represented by lower loans in their asset portfolios, lower 
jumbo certificate of deposits, and lowed net Federal funds purchased in their asset 
portfolios. This may suggest that acquiring institutions were willing to take over liquid 
banks with relatively poor management quality in order to diversify their asset 
portfolios. 
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Table 4.9. Acquisition hazard estimation results for the U.S. commercial banks.  
 I II III IV V VI 
Variables Acquisition Healthy 
acquisition 
Acquisition Healthy 
acquisition 
Acquisitio
n 
Healthy 
acquisition 
       
𝐶𝐴𝑃𝑖𝑡  -0.007 -0.006 -0.007 -0.006 -0.007 -0.006 
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
𝑁𝑃𝐿𝑖𝑡   0.041*** 0.040*** 0.041*** 0.040*** 0.041*** 0.040*** 
 (0.013) (0.014) (0.013) (0.014) (0.013) (0.014) 
𝑂𝑅𝐸𝑖𝑡   -0.075** -0.122*** -0.079** -0.127*** -0.078** -0.126*** 
 (0.031) (0.031) (0.032) (0.032) (0.032) (0.032) 
𝐶𝑂𝑀𝐿𝑖𝑡  -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.003 -0.002 -0.002 
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
𝑅𝐸𝐿𝑖𝑡   0.010*** 0.010*** 0.010*** 0.010*** 0.010*** 0.010*** 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
𝑀𝑁𝐺𝑖𝑡  0.008** 0.008*** 0.008** 0.008*** 0.008** 0.008*** 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
𝐸𝐴𝑅𝑁𝑖𝑡  -0.036*** -0.037*** -0.035*** -0.036*** -0.036*** -0.036*** 
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
𝐽𝐶𝐷𝑖𝑡   -0.019*** -0.020*** -0.019*** -0.021*** -0.019*** -0.02`*** 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
𝐿𝑂𝐴𝑁𝑖𝑡   -0.005* -0.004 -0.004* -0.003 -0.004* -0.003 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
𝐹𝐸𝐷𝐹𝑖𝑡   -0.017*** -0.017*** -0.018*** -0.018*** -0.018*** -0.018*** 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖𝑡   -0.099*** -0.096*** -0.088*** -0.086*** -0.088*** -0.086*** 
 (0.025) (0.024) (0.024) (0.024) (0.024) (0.024) 
𝐴𝐺𝐸𝑖𝑡   -0.125*** -0.123*** -0.125*** -0.124*** -0.127*** -0.125*** 
 (0.029) (0.029) (0.029) (0.029) (0.029) (0.029) 
𝐻𝑂𝐿𝐷𝑖𝑡  1.954*** 1.966*** 1.960*** 1.971*** 1.959*** 1.971*** 
 (0.061) (0.062) (0.061) (0.062) (0.061) (0.062) 
𝑇𝐴𝑅𝑃1𝑖𝑡  0.488*** 0.497***     
 (0.098) (0.099)     
𝑇𝐴𝑅𝑃2𝑖𝑡    0.602*** 0.619***   
   (0.101) (0.102)   
𝑇𝐴𝑅𝑃3𝑖𝑡      0.557*** 0.572*** 
     (0.010) (0.101) 
𝐶𝑂𝑁𝐶𝑡  0.011*** 0.011*** 0.011*** 0.011*** 0.011*** 0.011*** 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
𝐻𝑃𝐼𝑡   0.025** 0.025** 0.026** 0.026** 0.026** 0.026** 
 (0.010) (0.011) (0.010) (0.011) (0.010) (0.011) 
𝑈𝑁𝐸𝑡   -0.011 -0.014 -0.010 -0.012 -0.009 -0.011 
 (0.025) (0.025) (0.025) (0.025) (0.025) (0.025) 
𝐼𝑁𝐶𝑂𝑡   -0.051*** -0.0483** -0.051*** -0.048** -0.051*** -0.048** 
 (0.019) (0.020) (0.019) (0.020) (0.019) (0.020) 
       
Observations 158,654 158,654 158,654 158,654 158,654 158,654 
# banks 7405 7405 7405 7405 7405 7405 
# acquisitions 1167 1147 1167 1147 1167 1147 
LLF -9613 -9440 -9609 -9435 -9611 -9437 
Pseudo 𝑅2 0.0647 0.0656 0.0651 0.0661 0.0649 0.0659 
Wald test 1505 1515 1550 1561 1544 1557 
All models are estimated by the Cox proportional hazard model with time varying covariates. The dependent variable 
in models I, III, and V is the acquisition dummy that equals 1 if a bank is acquired within one quarter. LLF indicates 
log likelihood function. The pseudo 𝑅2 evaluates the goodness of fit by comparing the log-likelihood of estimated 
models with the log-likelihood of constant-only model. The Wald test evaluates the overall significance of the 
estimated coefficients. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * represent 1%, 5%, and 10% 
significance levels, respectively.  
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Coming to the other covariates, the results show that smaller banks were more 
likely to be acquired, compared to larger banks. Also, acquisition probability was 
negatively associated with bank age. Not surprisingly, affiliates of MBHC are more 
likely to be acquired, supporting the contention that distressed MBHC may give up their 
inefficient subsidiaries in order to either survive during adverse macro-financial 
conditions or acquire better performing banks. Furthermore, my empirical results 
indicate that banks headquartered in States with falling house prices were less attractive 
targets while acquiring hazards were higher in States with more concentrated banking 
sectors. This indicates that local economic conditions and banking sectors play a key 
role in acquisition decisions. 
More interesting, the empirical results show that receiving TARP capital 
assistance significantly increases probability of a recipient bank being acquired. This 
result is robust across all models. In particular, it indicates that recipient institutions are 
likely to be acquired when they hold TARP funds. This can be in part associated with a 
combination of factors, including public stigma, debt overhang problems, and 
restrictions on executive pay, which may encourage executive managers of recipient 
MBHCs to give up some of their subsidiaries to exit the program (see, e.g., Wilson and 
Wu, 2012; Cornett et al., 2013). Also, some recipient MBHC may be willing to trade 
their less efficient subsidiaries with more efficient institutions. 
Again, the sample was split into small and large banks using the $300 million 
demarcation threshold. The empirical results for time-to-acquisition of small and large 
banks are presented in Tables 4.10 and 4.11, respectively.  
Broadly speaking, factors significantly affecting time-to-acquisition of small and 
large banks tend to be similar in many respects. In particular, higher nonperforming 
assets, lower profitability, lower net federal funds, higher real estate loans in the loan 
portfolios, and membership of multibank holding companies are common factors that 
significantly increase acquisition hazards in both small and large banks. Furthermore, 
the empirical results reveal that acquiring institutions are willing to take over small 
banks in less competitive markets, regardless of acquired bank size. 
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Table 4.10. Acquisition hazard estimation results for small banks. 
 I II III IV V VI 
Variables Acquisition Healthy 
acquisition 
Acquisition Healthy 
acquisition 
Acquisition Healthy 
acquisition 
       
𝐶𝐴𝑃𝑖𝑡  -0.020*** -0.019*** -0.020*** -0.018*** -0.020*** -0.018*** 
 (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.007) (0.007) (0.006) 
𝑁𝑃𝐿𝑖𝑡   0.044*** 0.039** 0.044*** 0.039** 0.043*** 0.039** 
 (0.016) (0.017) (0.016) (0.017) (0.016) (0.017) 
𝑂𝑅𝐸𝑖𝑡   -0.043 -0.092*** -0.045 -0.093*** -0.044 -0.093*** 
 (0.032) (0.033) (0.032) (0.033) (0.032) (0.033) 
𝐶𝑂𝑀𝐿𝑖𝑡  0.004 0.002 0.004 0.002 0.004 0.002 
 (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.008) (0.007) (0.007) 
𝑅𝐸𝐿𝑖𝑡   0.010** 0.010** 0.010** 0.010** 0.010** 0.010** 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
𝑀𝑁𝐺𝑖𝑡  0.007 0.008* 0.007 0.008* 0.007 0.008* 
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
𝐸𝐴𝑅𝑁𝑖𝑡  -0.039*** -0.039*** -0.039*** -0.039*** -0.039*** -0.039*** 
 (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.007) 
𝐽𝐶𝐷𝑖𝑡   -0.019*** -0.022*** -0.019*** -0.022*** -0.019*** -0.022*** 
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
𝐿𝑂𝐴𝑁𝑖𝑡   -0.005 -0.003 -0.005 -0.003 -0.0053 -0.003 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
𝐹𝐸𝐷𝐹𝑖𝑡   -0.018*** -0.018*** -0.018*** -0.018*** -0.018*** -0.018*** 
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖𝑡   -0.250*** -0.244*** -0.242*** -0.235*** -0.243*** -0.237*** 
 (0.051) (0.051) (0.051) (0.051) (0.051) (0.051) 
𝐴𝐺𝐸𝑖𝑡   -0.173*** -0.170*** -0.173*** -0.170*** -0.175*** -0.172*** 
 (0.034) (0.034) (0.034) (0.034) (0.034) (0.034) 
𝐻𝑂𝐿𝐷𝑖𝑡  1.912*** 1.925*** 1.919*** 1.932*** 1.918*** 1.931*** 
 (0.072) (0.073) (0.072) (0.073) (0.072) (0.073) 
𝑇𝐴𝑅𝑃1𝑖𝑡  0.605*** 0.620***     
 (0.136) (0.137)     
𝑇𝐴𝑅𝑃2𝑖𝑡    0.631*** 0.650***   
   (0.149) (0.150)   
𝑇𝐴𝑅𝑃3𝑖𝑡      0.602*** 0.620*** 
     (0.146) (0.147) 
𝐶𝑂𝑁𝐶𝑡  0.0101*** 0.010*** 0.010*** 0.010*** 0.010*** 0.010*** 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
𝐻𝑃𝐼𝑡   0.037*** 0.036*** 0.037*** 0.036*** 0.037*** 0.037*** 
 (0.013) (0.014) (0.013) (0.014) (0.013) (0.014) 
𝑈𝑁𝐸𝑡   -0.016 -0.018 -0.013 -0.014 -0.012 -0.013 
 (0.030) (0.031) (0.030) (0.031) (0.030) (0.031) 
𝐼𝑁𝐶𝑂𝑡   -0.052** -0.048** -0.051** -0.048** -0.051** -0.048** 
 (0.023) (0.023) (0.023) (0.023) (0.023) (0.023) 
       
Observations 116,616 116,616 116,616 116,616 116,616 116,616 
# banks 5378 5378 5378 5378 5378 5378 
# acquisitions 820 802 820 802 820 802 
LLF -6511 -6365 -6512 -6365 -6513 -6366 
Pseudo 𝑅2 0.0652 0.0659 0.0651 0.0658 0.0651 0.0657 
Wald test 1208 1204 1212 1207 1212 1208 
The dependent variable in models II, IV, and VI is the healthy acquisition dummy that equals 1 if a healthy bank is 
acquired within one quarter. LLF indicates log likelihood function. The pseudo 𝑅2 evaluates the goodness of fit by 
comparing the log-likelihood of estimated models with the log-likelihood of constant-only model. The Wald test 
evaluates the overall significance of the estimated coefficients. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. 
***, **, and * represent 1%, 5%, and 10% significance levels, respectively.  
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Table 4.11. Acquisition hazard estimation results for large banks. 
 I II III IV V VI 
Variables Acquisition Healthy 
acquisition 
Acquisition Healthy 
acquisition 
Acquisition Healthy 
acquisition 
       
𝐶𝐴𝑃𝑖𝑡  0.022*** 0.021*** 0.023*** 0.023*** 0.023*** 0.022*** 
 (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) 
𝑁𝑃𝐿𝑖𝑡   0.038* 0.039* 0.039* 0.040* 0.039* 0.040* 
 (0.022) (0.022) (0.022) (0.022) (0.022) (0.022) 
𝑂𝑅𝐸𝑖𝑡   -0.182** -0.206*** -0.213*** -0.238*** -0.203*** -0.228*** 
 (0.075) (0.078) (0.080) (0.084) (0.078) (0.082) 
𝐶𝑂𝑀𝐿𝑖𝑡  -0.013 -0.012 -0.015 -0.015 -0.015 -0.014 
 (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) 
𝑅𝐸𝐿𝑖𝑡   0.018*** 0.018*** 0.017*** 0.017*** 0.017*** 0.017*** 
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
𝑀𝑁𝐺𝑖𝑡  0.007* 0.007* 0.007* 0.007* 0.0069* 0.007* 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
𝐸𝐴𝑅𝑁𝑖𝑡  -0.040*** -0.040*** -0.038*** -0.038*** -0.039*** -0.038*** 
 (0.007) (0.007) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.007) 
𝐽𝐶𝐷𝑖𝑡   -0.012 -0.012 -0.014* -0.013* -0.014* -0.013* 
 (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) 
𝐿𝑂𝐴𝑁𝑖𝑡   -0.002 -0.002 -0.001 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
𝐹𝐸𝐷𝐹𝑖𝑡   -0.021*** -0.021*** -0.022*** -0.022*** -0.022*** -0.022*** 
 (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) 
𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖𝑡   -0.008 -0.009 0.004 0.003 0.003 0.002 
 (0.044) (0.044) (0.043) (0.043) (0.043) (0.043) 
𝐴𝐺𝐸𝑖𝑡   -0.040 -0.045 -0.038 -0.044 -0.042 -0.047 
 (0.061) (0.061) (0.061) (0.061) (0.060) (0.061) 
𝐻𝑂𝐿𝐷𝑖𝑡  2.048*** 2.052*** 2.049*** 2.052*** 2.050*** 2.053*** 
 (0.127) (0.127) (0.126) (0.126) (0.126) (0.126) 
𝑇𝐴𝑅𝑃1𝑖𝑡  0.416*** 0.404***     
 (0.154) (0.155)     
𝑇𝐴𝑅𝑃2𝑖𝑡    0.724*** 0.715***   
   (0.151) (0.152)   
𝑇𝐴𝑅𝑃3𝑖𝑡      0.643*** 0.634*** 
     (0.147) (0.148) 
𝐶𝑂𝑁𝐶𝑡  0.009* 0.009* 0.009* 0.009* 0.009* 0.009* 
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
𝐻𝑃𝐼𝑡   0.015 0.014 0.018 0.017 0.018 0.0167 
 (0.016) (0.016) (0.017) (0.017) (0.016) (0.016) 
𝑈𝑁𝐸𝑡   0.027 0.027 0.0211 0.021 0.023 0.023 
 (0.044) (0.044) (0.043) (0.043) (0.043) (0.043) 
𝐼𝑁𝐶𝑂𝑡   -0.058 -0.056 -0.059 -0.057 -0.059 -0.057 
 (0.036) (0.037) (0.037) (0.037) (0.037) (0.037) 
       
Observations 42,038 42,038 42,038 42,038 42,038 42,038 
# banks 2027 2027 2027 2027 2027 2027 
# acquisitions 347 345 347 345 347 345 
LLF -2362 -2348 -2356 -2341 -2358 -2343 
Pseudo 𝑅2 0.0916 0.0919 0.0941 0.0944 0.0934 0.0938 
Wald test 465.3 462.8 483.1 479.8 483.5 480.3 
The dependent variable in models II, IV, and VI is the healthy acquisition dummy that equals 1 if a healthy bank is 
acquired within one quarter. LLF indicates log likelihood function. The pseudo 𝑅2 evaluates the goodness of fit by 
comparing the log-likelihood of estimated models with the log-likelihood of constant-only model. The Wald test 
evaluates the overall significance of the estimated coefficients. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. 
***, **, and * represent 1%, 5%, and 10% significance levels, respectively.  
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Despite these similarities, there are some key differences between factors 
affecting acquisition hazards of small and large banks. Notably, while larger banks with 
lower foreclosed real estate and less efficiency are more attractive targets, acquisition 
hazards of small banks are significantly and negatively associated with bank size, bank 
age and the fraction of jumbo certificate of deposits in their asset portfolios. 
Furthermore, although no robust relationship is found between local economic 
conditions and acquisition hazards, the results indicate that falling house prices and 
rising personal income significantly reduced likelihood of acquisition for small banks.  
In addition, one of the most striking findings of this study is the asymmetric 
impact of capital ratio on time-to-acquisition of small and large banks: large acquired 
institutions tend to have higher equity to asset ratio, while small acquisition targets had 
significantly lower capital ratios and closer to failure. Hannan and Pilloff (2009) argue 
that, on one hand, lower capitalization reflects lower income in the past and signals 
lower efficiency, which may increase the attractiveness of the target. On the other hand, 
higher capitalization may indicate inefficient capital allocation and therefore a well-
capitalised bank can be a very attractive target for acquiring institutions. 
Finally, the results indicate that receiving capital assistance significantly 
increases probability of being acquired across both small and large banks, although the 
impact is slightly higher across small banks. These results are robust across alternative 
TARP indicators and strongly support the second hypothesis of this chapter. 
To summarize, the empirical findings strongly support hypothesis two, which 
postulates that recipient banks are very attractive acquisition targets, regardless of their 
size and financial health, particularly before the repayment of the bailout funds.  
4.6. CONCLUSIONS 
The collapse of real estate bubble in the U.S. triggered severe liquidity shortages 
in many financial institutions exposed to real estate and mortgage backed securities, 
which eventually culminated in a series of unprecedented events in September 2008. As 
a comprehensive response to rapidly deteriorating financial system, the U.S. 
government created the Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP) to bailout the US 
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financial system and restart the economy. Under the TARP, the US Treasury purchased 
preferred stock and equity warrants from qualified institutions to help them survive and 
stimulate lending activities. Using a panel of the U.S. commercial banks over the period 
2007Q1 to 2012Q4, the Cox proportional hazard model is estimated to investigate the 
impact of receiving capital assistance on two different types of bank exits; exit due to 
regulatory closure and exit due to acquisition.   
The empirical results indicate that providing capital assistance enhances survival 
likelihood of large banks, while smaller banks are less likely to avoid regulatory 
closure. Also, capital infusions do not reduce probability of technical insolvency among 
recipient banks, regardless of their size. These results suggest that governmental capital 
assistance serves larger banks much better than their smaller counterparts. Furthermore, 
the empirical results reveal that receiving capital assistance significantly increases 
acquisition likelihood of recipient banks, regardless of their size and financial health. In 
general, these findings suggest that capital infusions do not improve financial stability 
of recipient banks. 
The findings of this chapter have important policy implications for policymakers 
and financial regulators: first, success of likewise programs require more transparency 
in selection of qualified institutions. Qualifying distressed institutions questions 
financial health of other participants and results in market stigmatisation which limits 
their access to liquidity and external funding. Second, government authorities must 
ensure that government funds will be used in the manner they were intended in order to 
avoid creating huge moral hazard incentives as well as opportunistic behaviour among 
recipient institutions. Finally, government bailout of smaller banks does not effectively 
help out of a distressed period unless enough capital is injected before they become 
stressed. One of the main reasons that smaller recipient did not perform well is that 
smaller banks waited much longer and received much less compared to their larger 
counterparts.  
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APPENDIX A4 
Table A4.1. Geographical distribution of US commercial banks as of March 31, 
2007, along with distribution of closed and acquired banks during 2007Q1-
2013Q1. 
Name Banks Closed Acquired  Name Banks Closed Acquired 
Alaska 5 0 1  Montana 76 0 14 
Alabama  152 5 25  North Carolina 80 5 23 
Arkansas 144 2 25  North Dakota 93 0 7 
Arizona 50 11 19  Nebraska 240 2 37 
California 279 32 52  New Hampshire 10 0 5 
Colorado 149 8 52  New Jersey 69 4 14 
Connecticut 24 0 8  New Mexico 48 2 3 
District of Colombia 5 0 1  Nevada 36 10 7 
Delaware 24 0 8  New York 139 4 21 
Florida 270 54 58  Ohio 177 2 30 
Georgia 332 82 57  Oklahoma 256 5 23 
Hawaii 7 0 0  Oregon 38 6 6 
Iowa 383 1 55  Pennsylvania 168 2 36 
Idaho 15 0 2  Rhode Island 6 0 1 
Illinois 588 50 65  South Carolina 76 5 16 
Indiana 126 2 24  South Dakota 85 1 12 
Kansas 342 8 51  Tennessee 193 3 21 
Kentucky 197 0 26  Texas 607 7 97 
Louisiana 142 2 16  Utah 58 6 4 
Massachusetts 51 0 10  Virginia 109 2 22 
Maryland 70 4 19  Vermont 14 0 4 
Maine 12 0 4  Washington 83 17 13 
Michigan 154 10 31  Wisconsin 265 6 31 
Minnesota 426 20 52  West Virginia 64 0 7 
Missouri 334 15 36  Wyoming 42 1 9 
Mississippi 92 2 7  Total 8449 452 1074 
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5. CHAPTER FIVE 
CONCLUDING REMARKS 
Throughout history, banking systems around the world have faced a wide range 
of difficult challenges including banking crises. In response to these distressing events, 
banking literature substantially extended to (i) identify major contributors to banking 
distress at both country-level (see Laeven and Valencia, 2008; Reinhart and Rogoff, 
2009) and bank-level (see Wheelock and Wilson, 2000; DeYoung, 2003), (ii) provide 
policy implications to limit riskiness of banks and banking system by designing early 
warning systems (see Martin, 1977; Demirgüc-Kunt and Detragiache, 2005; Kaminsky 
and Reinhart, 1999), and (iii) design appropriate policy tools to resolve banking crises 
(see Diamond and Rajan, 2002, 2005). Parallel to the banking literature, banking 
regulations also evolved enormously to ensure stability and soundness of banking 
systems. Notably, the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS) established the 
most comprehensive international regulatory framework to address major risk 
components, including market risk and credit risk, in banking institutions. 
In spite of all these advances in banking literature and regulations, in late 2000s, 
the United States faced subprime mortgage crisis, which rapidly spread throughout the 
globalised and interconnected world. The main implication of this crisis was that the 
complex banking regulations failed to identify and limit riskiness of the banking 
systems at both domestic and international levels. It is therefore not surprising that a 
tremendous number of studies have focused on the causes (see Demyanyk and Van 
Hemert, 2011; Acharya et al., 2009), consequences of contagion effects (see Mian and 
Sufi, 2009; Longstaff, 2010), and remedies of the recent crisis (see Diamond and Rajan, 
2009; Freedman et al., 2010).  
Nevertheless, there remains substantial uncertainty on how reliable quantitative 
models are in measuring risk, how systematic factors such as house prices undermine 
the stability of banking system, and how effectively government bailout programs can 
combat the banking crisis. This thesis contributes to this literature and includes three 
empirical studies to address the abovementioned questions. Notably, forecasting 
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performance of alternative value at risk (VaR) models, the linkage between house price 
fluctuations and evolution of nonperforming loans (NPL), and the impact of capital 
infusions on stability of recipient banks are evaluated in this study. In essence, the last 
three chapters can be considered as an empirical investigation of market risk, credit risk, 
and liquidity risk in the U.S. banking institutions. Throughout this thesis, various 
econometric approaches are used. These models include univariate and multivariate 
time series analysis, dynamic panel data models, and survival analysis. Below an outline 
of the thesis is given. 
Chapter 2 contributes to the existing literature by investigating the performance 
of alternative value at risk (VaR) models in measuring riskiness of international equity 
portfolios. Many large banking institutions have become highly involved in market-
based activities (see Laeven et al., 2014). In addition, over the last two decades and due 
to deregulations, technological advances, and globalisations of financial markets, many 
large banks have expanded their market-based activities across the world to benefit from 
portfolio diversifications and potentially higher rates of return. Mismanagement and 
miscalculation of market risk of international equity portfolios in such banks can pose 
severe threat to the existence of the bank and stability of the global financial system. In 
general, an international equity portfolio is composed of two main risk components: 
equity risk and foreign exchange rate risk. Accordingly, two alternative approaches can 
be used to estimate VaR threshold of international equity portfolios: (i) applying 
univariate VaR models on portfolio returns, and (ii) applying multivariate VaR models 
on portfolio’s risk components.  
In Chapter 2, a variety of GARCH type models are employed to model 
conditional volatilities in both univariate and multivariate frameworks while constant 
conditional correlation (CCC), dynamic conditional correlation (DCC), and asymmetric 
dynamic conditional correlation (ADCC) are applied to model conditional correlations 
in multivariate framework. Using these alternative approaches, international portfolio 
VaR thresholds are calculated in eight countries and during both pre-crisis period, from 
January 2003 to December 2006, and crisis period, from January 2007 to December 
2010. Once VaR thresholds are measured, various backtesting criteria are applied to 
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evaluate the performance of alternative VaR models from both regulatory and risk 
management perspectives. 
From regulatory perspective, the empirical findings of Chapter 2 reveal that 
most parametric VaR models have satisfactory performance with low number of 
violations during pre-crisis period, while the number of violations, mean deviation of 
violations, and maximum deviation of violations dramatically increase during crisis 
period. More importantly, most VaR models fail to pass BCBS criteria during crisis 
period, indicating that parametric VaR models are not very reliable during financial 
crises. Another interesting finding of this chapter is that performance of alternative VaR 
models widely vary across countries and no benchmark model can be selected as a 
superior VaR model across all countries. However, portfolio VaR models incur lower 
number of violations compared to univariate VaR models, while DCC and ADCC 
models perform better than CCC models during crisis period. Furthermore, applying 
Student-t distribution as distributional assumption for VaR models leads to more 
accurate and conservative VaR estimations over both sub-sample periods. While 
regulators are mainly interested in the number of violations of internal VaR models, risk 
managers are primarily concerned about goodness of fit and capital requirements of 
VaR models. From risk management perspective, it is found that portfolio models 
produce slightly higher regulatory capital requirement and weaker goodness of fit across 
most sample countries, while most univariate models fail to pass the BCBS criteria 
during crisis period. Furthermore, mixed empirical evidence is found on the 
performance of alternative portfolio models across sample countries. 
The findings of Chapter 2 have several important implications for regulators and 
risk managers. First and foremost, the empirical results reveal that existent parametric 
VaR models are not reliable during crisis periods. This in turn indicates that despite all 
advances in volatility and VaR modelling over the last three decades, further 
investigations are of paramount importance to develop better performing models during 
crisis periods. Moreover, in response to weak performance of VaR models, the BCBS 
(2009) revised its market risk framework by adding stressed VaR to capital 
requirements to ensure stability of large international banks. However, the revised 
framework significantly increases the capital requirements imposes excessive capital 
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requirements for banks, which eventually leads to inefficient capital allocation in banks 
(see Rossignolo et al., 2012). Therefore, further research is required to design a more 
appropriate capital requirement framework before stressed VaR is officially 
incorporated into regulations. Future works might also focus on designing a more 
comprehensive backtesting framework to overcome current issues with existent 
backtesting models. Finally, the empirical study presented in Chapter 2 can be 
developed by considering larger international portfolios containing more assets and risk 
components.   
Chapter 3 puts under econometric scrutiny the linkage between house price 
fluctuations and evolution of nonperforming loans (NPL) in the U.S. banking 
institutions. The recent subprime mortgage crisis in the U.S. was originated with the 
collapse of house price bubble. The U.S. banking institutions dramatically suffered from 
falling house prices while they were the primary contributors to the creation of the 
housing bubble through their lending policies in pre-crisis period. This indicates that 
house price fluctuations can be considered as a key indicator that can systematically 
undermine the stability of individual banks and thereby the stability of the whole 
banking system. The performance of banks’ Loan portfolios are expected to be tightly 
associated with house price fluctuations as (i) real estate loans often form a large portion 
of loan portfolios, and (ii) real estate is widely used as collateral for other types of loans 
(see Goodhart and Hofmann, 2008; Davis and Zhu, 2009). Nonetheless, previous 
studies, including Reinhart and Rogoff (2009), and Barrell et al. (2010), have mainly 
focused on the linkage between house prices and stability of the banking systems while 
far less is known about how house price fluctuations affect quality of loan portfolios in 
individual banks. Using a large panel of the insured banking institutions in the United 
States, dynamic panel data models are applied in Chapter 3 to investigate the linkage 
between house price fluctuations and evolution of nonperforming loans over three 
periods; the pre-crisis period of 1999-2005, the crisis period of 2006-2012, and full 
sample period of 1999-2012. This study is further developed by investigating this 
relationship across different loan categories, different types of banks, different bank 
size. 
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The empirical findings of Chapter 3 reveal that NPL dynamics across U.S. banks 
can be explained by a mixture of idiosyncratic and systematic factors. In particular, it is 
found that evolution of NPL is highly associated with the swings in house prices, while 
the impact of house price fluctuations on NPL is stronger during crisis period. 
Furthermore, there is strong empirical evidence that the impact of house price 
fluctuations widely vary across different loan categories, with real estate loans being the 
most responsive loan category. Moreover, different loan categories respond differently 
to idiosyncratic factors. In other words, while real estate NPL is most sensitive to loan 
portfolio concentration, commercial NPL and consumer NPL are highly responsive to 
bank size. The empirical results also show that sensitivity of loan portfolios to house 
price fluctuations and other NPL determinants varies across savings institutions and 
commercial banks. Finally, it is found that falling house prices have greater impact on 
the evolution of NPL in large banks during crisis period, while large banks are also 
more sensitive to business cycle fluctuations.   
The empirical work presented in Chapter 3 is among first studies on the linkage 
between house prices and stability of individual banks and further analyses are no doubt 
needed. Future works might assess the impact of house prices on the quality of capital 
in banks. It is also interesting to evaluate the impact of house price fluctuations and 
funding resources of banks on their riskiness and lending behaviour. Furthermore, one 
of the main findings of Chapter 3 is the asymmetric linkage between house prices and 
quality of loan portfolios. Therefore, further research is required to investigate the 
potential nonlinear relationship between house prices and NPL. This in turn requires 
developing a dynamic threshold framework, which is beyond the scope of this thesis. 
Finally, the impact of house price fluctuations on the quality of loan portfolios can be 
investigated at loan-level, which has been largely neglected due to data constraints. 
Chapter 4 examines how effectively government bailout programs can combat 
the banking crisis. The U.S. financial system faced an unprecedented liquidity crisis in 
September 2008 when a series of distressing events occurred in various key industries. 
As a comprehensive response, the U.S. government applied a wide range of policy tolls 
to combat the crisis. In particular, the U.S. government created the troubled asset relief 
program (TARP) to stem the panic and restore confidence in the U.S. financial system, 
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with special focus given to the banking system. The capital purchase program (CPP) 
was then launched as an initial program under TARP to purchase preferred stock and 
equity warrants from qualified institutions to help them survive and stimulate lending 
activities. However, the success of capital infusion programs has been challenged by 
many pundits and researchers (see Diamond and Rajan, 2005; Farruggio et al., 2013). 
Using a panel of the US commercial banks over the period 2007Q1 to 2012Q4, the Cox 
proportional hazard model is applied in Chapter 4 to investigate the impact of receiving 
capital assistance on two different types of bank exits; exit due to regulatory closure and 
exit due to acquisition. 
The empirical results of this study indicate that providing governmental capital 
assistance to banks during periods of banking crisis do not enhance the probability of 
avoiding technical insolvency. However, larger recipient banks might avoid regulatory 
closure, perhaps due to better regulatory and political connections. This in turn indicates 
that governmental capital assistance serves larger banks much better than their smaller 
counterparts. It is also found that recipient banks are more attractive acquisition targets, 
regardless of their size and financial health. Overall, the empirical findings of Chapter 4 
reveal that capital infusions do not enhance financial stability of the recipient banks. 
Considering the key role that government policy tools play in restoring stability 
during periods of banking crisis, further research is needed in this line of literature 
beyond any doubt. Future works can be developed in several directions. First, it is 
essential to design a framework for the selection of qualified institutions in capital 
injection programs. Second, better instruments of intervention are essential for smaller 
banking institutions as their credit rating adjustment process might be very slow, while 
they are vulnerable to public stigma. Third, new guidelines are required to monitor risk 
taking behaviour of the recipient banks to reduce moral hazard incentives and to ensure 
that government funds are used in the manner they are intended to. In addition, 
empirical studies can evaluate indirect effects of capital infusion programs on the 
stability of the banking system. In particular, special focus can be given to competition 
distortion in the banking system due to implementation of government bailout programs 
and its impact on risk taking behaviour of individual banks.  
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